Impact of Asian Soft Power in Latin America - China and South Korea as Emerging Powers in the Subcontinent by Milanowitsch, Bianca Katharina & Derichs, Claudia (Prof. Dr.)
 
 
Impact of Asian Soft Power in Latin America - China 
and South Korea as Emerging Powers in the 
Subcontinent 
 
Inauguraldissertation 
zur Erlangung des Grades einer Doktorin der Philosophie 
 
dem Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
und Philosophie 
 
der Philipps-Universität Marburg 
 
vorgelegt von 
 
 
 
Bianca Milanowitsch 
 
aus Ulm 
 
2018  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Vom Fachbereich Gesellschaftswissenschaften 
und Philosophie als Dissertation angenommen am   03.04.2017  
 
Tag der Disputation/mündlichen Prüfung   03.04.2017 
 
Gutachter                 Prof. Dr. Claudia Derichs 
 
        Prof. Dr. Hubert Zimmermann 
     
Acknowledgements 
 
I would like to express my gratitude to Prof. Dr. Claudia Derichs. Her knowledge, 
helpful advice and constructive feedback helped me carry out my research during these 
past five years. 
 
Thank you to Marburg University Research Academy (MARA) for backing my field 
research in the year 2014, during which I was able to collect crucial data and to carry 
out interviews. I would also like to express my gratitude towards the experts I was able 
to interview in Chile. Thank you, Karina Fernanda Piña Pérez, for your help before 
and during my stay in Santiago. 
 
Finally, I cannot express in such a short space how grateful I am to my mother for her 
never-ending help and encouragement throughout all these years, and to Said for 
always being my side and supporting me in everything I do.  
 
 
  
Contents 
 
List of abbreviations         i 
1. Introduction         1 
   1.1 Preliminary remarks       1 
   1.2 Current state of research and theoretical approach   4 
      1.2.1 Power        4 
      1.2.2 Hard and soft power      6 
      1.2.3 Great and emerging powers     11 
      1.2.4 Middle and regional powers     14 
   1.3 Research design       16 
      1.3.1 Units of analysis       16 
      1.3.2 Research goals and methodology      17 
      1.3.3 Time frame        20 
   1.4 Structure        20 
2. Power constellations in the international system and in the 
context of East Asia        21 
   2.1. China: Emerging power      21 
      2.1.1 China´s power resources and implementation of its soft power  
   Strategy        24 
      2.1.2 China´s role in East Asia       30 
   2.2 South Korea: Middle power      33 
      2.2.1 South Korea´s power resources and implementation of its soft 
power strategy: The Korean Wave      34 
      2.2.2 South Korea´s role in East Asia     43 
   2.3 Preliminary conclusions      47 
3. Latin America meets East Asia      49 
   3.1 Latin America. From US backyard to independent subcontinent 50 
   3.2 Chinese presence in Latin America     52 
      3.2.1 Chinese soft power in the region     57 
   3.3 A growing presence in the subcontinent: South Korea´s foreign 
         relations with Latin America      59 
      3.3.1 South Korean soft power in the region    62 
   3.4 Preliminary conclusions      67 
4. Case study Chile        69 
  
   4.1 Chile-China and Chile-South Korea     70 
   4.2. Operationalization of soft power     72 
      4.2.1 Soft power use by the government     76 
        a. Treaties and MOUs       76 
        b. Cultural institutions       80 
        c. Cultural events       82 
        d. Summary        85 
      4.2.2 Non-governmental soft power     85 
        a. Chinese and South Korean immigrants    85 
        b. Cultural institutions       89 
        c. Cultural events       92 
        d. Summary        94 
      4.2.3 Combined efforts       95 
        a. Education: Universities, research centers and schools  95 
        b. Media presence       101 
        c. South Korean and Chinese companies    104 
        d. Summary        105 
   4.3 Conclusions drawn from the case study    107 
5. Conclusions and outlook       109 
Bibliography         116 
 
i 
 
List of abbreviations 
 
 
APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
 
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
 
BRICS: Acronym for Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa 
 
CI: Confucius Institute 
 
CP (in citations sometimes CCP): Communist Party of China 
 
C-Pop: Chinese pop 
 
ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
 
IDB: Inter-American Development Bank 
 
IR: International Relations 
 
FTA/FTAs: Free Trade Agreement(s) 
 
Gastrodiplomacy: Culinary (gastronomic) diplomacy 
 
Hanban: Zhongguo Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi (中国国家汉
语国际推广领导小组办公室)/Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign 
Language (NOTCFL) 
 
HSK: Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (汉语水平考试)/Chinese Proficiency Test 
 
J-Pop: Japanese pop 
 
K-drama: Korean drama 
 
K-Pop: Korean pop 
 
Mercosur: Mercado Común del Sur/Mercado Comum do Sul/Southern Common Market 
 
MCST: Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism 
 
MIKTA: Acronym for Mexico-Indonesia-South Korea-Turkey-Australia 
 
MOFA: Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
 
MOU: Memorandum Of Understanding 
 
OAS: Organization of American States 
 
PRC: People´s Republic of China 
 
ii 
 
R&D: Research & Development 
 
SI: King Sejong Institute 
 
UN: United Nations 
 
UNESCO: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
 
US/USA: United States of America 
 
TV: Television 
 
WTO: World Trade Organization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Preliminary remarks  
  
International relations research about Latin America1 has generally focused on political 
and domestic instabilities, a shift towards socialist political systems, and on the changes 
the subcontinent has undergone in the last decades. Until recently, most events occurring 
in the region were categorized under the umbrella of the “US backyard” notion, referring 
to the sphere of influence created by the North American country, for example through 
military (Möller, 2006, p. 244, Nolte, 2010, p. 888 and Leiteritz, 2012, p. 76) and political 
interventions (Armony, 2012, p. 195). With more and more Latin American countries 
becoming important international actors and the hegemonic influence of the US diluting,2 
the region´s international focus is beginning to shift (Sun, 2013, n.p.). 
  
Latin American countries have accumulated enough expertise to carry out extensive 
relations, including with actors who shared similar experiences or growth models in the 
past. Brazil, for instance, is part of BRICS (Tank, 2012, n.p.). 3  “These countries´ 
increasing might in the global economy was (and still is) believed to have the potential to 
reshape the global economic and political landscape of the twenty-first century” (Hart 
and Jones, 2010, p. 65).  
 
Mexico is part of MIKTA.4 It shares with the other countries common starting points as 
rising economies and middle powers (Fisher 2014, p. 4),5 while taking advantage of the 
“significant changes [that] have taken place in the distribution of political power in Latin 
American countries over the past decade, at both national and hemispheric level” (Varas, 
2009, p. 2). It is through Latin America´s “‘multidirectional diplomacy’” (Dosch, 2010, 
p.5) that a door has opened for new actors to step in. One of them is East Asia.6  
                                                 
1 A region that in this study refers to South and Central America (UNSTATS 2013). Caribbean countries 
such as Cuba are also mentioned as part of Latin America. 
2 Some authors blame that situation on an “imperial overstretch”, meaning that the US´ ” global interests 
and obligations is nowadays larger than the country´s power to defend them all simultaneously” (Kennedy, 
1988, p. 666). 
3 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 
4 Mexico, Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Turkey and Australia-. 
5 These concepts will be explained in the current state of research. 
6 According to the United Nations Statistic Divisions, East Asia is composed of China, Hong Kong, Macao, 
Japan, Mongolia, North and South Korea (UNSTATS 2013). 
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That last region has built up an immense growth potential, above all in the economic 
sphere (Chellaney, 2006, p. 17 and Kennedy, 2008, p. 568). Research has consequently 
focused for several decades on its significance as a growth hub within the 
international system. Embedded within the East Asian region are China and South Korea. 
Both countries followed a similar path starting in the 1960s and 1970s, which transformed 
them completely and which led to their current position within the international system 
and, as will be seen, to their rise as emerging powers in Latin America. 
 
China had been the most advanced country in the world, with its fleet, discoveries and 
scientific inventions (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 21-26) until its eventual encounter with more 
powerful European counterparts (Hayes, 2012, pp. 17-20 and pp. 49-54). Events during 
the 20th century, such as Maoism, again limited the country´s international relations 
(Kissinger, 2012, p. 208) due to inward-oriented growth policies. With Deng Xiaoping 
leading the country in the 1970s, future changes included on the one hand less ideological 
- i.e., pragmatic - premises (Hayes, 2012, p. 49, Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
Chile, 2010a, p. 13 and Brown, 2010, p. 85). On the other hand, the traditionally 
communist economic model morphed into the so-called socialism with Chinese 
characteristics7 (Möller, 2006, p. 128 and Kang, 2012, p. 919) through the open-door 
policy that “welcomed foreign capital and businesses (...) [and] infused life into the 
hobbled economy” (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 72).  
 
The Four Modernizations that were carried out domestically and internationally in fields 
such as the economy, defense and technology (Kissinger, 2012, p. 346, Khanna, 2009, p. 
302 and Schaeff, 1994, p. 78) did also play an important role. The country aimed at 
applying capitalist methods (Hartmann, 2006, p. 71 and p. 73) to reenter the world stage, 
leaving its worldwide isolation behind by reforming and changing itself (Schaeff, 1994, 
p. 78). Nowadays, China can be considered almost sui generis as it has achieved, in the 
shortest amount of time, an unprecedented growth of its previously weak economy 
(China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 3). As an example, it “now has a tangible (...) 
presence in Latin America that spans politics, economics, and regions” (China Latin 
America Task Force, 2006, p. 1). Due to China´s growth on a worldwide scale and 
                                                 
7 “[M]eaning capitalism with an element of state ownership” (Hauser, 2009, p. 12). Other terms are also 
used, for example socialist market economy (Meder, 2000, pp. 101-102), hybrid, mixed economy (Haug, 
2006, p. 2) as well as “modified” Marxism (Kennedy, 1988, p. 578). 
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because it is the vanguard for East Asian growth and emerging presence in the 
subcontinent, I chose the country as one of the cases to be analyzed. For a comparative 
research, a second case was necessary. 
 
South Korea may seem inconspicuous when compared to its regional neighbors, but it is 
full of potential. The country is a regional economic hub of its own as well as an exporter 
of technology and expertise (Pascha, 2005, pp. 106-107) even though it is surrounded by 
American, Japanese and Chinese presence (Lee, 2005, p. 15 and Kim and Jaffe, p. 64). 
Similarly to China, South Korea´s current position on the international stage was achieved 
after a radical transformation. 
 
The Korean War (1950-1953) was followed by the “Miracle on the Han River”, which 
marked the beginning of a quick development of the country´s industry and thoroughly 
export-oriented growth (Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989, p. 2). The authoritarian regime 
of Park Chun Hee, in the 1960s and 1970s, accelerated the country´s development, for 
example by supporting family-run companies that became enormous conglomerates 
known as chaebols (Castells, 1992 p. 38 and Kang, 1993, p. 79). His dictatorship ended 
in 1979 (Shin, Chang, Lee and Kim, 2007, pp. 9, 22 and 25) and had at that point already 
changed South Korea´s role in the world. This happened during the same period as and 
in a similar way to Deng Xiaoping´s Four Modernizations. South Korea´s growth from a 
war-torn country (Steers, Shin and Ungson, 1989, p. 2) to one of the most important 
economies worldwide has enabled it to gain respect as a model of growth, and to establish 
multiple links with Latin America. These include commercial, cultural, political and 
economic exchanges. 
  
Both China and South Korea have spent decades broadening the presence of their cultural 
institutions (Ryoo, 2009, p. 137). More recently, they have begun exporting their culture 
strategically through policies that build on existing perceptions and knowledge of and 
about them (Yang, 2003, xi-xii and Russell, 2008, xii). Latin America is at the receiving 
end, being shaped by these events (Roett, 2010, p. 206) that are hidden behind economic 
developments and high politics.8  
                                                 
8 The term “high politics [refers to] security and survival (...) low politics [to] economic and social affairs” 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 106). For Keohane and Nye the term high politics includes security and 
survival, matched directly with military force (Keohane & Nye 2007, p. 24). 
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While liberal theory of IR states that countries are changing their power tools and are 
turning to low politics, high politics and the so called “hard power”9  still dominate 
research on Latin America and on East Asia. Culture, along with related foreign policy 
actions, are mostly forgotten even though “[c]ultural policy, backed by relative cultural 
attractiveness, is [an] element of national power” (Robinson, 1994, p. 580). This so called 
“soft power”, a concept introduced into international relations (IR) theory by Joseph Nye 
in the 1990s, will be explained, analyzed and further defined throughout the study as it 
represents the element I chose to compare the regions of Latin America and East Asia. 
 
1.2 Current state of research and theoretical approach 
 
Two concepts are central to this study: soft power and emerging powers. I will first define 
each of them through an analysis of the current state of research, afterwards depict where 
there has been a lack of academic definition and how it opens a door for an extension of 
these concepts through the research. Additional terms will be defined on their own when 
they become relevant for further analysis. The theory of complex interdependence, part 
of the liberal theories that constitute international relations analysis, was chosen as the 
theoretical approach. 
 
1.2.1 Power 
 
Most concepts used in this research include the word “power”.10 What does power in 
international relations mean?  
 
Power is, foremost, the ability of a country to achieve its goals, purposes and outcomes, 
which signifies a certain degree of control over others (Nye, 1990a, p. 26, Nye, 2004a, p. 
1 and Nye, 1990b, p. 154). Nye further defines power as “the ability to get others to do 
what they otherwise would not do” (Nye, 1990a, p. 26). In international relations, it is 
possible to become powerful either through own efforts or by influencing and controlling 
other actors to achieve outcomes that suit the state´s own goals (Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). If 
a country seeks power, it must first possess the necessary resources, e.g. “economic 
strength” (Nye, 2004a, p. 3).  
                                                 
9 See segment 1.2.2. in this chapter for the definition of that concept. 
10 In fact, for Bilgin and Eliş “there are no relations exempt from power” (Bilgin and Eliş, 2008, p. 15). 
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But there is no agreement among international theory scholars about which elements a 
country should accumulate to be powerful. For Yan, a state´s power can be political, 
economic or military (Yan, 2011b, p. 84). “[P]olitical power is the resource power for 
operating power, military power, economic power, and cultural power” (Yan, 2011b, p. 
101). This would in turn mean that a country without political power cannot harness other 
elements (Yan, 2011b, p. 101).  
 
According to Clemens, military, cultural and economic factors determine the power a 
country has (Clemens, 1998, p. 187). For Nye, “technology, education, and economic 
growth are becoming more (…), whereas geography, population, and raw materials are 
becoming less important” (Nye, 1990a, p. 29). The author clarifies that power has 
changed over time as the resources countries have needed vary according to the period 
studied. Technology and economic force are now decisive for the success of current states, 
while those in the 18th century depended on their population, due to the existing tax 
system (Nye, 1990b, p. 154). Nowadays, different power constellations enrich the 
international system. For instance, resource poor countries like Japan have positioned 
themselves internationally (Menzel, 2004, p. 195).  
 
Yet, having power alone does not guarantee that goals will be met or that existing 
resources will suffice. “[S]ome countries will make the most of their potential while 
others waste their assets” (Clemens, 1998, p. 200). This means that a weaker actor could 
become stronger or stronger powers could lose their previous influence when the context 
changes (Nye, 2004a, pp. 2-3 and Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). “Power conversion is a basic 
problem (...). Some countries are better than others at converting their resources into 
effective influence (...). Power conversion is the capacity to convert potential power, as 
measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed behavior of others” 
(Nye, 1990a, p. 27).11 
 
Two possibilities for countries to convert potential and exert power are the foreign policy 
tools of hard and soft power.12 
                                                 
11 See Clemens (1998, p. 147) for conversion power, its influence on achieving hard power and Meder 
(2000, p. 96) for his analysis of political power derived from economic one. How can an economic power 
turn into a political one?. 
12 A country can decide between using coercion and threats, sanctions could also be added, or attracting and 
coopting other countries (Nye, 2004a, p. 2). 
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1.2.2 Hard and soft power 
 
Hard power determined international relations theory in the past (Lamus, 2011, p. 78). 
According to realism, the traditional current of IR theory, (hard) power could be acquired 
through military means only, through aggressive politics as well as through territorial 
expansion (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 103). Realism emphasizes characteristics of 
the international system such as predominance of the coherent and unitary state, 
integration between states when it “serves the national interest of the most powerful” 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 23), acting without moral principles to prioritize one´s safety 
(Donnelly, 2005, p. 31-35) and struggle for power (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 24). For 
a country to be and to remain powerful it must stand alone and prevent others from taking 
advantage of its weakness, for example through not letting its hard power become 
diffused (Bell, 2011, p. 12).  
 
Opposing this view, Liberal IR theory states that “welfare—not security—is becoming 
the primary goal and concern of states” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 107) even though 
military power and economic pressure still matter for most states (Vasilevskytė, 2013, p. 
145). Liberal theory comprises distinctive strands (Burchill, 2005, p .55), each with their 
own analytical core area. As a theoretical approach, I chose liberal complex 
interdependence theory, which was developed in the 1970s. It affirms that countries 
permanently depend, for their international standing and in situations of reciprocal effects 
(Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 8), on the actions of other actors (Jackson and Sørensen, 
2007, p. 44 and p. 103) and on “international transactions–flow of money, goods, people 
and messages across international boundaries” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 9). 
 
Within complex interdependence, not only mutual benefit is possible. In dependence 
situations, like those between developing and industrialized countries (Keohane and Nye, 
1977, p. 9), one country benefits more than the other and the weaker depends on the 
actions of the stronger for survival. Events in one country might even initially implicate 
and affect one actor, then spread to its neighbors, region and eventually to the 
international system (Fujita, 2013, p. 3). Interdependence will “always involve costs (...) 
but it is impossible to specify a priori whether the benefits of a relationship will exceed 
the costs. This will depend on the values of the actors as well as on the nature of the 
relationship” (Keohane and Nye, 1977, pp. 9-10).  
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States are understood as actors with a distinct agenda in foreign relations and international 
politics that varies according to needs: they can either cooperate or compete, depending 
on their current priorities (Clemens, 1998, p. 32). Because even aspects such as cultural 
policies and negotiating skills do matter, it has become more difficult for states to decide 
on how to carry out a coherent foreign policy (Keohane and Nye, 1977, p. 27). Within 
that “absence of hierarchy among issues” (Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 44) “military 
force is not used by governments toward other governments (...). Military force could, for 
instance, be irrelevant to resolving disagreements on economic issues of an alliance” 
(Keohane & Nye, 2007, p. 25). Using military force is becoming more and more costly 
and its consequences uncertain (Nye, 1990b, pp. 154-156). If a country does not respect 
given rules, it will be shunned by others who might even resort to penalties (Burchill, 
2005, p. 66).  
 
For countries to achieve their goals, another alternative to exert influence and power 
(Jackson and Sørensen, 2007, p. 44) is needed. This is where soft power steps in.13 Soft 
power is “the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or 
payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country´s culture, political ideals, and 
policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is 
enhanced” (Nye, 2004a, p. x).  
 
Soft power is composed of resources that produce attraction, through which a country can 
“shape the preferences of others” (Ernst & Young, p. 4) and co-opt them into changing 
their behavior towards itself (Norris, 2010, p. 1). In short, a state with enough soft power 
dominates or defines the agenda of another actor (Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). “Ultimately, 
nations with the greatest soft power find that citizens of other countries aspire to share 
their values and institutions, and leaders of foreign countries view their policies as 
legitimate and want to follow their leads” (Kurlantzick, 2005, p. 420). Seeking the 
expansion of power requires convincing others without the use of coercive power because 
if too much of it is deployed, “attraction can turn to repulsion” (Nye, 2004a, p. x).14  
                                                 
13Although the term “soft power” was first coined by Nye, literature states that it is based on previous 
concepts. According to Pan, “[t]he term can be seen as an extension and development of Carr´s (1954) idea 
of ‘power over opinion’ and Lukes´ (1974) ‘third dimension of power’, both shed light on how the 
attractiveness of a nation´s culture, ideals, policies (...) give it the capacity to persuade other nations to 
willingly adopt its goals” (Pan, 2012, p. 23). Previous ideas, including the constructivist discussion about 
the creation of ideas or norms, did not become as well-known as Nye´s, because he turned them into an 
international instrument of foreign policy (Janelli and Yim, 2007, p. 1). 
14 As an example, the US is losing its position as a great power, its soft power has notably weakened while 
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Attraction and admiration do not necessarily have to produce the outcomes a country had 
imagined beforehand (Nye, 2004a, p. 6). Instead, they depend on the subjective 
perception of the recipients of the policy carried out internationally. Power outcome 
varies greatly, more than in the case of hard power (McClory, 2010, p. 7). An example 
would be Japan´s anime and manga industry. Young people all over the world are 
attracted to Japanese culture, even travel to the country and learn the language. However, 
this does not mean that governments in countries like China will start liking Japan.  
 
According to Nye, a country´s soft power consists of three categories: “[c]ulture (in places 
where [a country] is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at 
home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having 
moral authority)” (Nye, 2004a, p. 11).15 This study will place an emphasis on cultural soft 
power. As will be seen, culture comprises far more facets than those mentioned by Nye.16 
His definition of culture includes “high culture such as literature, art, and education (...) 
and popular culture, which focuses on mass entertainment” (Nye, 2004a, p. 11). Culture 
turns into soft power when it manages to attract other countries’ populations and 
governments, but it is also important to keep in mind that different contexts lead to 
different degrees of power conversion (Nye, 2004a, p. 12).  
 
Countries that cannot rely purely on their appeal, their values and their culture to attract 
others, can also choose to combine pressure with high politics for example offering free 
trade agreements on the one hand and exchanges in the cultural and educational field on 
the other hand. To achieve a perfect or even sufficient combination is difficult, but if 
managed, power can be enhanced, and the desired outcomes be attained (Kounalakis and 
Simonyi, 2011, p. 9). Current literature suggests that countries should resort to that “smart 
power” (Nye, 2002, p. 34).  
 
Wilson defines smart power as the combination “of hard (…) and soft power in ways that 
are mutually reinforcing such that the actor´s purposes are advanced effectively and 
                                                 
its hard power has gained the upper hand (Nye, 2004a, p. xi). 
15 The concept of soft power can still grow beyond these three categories. Norris writes that “it is possible 
that states can have soft power sources outside those which Nye advanced; insofar as the potential soft 
power resource is attractive and influences another state by co-opting its behavior” (Norris, 2010, p. 1).  
16  Other authors and institutions, i.e., the British Council include additional sides to culture in an 
international context, for example sport, food and religion (Holden, 2013, p. 3). As will be seen in the case 
study, culture can also be linked to education (Janelli and Yim, 2007, p. 1). 
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efficiently” (Wilson, 2008, p. 110). Smart power combines command power and co-
optive power (Nye, 2004a, p. x-xiii and p. 7 and Lee, 2009, p. 6). The first one is defined 
as ‘the ability to change what others do’ and relies on coercion, usually through military 
force, or inducement, usually through payment.” (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 5). The second 
one, co-optive power, is “the ability to shape what others want–can rest on the 
attractiveness of one´s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of 
political choices” (Nye, 2004a, p. 7) of others. Smart power has been criticized for the 
lack of specification on the interconnection that persists between hard and soft power (Lai 
and Lu, 2012, p. 4). 
 
Soft power has also received much criticism, due to several existing theoretical and 
practical flaws. 
  
The first issue is that Nye has conceptionalized that tool without operationalizing it, which 
means that it is so flexibly described that it is still vague (Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). The 
author himself writes that “attraction often has a diffuse effect, creating general influence 
rather than producing an easily observable specific action” (Nye, 2004a, p. 16). How can 
soft power be measured if, for example “it is almost impossible to establish the causal 
chain between a country´s attraction and specific policy outcomes” (Lee, 2009, p. 7)? 
Which categories can be useful to split soft power into measurable units? How do other 
power resources, for example economic strength,17  have an influence on soft power 
growth? And can culture be measured at all?18  
 
This study splits cultural soft power into several categories (benchmarks) and determines 
whether this kind of soft power is being employed as a foreign policy tool in the 
subcontinent. 
 
The second flaw in Nye´s theoretical approach is equating soft power to great power 
politics, which reduces the use of that tool to already powerful countries. The author fails 
to establish a congruent proposition for smaller or weaker countries to take advantage of 
                                                 
17 For Nye, “economic prowess contributes not only to wealth but also to reputation and attractiveness” 
(Nye, 2004a, p. 33). 
18 That same question is posed in international relations theory and in other study areas too. Hopper asks 
“can the sheer quantity of cultural movements be measured and evaluated in any meaningful way? How do 
we quantify both the vast number and different types of cultural intrusions into any given country or region?” 
(Hopper, 2007, p. 45). 
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their cultural potential as a tool to position themselves internationally. For instance, his 
2004 book about soft power mentions that Norway and Canada possess soft power, which 
would help both countries vis-à-vis stronger neighbors or countries, yet their actions 
depend on the perception of stronger actors (Nye, 2004a, 10).  
 
Nye further affirms that “both countries and nonstate actors, also possess soft power than 
can be used to help or hinder the United States´ achievement of its preferred outcomes” 
(Nye, 2004a, p. 73). Such a statement reflects his persistent Western bias. Furthermore, 
the author does not offer concrete suggestions for countries that want to increase their 
resources by turning them into soft power tools. It is solely mentioned that soft power “is 
available to all countries, and many invest in ways to use soft-power resources to ‘punch 
above their weight’ in international politics” (Nye, 2004a, p. 89). 
 
Through this research, I will show an extended analysis of why and how the soft power 
concept can be applied to other countries besides great powers.  
 
Another important aspect to be considered is that, according to Nye, “popular culture is 
more likely to attract people and produce soft power in the sense of preferred outcomes 
in situations where cultures are somewhat similar rather than widely dissimilar” (Nye, 
2004a, pp. 15-16). Then, the question to be asked is how Asian countries have been able 
to exert soft power in culturally different contexts, specifically in Latin America. This is 
the third aspect I will analyze.  
 
The fourth aspect is that Nye did not sufficiently define what happens when one power 
resource is understood as both hard or soft power, nor extend his research on that topic to 
give sufficient explanations about why this situation presents itself (Lai and Lu, p. 24 and 
Mustonen, 2010, n.p.). In short, Nye “did not provide a clear, logical and persuasive 
explanation to this contradiction” (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 24).19  
 
In an article of 2008 Nye states that the “military can sometimes play an important role 
in the generation of soft power. In addition to (...) power that is generated by its hard 
                                                 
19 For Zheng and Zhang, “there are no absolute soft or hard power resources in world politics. Compared 
to Nye´s static thinking, dynamic thinking is more suitable to be applied in the analysis of the soft or hard 
effectiveness of power resources in international politics” (Lai and Lu, 2012, p. 26). These authors offer a 
helpful insight into alternative methods of differentiating soft and hard power. 
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power capabilities, the military has a broad range of officer exchanges, joint training, and 
assistance programs with other countries in peacetime” (Nye, 2008, p. 106). Nevertheless, 
analysis by the author remains focused on the US and his original definition of hard and 
soft power, which is why this study will aim at further differentiating both concepts from 
another and questioning why foreign policy that is intended to be hard power might be 
perceived as soft, and vice versa.  
 
Finally, one recurrent topic within Nye´s texts that has caused skepticism is the ability of 
governments to generate soft power from existing resources. “Generally, (...) soft-power 
resources are slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard-power 
resources [yet,] the fact that soft-power resources are awkward to wield has not prevented 
governments from trying” (Nye, 2004a, pp. 99-100). At times, soft power reaches the 
target population before the government can start to adapt (Lee, 2015). So, how much 
control do governments indeed have over their soft power? How do they manage to 
achieve the desired attraction and how long does it take for outcomes to be seen? (Nye, 
2004a, p. 17 and p. 99). 
 
Having stated the most important questions related to the conceptualization of soft power 
that will be researched, the next two sections will offer a deeper analysis of the concepts 
of traditional, emerging, middle and regional powers. 
 
1.2.3 Great and emerging powers 
 
Countries with power exertion and acquisition capacities fall into four categories. I 
exclude from this enumeration smaller countries that do not have much international 
influence (Narlikar, 2010, p. 21).  
 
The first category is composed of great (sometimes called traditional) powers. The second 
category consists of emerging powers, the third of regional powers and the fourth of 
middle powers. Some types of power can also overlap. China, for instance, is considered 
a great power, a regional power, and an emerging power, depending on the frame of 
analysis. 
 
Great and established powers (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 70) are those that have achieved 
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a predominant position in the international system, having left behind most obstacles that 
could impede their current position. They dominate in the economic, military, political, 
social and cultural realms. They constitute the core of the international system, “enjoying 
both material power and legitimacy” (Narlikar, 2010, p 7) and become “managers” that 
define mechanisms that will be called upon to create balance within it, such as military 
force or diplomatic arrangements (Østerud, 1992, p. 6). 
 
Such dominant actors, “have usually framed the rules under which interdependency has 
flourished” (Burchill, 2005, p. 67). Therefore, the undergoing decline of the U.S. as a 
hegemonic20 power facilitates new types of interdependence between international actors. 
At the same time, “great powers are now much less inclined to use force to resolve their 
political differences with each other” (Burchill, 2005, p. 82). An opportunity has appeared 
that did not exist before for countries with less hard power resources.  
 
The international system has become more diverse with some countries having welcomed 
the possibility of asserting their power (Varas, 2009, p. 9) through “rapid economic, 
development, and expanding political and cultural influence” (Tank, 2012, n.p.). A 
similar movement took place during decolonization, when countries that were previously 
dominated by great powers had the opportunity to carry out their own regional and 
international relations while having to learn from their newly acquired independence 
(Østerud, 1992, p. 9). Those that manage to take advantage of this situation and of the 
resources they have at their reach, are known as emerging powers.  
 
One concurring definition for this concept is still absent from international relations 
literature (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65 and Strauss, 2012a, p. 135). The fact that each 
author can create his or her own categories to determine what an emerging power is, 
makes it harder to apply it to case studies - a commonality with soft power. I will start the 
analysis of emerging powers by stating the most common categories used in literature to 
define the classification of a country as such. They are:  
 
1. Economic and/or financial strength, as well as potential to continue growing (Tank, 
2012, n.p.). BRICS are the quintessential emerging powers, i.e. strong economic actors 
                                                 
20 Hegemonic meaning here that a country can determine the rules and the agendas of international politics, 
by itself (Nye, 2002, p. 39). 
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who invest in other world regions (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65 and pp. 72-73).  
2. A considerable amount of political power. An important issue for emerging powers is 
how to turn political power into economic power (Tank, 2012, n.p.). 
3. Internal cohesion (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 65), because emerging countries still “face 
major domestic political challenges (...) endemic poverty, major income inequality, 
insufficient infrastructure, regional imbalances (...) and major environmental challenges.” 
(Vogt, 2009, p. 5) 
4. The “ability to contribute to the generation of a revised international order” (Hart and 
Jones, 2010, p. 65), meaning the potential to acquire a more influential position within 
the international system and to challenge the status quo (Tank, 2012, n.p. and Ding, 2010, 
p. 255). This could be done by taking a more active stance in international institutions, 
bloc voting, forming issue-based alliances, providing peacekeeping forces or other types 
of aid during crisis situations (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 66 and 75 and Tank, 2012, n.p.).21  
5. Recognition as an emerging power, by others in the international system (Tank, 2012, 
n.p., Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 15 and Jacob, 2010, p. 145).  
6. Close relations to other emerging powers, at the institutional, regional or bilateral level 
(Varas, 2009, p. 5). If these actors gather, they create a balance within the international 
order (Hart and Jones, 2010, p. 66 and p. 71) and weaken the influence of emerged 
countries (Vogt, 2009, p. 8). More growth and integration into the international system 
entails responsibility and effects like spillovers. While in the past emerging powers could 
only harm themselves with their actions, or within their region, these countries´ actions 
now may reverberate on others (Vogt, 2009, p. 4).  
 
This study will expand the preliminary definition of emerging power stated in this section, 
and punctually define the following two aspects: 
 
The first one is that literature acknowledges a possible rise of countries with economic 
and political power, but neglects a rise through cultural policies. Just as with soft power, 
the emerging power concept has been tailored to great or dominant powers, not to smaller 
or weaker states. Some countries do not participate much in the international system as 
they do not, yet, have the necessary resources at hand. Will they nevertheless be able to 
                                                 
21 Liberal theorists believe that not all emerging powers want to change the established system, but prefer 
free-riding, cooperative instances or a less proactive leadership as well as agenda-setting, and precaution 
(Narlikar, 2010, p. 14 and p. 21). 
14 
 
rise? I would like to bolster the existing groundwork through the comparison of Chinese 
and Korean culture in Latin America. 
 
The second aspect I will question is that China is an emerging power in Asia and Brazil 
in South America, according to the literature on emerging powers. But can Brazil not be 
considered an emerging power in Africa and China an emerging power in Latin America? 
International relations theory neglects a rise of countries in world regions besides their 
own, as well as the characteristics that determine and shape it.  
 
After the introduction of the concept of emerging powers, I will proceed towards the 
analysis of the third and fourth power categories mentioned at the start of this section: 
middle and regional powers. 
 
1.2.4 Middle and regional powers 
 
Literature seldom mentions those countries that are in between emerging and emerged. 
These middle powers are neither great powers, nor are they emerging powers. According 
to realism, it is due to their power resources that they are ranked in the middle of the 
international system; for liberals, their behavior justifies that categorization (Kim, 2012c, 
p. 534). They have limited options and as a result aspire to participate in the world stage 
by achieving a measurable degree of influence, for example as mediators (Flemes, 2007, 
pp. 10-11).  
 
Considering that these states cannot act out by themselves, they mostly prefer to be part 
of groups or of international institutions. Their guiding principle is an active diplomacy, 
or niche diplomacy, which is “the capacity of middle powers to increase their global, 
influence and acceptance through the employment of their specific capabilities (e.g. 
peacekeeping)” (Flemes, 2007, p. 11). According to Kim, soft power is also one type of 
niche (Kim, 2012c, p. 535).  
 
These countries can be differentiated from emerging powers as the latter were “never 
fully integrated into the post-1945 order. Being on the outside looking in has heavily 
conditioned their strategic interests and conceptions of national purpose” (Hart and Jones, 
2010, p. 67). 
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One example of a middle power is South Korea. It owes its title as a “middle nation” to 
its “tenuous position between the two great powers on the parameters of its territory: 
China and Japan.” (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 64). Kim adds the US to actors the East Asian 
country must balance when it carries out its foreign policy (Kim, 2012c, p. 535).  
 
Contrary to middle powers, who need a functional leadership to survive within the 
international system, for example through acting as negotiators or catalyzers (Nolte, 2010, 
p. 892), “regional leadership is more focused on comparatively high military and 
economic capabilities” (Flemes, 2007, p. 11). Middle and regional powers can also be 
differentiated through their responsibility in their own region, which means that the latter 
must be stable in a domestic sense, express their willingness to take care of regional issues 
and their capability do so; they must be accepted by others in the region (Nolte, 2010, p. 
890) as the responsible stakeholder. Just as with emerging powers, regional powers lack 
a unified definition in literature. The word “region itself means something different, 
depending on the scientific approach or discipline and (…) world regions change together 
with their internal dynamics” (Østerud, 1992, p. 2). 
 
In the following paragraphs, I will define what a regional power is and how countries fit 
into that framework. Taken from different approaches (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 8), the 
characteristics that these countries have in common and on which the research will be 
based, are the following: 
 
1. Being part of a specific, delineated region (Østerud, 1992, p. 12 and Nolte, 2010, p. 
889) in which “features of the general states system may be reproduced in miniature” 
(Østerud, 1992, p. 1).  
2. Predominance, great influence (Nolte, 1993, p. 893) and leadership within a 
geographically restricted area (Shim and Flamm, 2002, p. 7), as well as being effective 
by taking actions against possible coalitions in the region (Flemes, 2007, p. 7, Nolte, 2010, 
p. 889 and 892 and Østerud, 1992, p. 12). This category includes geographic, economic 
and political-ideological predominance (Nolte, 2010, p. 893). 
3. Interconnection with the other countries in the region, which allows for commonalities 
such as a “identity or (...) [ a] regional security agenda” (Nolte, 2010, p. 893). That same 
regional power should represent the region in the international sphere, by stating its own 
interests and those of the whole region (Nolte, 2010, p. 893). 
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4. Participation and influence in regional cooperation, governance structures and affairs 
(Nolte, 2010, p. 889 and p. 893), as well as in organizations that “serve as power bases 
for their largest members to project power in world affairs” (Flemes, 2007, p. 7). 
5. Reputation and recognition as a regional power (Østerud, 1992, p. 5). Nolte adds that 
it is also important for a regional power to be recognized by its peers, for example other 
regional powers (Nolte, 2010, p. 893).  
 
A final aspect to be considered is that the concept of regional powers can encompass 
others, i.e., emerging and great powers. As mentioned before, “[o]ften the 
conceptualization of the term lacks clear distinctive characteristics in relation to 
comparable classifications, so that several terms are applied to one and the same country” 
(Shim and Flamm, 2002, p. 7 and Nolte, 2010, p. 883). For example, the US is a regional 
as well as great power, China is an emerging and a regional power, Mexico is a middle 
power in some areas, an emerging power in other cases and a regional power within Latin 
America. 
 
1.3 Research design 
 
1.3.1 Units of analysis  
 
Soft, hard and smart power refer to foreign policy tools or instruments, while the concepts 
of emerging, traditional, small, regional and middle powers refer to a country´s position 
within the international system. A country cannot be an international hard or soft power. 
Instead, it resorts to one of these tools as part of its foreign policy, for example if it wants 
to be a pioneer or a leader.  
 
To position itself as an emerging, regional or another type of power, a country can make 
use of different tools that include military, cultural or economic policies. They are then 
classified according to a spectrum of hard or soft power tools. A country could 
consequently be a regional power, having achieved that status through hard power.  
 
The variables state power (emerging, regional, etc.) and a state´s foreign policy tool (soft 
or smart power) form a circular connection. A country needs hard or soft power to 
position itself. Once having achieved that goal, it becomes stronger and can invest more 
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to further enhance its power tools. Conversely, if a country´s power starts dwindling, it 
starts losing the power of its tools. Foreign policy tools represent the dependent variable. 
On that account, both variables are dependent on each other, influenced by independent 
variables such as other countries´ perceptions, external impacts on the international 
system or changes in the domestic sphere.  
 
Within liberal theory of IR, other actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
populations acting as the recipients of soft power or companies form part of the 
international system. These stakeholders can carry out soft or hard power related activities 
which change their international positioning. In this study, companies and other actors 
are considered part of the network of activities that countries carry out and rely on for the 
enhancement of their foreign policy tools, so that they can determine their position within 
the international system. Thus, states and their foreign policies are my main unit of 
analysis. 
 
1.3.2 Research goals and methodology 
 
With the main elements and concepts of already mentioned, the research question can be 
stated as follows: Has using soft power as a strategic foreign policy tool enabled China 
and South Korea to position themselves as emerging powers in Latin America? The 
corresponding hypothesis is that soft power is a strategic foreign policy that enables both 
countries to position themselves as emerging powers in the subcontinent. The main 
research goal is to further conceptionalize the notion of soft power and to operationalize 
it, using the case study of Chinese and South Korean foreign policy in Chile. A sub goal 
is to expand the definition of emerging powers, as it currently lacks concrete conceptual 
analysis and definition within IR literature. 
 
Data and information for this research were collected via different methods22 within a 
triangulation approach that was chosen because sources vary according to their given 
meaning within the research. For the main body of the study, a combination of literature, 
                                                 
22 Of almost exclusively qualitative nature and using a mixed methods analysis with multiple sources of 
evidence (Yin, 2009, p. 98) to avoid bias. Quantitative data, for example government or university statistics 
are included, but they are not evaluated through quantitative methods. If secondary data are compared or 
put together as new categories, this is done within the case study and as evidential support to show 
tendencies and interpretations. 
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desktop research and secondary data analysis was used to filter all information that could 
be found. For the case study, research material was initially acquired through an extensive 
work with literature and desktop research (secondary sources), qualitative semi-structured 
expert interviews carried out in May 2014 (primary sources), participation in seminars in 
Chile (primary sources), data from e-mail contact with institutions and researchers in 
Chile (primary sources) and finally secondary data analysis, mainly of governmental and 
academic sources in Latin America and in Chile.  
 
The study is a comparative research based on assimilar cases. China and South Korea 
were chosen because of their different historical paths, divergent relations with Latin 
America and distinctive foreign policies, among other reasons. The use of soft power and 
their rise in Latin America is the lens through which both countries are compared.  
 
Within that comparison, I chose a hypothesis testing case study (Levy, 2008, p. 6). That 
single-case, representative and instrumental case was chosen, as the amount of 
information available on China, South Korea in Latin America would have been 
overwhelming for a multiple-case study. Chile was singled out due to its historical links 
to East Asia, within APEC23 and in the economic field (Khanna, 2009, p. 164), because 
of its predominant position in Latin America as one of the closest trade partners of both 
China and South Korea, as well as due to the amount of information available from 
different sources on these topics.  
 
The case study was designed to analyze the local presence of South Korean and Chinese 
soft power. Its aim is to conclude whether China and/or South Korea have become 
emerging powers in the Latin American subcontinent, not primarily how their domestic 
policies allow them to act in a specific way or how they perceive Latin America.  
 
The experts for the interviews24 carried out during the field research in Chile were chosen 
according to their position, own experience within the context of Asian presence in Latin 
America, and according to the knowledge that could contribute towards answering the 
research question, as well as testing the hypothesis. The main actors were government 
                                                 
23 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. 
24 See “List of interviewees and observations” for more information on each of the interviewees. Two of 
the experts asked not to be included either by name or by institution, which is why their association is not 
mentioned or their name was changed. 
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employees (Ministry of foreign relations, Central University), professors (Catholic 
University, Andrés Bello University), nongovernmental institutions (Corporación 
Cruzando el Pacífico) and entrepreneurs (Empresas Chile). 
 
Expert interviews were designed as systematizing (Bogner and Menz, 2009, pp. 64-65), 
in the interest of acquiring as much information and knowledge as possible. While I 
prepared a guideline resembling a database with essential questions to be asked during 
the interviews, new ones were added throughout the field research, when required. 
Consequently, the expert interviews acquired an additional explorative perspective. 
During my stay in Chile, I was also invited to a seminar about binational cooperation with 
China, at the Ministry of foreign relations, was able to research at the library of the 
Confucius Institute of the Catholic University and to attend the opening ceremony of the 
regional office of Hanban in Santiago.25 
 
I adopted the method of content analysis for the case study research (Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea, 2015, p. xx, McNabb, 2010, p. 304). Content analysis is able “to validate 
or extend conceptually a theoretical framework or theory (…). Existing theory or research 
(…) can provide predictions about the variables of interest or about the relationships 
among variables, thus helping to determine the initial coding scheme or relationships 
between codes” (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, p. 1279). Hsieh and Shannon state that this 
method balances different sources such as literature research, interview and observations 
to categorize new information, complement the initial theory or contest it. Data that do 
not fit into the initial categories can become a new category or the subcategory of 
previously created ones. They can also support, contradict or extend the theory on which 
the categories are based on (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005, pp. 1282-1283). 
 
All research carried out for the case study, including the expert interviews and their 
transcriptions, literature, desktop research, secondary data analysis and participation in 
seminars, was coded through categories based on Joseph Nye´s concept of soft power and 
the liberal theory of IR. These categories were subdivided into indicators to 
systematically include all characteristics of the soft power measured. In conclusion, 
comparative research, the research question and the hypothesis, set a limit to the use given 
                                                 
25 Opening ceremony of the Confucius Institute Latin America Regional Center at the Catholic University 
in Santiago de Chile, 12.05.14. 
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to the information categorized through the content analysis, as well as within the 
indicators.  
 
1.3.3 Time frame 
 
One possible time frame for this study would have been between the 1990s and 2016, to 
evaluate the development of the concept of soft power, which was itself defined at the 
beginning of that period. Yet, China´s international and regional rise has been more recent, 
specifically since the country became a member of the World Trade Organization in 2001 
(Permanent Mission of China to the WTO, 2011). South Korea´s cultural soft power has 
skyrocketed since the beginning of the new century, with its middle power tools 
multiplying at a rapid pace. The notion of East Asian soft power in Latin America became 
relevant about 15 years ago, a time during which the subcontinent also began distancing 
itself from the US. Thus, the period between 2005 and 2016 is apt as a time frame. 
Previous dates are briefly mentioned when they are relevant for the research carried out. 
 
1.4 Structure 
 
The study is divided into five chapters.  
 
This first chapter introduced all important concepts and elements, including the research 
question, the goals and the hypothesis, the current state of research, the theory of IR it is 
embedded in and the methodological approach. Defining these components beforehand 
is crucial as the research employs all of them, particularly soft and emerging power.  
 
The second chapter immediately makes use of the results from the introduction. It outlines 
China´s and South Korea´s positioning along with use of power in the global arena and 
in their own regional context. The chapter gives an insight into how both countries have 
risen, and which concepts are most central for an analysis of soft power, as well as of 
other types of power (tools). For example: Which regional factors have shaped China´s 
and South Korea´s foreign policies and soft power? Which are the different types of hard 
and soft power tools that a country has or can have at its disposition? The chapter lays the 
groundwork for the application of the soft and emerging power concepts 
to one specific region. 
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The third chapter continues the regional approach to international relations, but within 
Latin America. Starting with the changes that occurred in the subcontinent during the last 
decade - i.e., an increased East Asian presence, specifically of China and South Korea- 
that chapter prepares the transition towards the analysis of one specific country within 
that regional setting. 
  
The fourth chapter presents the case study Chile. First, the country´s relations to East Asia, 
specifically to China and South Korea are presented. Afterwards, the chapter is divided 
into the categories created with the help of content analysis.  
 
The fifth chapter combines the preliminary conclusions from all previous chapters and 
discusses whether and how the research goals have been achieved, if the hypothesis 
established at the beginning of the study is valid and what the answer to the research 
question is. It also accentuates questions for further research. 
 
2. Power constellations in the international system and in the context of 
East Asia 
  
This chapter analyzes China´s and South Korea´s positioning and use of power within the 
international system and in East Asia. A first step will be made to conceptualize Joseph 
Nye´s soft power theory. I will discuss the tools China and South Korea have at their 
disposition to exert that power and up to which point cultural closeness within the region 
enables both countries to broaden their soft power more effectively. Furthermore, it will 
be shown that Nye differentiates insufficiently between power tools. Part of the research 
is also going to investigate whether soft and hard power are two sides of the same coin.26 
 
2.1. China: Emerging power 
 
Before analyzing China´s power resources, its soft power and its role in East Asia, I would 
like to define why the country can be considered an emerging power, based on the 
categories I formulated in the introduction.27 
                                                 
26 With hard power, for example, being concealed as soft power. 
27 Other authors state that China is not growing and compare its status to that of a middle power which 
poses no threat. “China (...) is consistently overrated as an economy, a world power, and a source of ideas. 
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The first category states that a country is an emerging power when it has economic 
strength and potential for growth. China has set the bar on how another country can 
achieve economic growth while simultaneously positioning itself internationally. China 
was still considered underdeveloped until the 1980s. This was the result of the Maoist 
Great Leap Forward, a catastrophically planned program to transform the country´s 
economy (Hayes, 2012, pp. 73-74), and of the cultural revolution (Kennedy, 1988, p. 515) 
that proposed eliminating vestigial cultural, educational, moral and ideological elements 
and radically abandoning Chinese traditions, to start anew towards the (communist) future 
(Kissinger, 2012, pp. 109-110 and pp. 206-207 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
Chile, 2010a, p. 14).  
 
China began changing after the end of Maoism. Through Deng´s Four Modernizations 
and reform policies, the inward-oriented country opened itself again and external relations 
with other countries were formalized (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 346-360). China started 
becoming a massive economic hub and a growing power; it even discarded fear of 
intervention in and disrespect of its sovereignty that it associated with entering 
international organizations (He, 2009, p. 118). This was confirmed through its long-
awaited entry into the WTO in 2001 (Hayes, 2012, p. 78) and its assertive position within 
the United Nations Security Council (United States Congress Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 59, Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 131). 
  
The second category stated in the introduction refers to the need for emerging countries 
to have political power. China has proved that it has political strength through actions in 
its own region and in countries ranging from Zimbabwe (Rawnsley, 2009, p. 290), to 
Jamaica (Henderson, 2010, p. 14). Basing its actions on the principle of sovereignty, and 
nonintervention policies (Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 110), 28  the country has 
established relations with many different actors. Its political power is reflected in the 
ability to successfully pressure other countries in the world (United States Congress 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 4). China has for example established 
close or strategic partnerships,29 motivating actors to turn their backs on Taiwan, or 
                                                 
Economically, China is a relatively unimportant small market, (...) and politically its influence is puny” 
(Segal, 1999, p. 24). 
28 Which are subject to double moral standards as China itself has been carrying out small interventions. 
Nevertheless, it keeps emphasizing “how determined it is to preserve its own complete independence, and 
how much it disapproves of (...) superpowers’ military interventions abroad” (Kennedy, 1988, p. 589). 
29 Referring to a denomination adopted by the Chinese government since the 1990s. It refers to countries 
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forcing them to choose between the two of them by tying Chinese investment and trade 
to their response (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, 
p. 5). 
 
The third category is internal cohesion, which China has achieved. Nevertheless, it faces 
internal disputes in Tibet, Xinjiang (Khanna, 2009, pp. 78-81, Hauser, 2009, pp. 33-34 
and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 28-29) and Taiwan (Yahuda, 
2007, p. 106).  
 
The fourth category refers to a country´s ability to challenge the status quo in the 
international system and to contribute to generating a revised international order. China 
is challenging the established order (He, 2009, p. 104) as a powerful actor in different 
world regions, as the creator of the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank (Yoon, 2014), 
the Shanghai Group and of the Chinese bank for development, as a major aid giver, and 
as a consulting partner of ASEAN and other international organizations. With China´s 
growth, there is hope the country will turn into a responsible stakeholder (Heilmann, 2004, 
p. 251 and Dittmer, 2010b, p. 226), especially because it has become difficult to make 
decisions on a global level without its participation (Saich, 2004, p. 310 and Heilmann, 
2004, p. 245).  
 
The fifth category states that China must be recognized as an emerging power to become 
one. With the creation of the acronym BRICS, it has achieved that recognition. This last 
category also refers to close relations with other emerging powers. Contrary to how China 
interacts with major powers and with smaller ones, it adopts a different strategy when 
negotiating with its peers. Narliskar calls it a “competitive-cooperative relationship” 
(Narlikar, 2010, p. 103). South-South cooperation has also increased through the 
country´s ability to achieve investments and contracts throughout the world, in part by 
portraying itself as a developing country (Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 117), rather than 
as an emerging or great power (Kissinger, 2012, p. 504).  
 
Having defined China´s power status, the next segment will analyze Chinese soft power 
                                                 
the Chinese government wants to deepen relations with (He, 2009, p. 115); no clear guideline on who 
becomes strategic partners exists, as both industrialized and developing countries are included (Oviedo, 
2006, pp. 385-386 and p. 391 and Schmalz, 2006, p. 36).  
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tools and how the country is implementing them in East Asia. 
 
2.1.1. China´s power resources and implementation of its soft power strategy 
 
Already in the 1990s, when Nye first coined the term, there was discussion in China about 
the term soft power, e.g. how it could be translated and how it would benefit the country. 
Edney analyzes how Nye sees soft power and how the Chinese do: for the former, it is 
more important to foster a country´s own strength, while the Chinese perspective focuses 
on “countering the effects of Western influence (…), and does not yet see soft power as 
a means by which the fundamental patterns of international relations might be 
restructured” (Edney, 2012, p. 906).  
 
An important part of the discussion within China about how to treat soft power was 
influenced by the definitions Chinese authors themselves offered. Yan and Xu define soft 
power as “a combination of country´s international attractiveness, (…) its external and 
internal mobilization capabilities” (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 20). Both authors, as well as 
professors Qian Chengdan and Chen Yugang clarify that China´s institutions are a 
hindrance to its soft power and that the country´s political system needs to be reformed 
to achieve better results (Glaser and Murphy, 2009, p. 21). 
 
The approach towards soft power that was chosen by the Chinese government underlines 
the importance of soft power for a country like China that aspires to actively participate 
in the world system as a respectable actor. Soft power had to be adapted to Chinese 
tradition and to emphasize the country´s uniqueness (Lai, 2006, p. 2). For example, Nye 
defines culture as one of three pillars of s soft power, while the Chinese government has 
put it on a pedestal, where it “has become almost a synonym for cultural attractiveness” 
(Edney, 2012, p. 908). That almost purely cultural approach might reflect Chinese fears 
of being questioned about other issues, i.e., politics (Dynon, 2014). Dynon refers to “all 
culture, no politics” (Dynon, 2014), which could hinder the growth of Chinese soft power. 
 
Another important part of the government´s actions concern the inclusion of soft power 
in actual policies. One example is the 10-year guideline passed in 2011, which relates to 
cultural industries, socialist culture, soft power related institutions and the commitment 
of the government to become more competitive in those areas (Huang, 2011). Most 
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importantly, culture has been included in five-year plans and in important declarations 
(Smits, 2014, pp. 12-13) related to the expansion of cultural industries as part of the 
country´s development (Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 195-196).  
 
The eleventh plan reinforces “a larger presence of China at international cultural markets. 
It designs a comprehensive approach to popularizing Chinese culture worldwide through 
cultural exchanges (...). It also emphasizes the growth and exports of Chinese (...) artistic 
products, including movies, TV dramas (...), music, electronic games” (Lai, 2006, p. 6). 
The twelfth plan (2011-2015) continued this approach by promising to invest heavily in 
cultural industries, with the goal to modernize and to make China´s cultural sector more 
competitive, specifically in areas such as philosophy, cinema and literature (Reyes Matta, 
2012, p. 195). 
 
Beijing Consensus 
 
The actions and strategies that characterize China’s soft power strategy are sometimes 
referred to as its charm offensive (McClory, 2010, p. 2). That term also includes 
development aid, infrastructure-building, the hosting of international events (Nye, 2011, 
Rawnsley, 2009, pp. 285-286 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 
18) as well as concepts such as Peaceful Rise (Yan, 2011b, p. 100).  
 
Chinese concepts and policies can also be summarized as the so-called Beijing Consensus 
(BC). It is a clear contrast and alternative (Schmidt, 2009, p. 142) to the Western 
Washington Consensus for the development of countries, which has been on a steady 
downfall since it failed to bail countries out of the economic crisis, while China was not 
disastrously affected by it (Fanjul, 2009, pp. 1-2).  
 
The Consensus “avoids rule making and (at least in theory) the imposition of rigid 
standards of political and economic conduct on China´s partners. It is guided by a 
proclaimed noninterference in the affairs of other states, (...) support of state-centered 
development, and removal of conditionality from trade, aid, and investment policies” 
(Gurtov, 2010, p. 21). The Beijing Consensus has thus opened new possibilities for those 
countries in the international system who now feel treated as equals (Dittmer, 2010a, p. 7 
and Schmidt, 2009, p. 142) despite having instable or autocratic governments, e.g. Sudan, 
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Uzbekistan or Venezuela (Henderson, 2010, pp. 16-18). 
 
Rawnsley notes a possible “success of soft power as this approach to development 
connects an attainable economic paradigm with a set of specific political and cultural 
values—authoritarian state-led management (…), ‘Asian values’, etc.” (Rawnsley, 2009, 
p. 283). On the other hand, doubts persist over how the model can be exported despite 
Chinese peculiarities that cannot be easily imitated or left out (Fanjul, 2009, pp. 5-6).  
 
According to Edney, “there is disagreement among scholars and officials over whether 
China´s development experience ‘is or should be a source of China´s soft power’ ” (Edney, 
2012, p. 911). Li states that the Consensus is not a model for other countries in East Asia, 
due to its flaws and to the problems present in China, e.g. inequality (Li, 2009, p. 38). 
The democratic institutions in existence in several countries makes them oppose the 
autocratic elements of the Consensus (Ernst & Young, 2012, p. 16). 
 
Confucius Institutes 
 
The main channel for China to exert its soft power is the Confucius Institute (CI), which 
was modelled after other cultural institutions, for example the Goethe Institute (Pan, 2013 
p. 25 and Lai, 2006, p. 2). The institute was named after Confucius, the most influential 
scholar in Chinese history. During the Maoist regime, Confucian thoughts were repressed, 
and his legacy shunned, but with the arrival of new governments they were again treated 
as part of China´s traditional culture and history (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 504-505, Pan, 2013, 
pp. 24-26 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 19). 
 
Brown refers to CIs as “the front line in presenting the ‘soft side’ of Chinese culture” 
(Brown, 2010, p. 90). They allow China to work towards its goal of using “language 
teaching as a means of building relationships, enhancing socio-cultural understanding and 
promoting trade and foreign investment” (Pan, 2013 p. 25).  
 
The CI remains different from other international cultural institutes. It is closely linked to 
the Communist Party although being called an independent organization, and functions 
within the host university which partners up with a Chinese one (Pan, 2013, p. 23). “Sino-
foreign joint partnership (...) allows Confucius Institutes sounder financial fundamentals. 
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While the Chinese partner supplies the teaching staff and materials, the host university 
(or school) houses the institutes” (Lai, 2006, p. 10). In some cases, the institute has even 
helped create local programs related to Chinese studies (Hanban (Confucius Institute 
Headquarters), 2014, p. 5).  
 
The first CI opened in 2004, and within six years there were already 322 Institutes and 
369 classrooms present throughout the world 30  (Hanban (Confucius Institute 
Headquarters), 2011, p. 4). Within 9 years, there were 353 institutes and 473 classrooms 
worldwide (Pan, 2013 p. 22). According to Hanban, 440 institutes and 646 classrooms 
had been opened by 2013 and it became necessary to create regional centers with an aim 
to coordinate all efforts (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 3).  
 
The goals of the institute are to promote Chinese culture, for example through activities 
on special occasions, and Chinese-language learning. It also offers scholarships and 
coordinates the China bridge competition (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 
2011, p. 7, p. 37 and p. 54). Official guidelines such as “The development plan of 
Confucius Institutes (2012-2020)”, “The Guidelines for Chinese Language Teaching 
Materials” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 2 and p. 60) and the 
“International Curriculum for Chinese Language Learning” (Hanban (Confucius Institute 
Headquarters), 2008, p. i) give a thorough insight into some aspects of the cultural soft 
power that the country wants to extend to the rest of the world (Robinson, 1994, p. 581).  
 
Hanban,31 a representative of China´s government abroad, oversees the CI and Chinese 
cultural presence in other countries by maintaining, evaluating and upgrading the existing 
infrastructure (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, pp. 32-33). Other 
entities also participate in these activities, which weakens the coordination ability of the 
government. Examples are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Culture, the 
State Administration of Radio, Film, and TV, the Ministry of Commerce and of 
Communications (Smits, 2014, pp. 14-16). 
 
 
                                                 
30 See Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters) (2016) for the full list of institutes and classrooms that 
existed in 2015.  
31 Chinese National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language. 
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International media presence 
 
China is promoting itself internationally through its news agency Xinhua (Nye, 2011), 
which achieves worldwide coverage through its channels in different languages. This is 
strategic calculus, since one of the factors that could hinder the growth of the country´s 
soft power is “that Chinese movies, television programs, and literature, among other 
offerings, are almost exclusively available only in the Chinese language.” (Whitney and 
Shambaugh, 2009, p. 17)  
 
CCTV (Nye, 2011 and Smits, 2014, p. 8)32 is also attracting the attention of a wide 
population in different countries (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 17), The channel “is 
a political instrument: it receives instruction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about 
what to include in its programming, based on guidance provided by embassies in the 
target areas. Programs are designed (...) to sell Chinese business, culture, tourism, and 
even language” (Rawnsley, 2009, p. 286). China Radio International streams are also 
constantly being expanded (Nye, 2011 and Kurlantzick, 2005, p. 423). 
 
Television and the film industry are also related to the impact a country´s soft power can 
achieve through the media. Chinese drama production has adapted to changes in the 
country and to new realities, for example the emigration of Chinese nationals and the role 
of women in society (Fernández, 2012 and Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 204). Chinese dramas 
are being exported worldwide via internet, for example through the online presence of 
CCTV, which has turned dramas into cultural ambassadors (Fernández, 2012). 
 
Hong Kong cinema, once an example for good “plots and cinematographic style” 
(Khanna, 2009, p. 263) has been on decline for several decades. Before 1997, it influenced 
generations of fans of Jet Li, Jackie Chan and Bruce Lee (Yang, 2003, pp. 52-55, pp. 60-
65 and p. 97). Their main topics were mostly thrillers, action and especially wuxia 
(martial arts). Since then, regional and international blockbusters such as Enter the 
Dragon from 1973 and A Better Tomorrow from 1986 (Yang, 2003, p. 55 and p. 87) have 
slowly been replaced by partially state-financed movies, i.e., Crouching Tiger, Hidden 
Dragon (Nye, 2004a, p. 88 and Yang, 2003, p. 103). 
                                                 
32 China Central Television. 
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Current Chinese movies are barely competitive outside the country, since there is no 
motivation to export them due to China´s immense domestic market, while censorship 
and excessive bureaucracy hinder the creation of innovative productions (Keane, 2006, p. 
12 and pp. 17-18).33 The “persistence of protectionist policies in media, communications 
and culture neglects the nurturing of national champions and targeting of potentially 
lucrative international markets” (Keane, 2006, p. 12). Keane confirms that weak 
innovation capacity has led China to copy contents, which has in turn hurt the country´s 
industry while others, such as in the South Korean case, have grown (Keane, 2006, pp. 
17-18). 
 
Education 
 
China is reinforcing educational policies to make them part of its soft power attraction. 
This has been successful as more international students are going to the East Asian 
country to study. Most of them stem from Asia, but Western students´ numbers are also 
rising (The Independent, 2010). China´s Ministry of Education (MOE) has been actively 
enabling an easier “visa access, an increase in the number of scholarships available and 
more English language courses (…) among the policies to be implemented by the MOE 
as it looks to open up China´s institutes of higher education to the outside world” (The 
Independent, 2010).  
 
Accompanying initiatives in the field of education and cultural exchange are cultural 
centers in different countries (Lai, 2006, p. 6), the “Confucius China Studies Program”, 
which invite foreigners to China to acquire a doctoral degree, and the “Young Leaders 
Program” (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 6).  
 
Another initiative is the “Chinese Program for Foreign Diplomats” (Hanban (Confucius 
Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 54) There is also the Chinese Bridge, a worldwide 
competition that includes summer and winter camps, and which hosts thousands of 
participants each year, including foreign students in China to college as well as secondary 
students from other countries (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 7 and 
                                                 
33  Instead, American filmmakers have, for example, used the story of Mulan to create content with 
inherently East Asian traditions, something the Chinese themselves have yet to achieve (Reyes Matta, 2012, 
pp. 197-198). 
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p. 37). The purpose is to get to know Chinese culture and language while creating an 
opportunity for exchange (Hubbert, 2014, p. 34). The summer camps, which are 
sponsored by the CI, “build soft power by creating attraction to Chinese culture, but also 
wield soft power through encouraging targets to understand China as an object of desire.” 
(Hubbert, 2014, p. 34) 
 
Conclusions 
 
As could be seen from the Beijing Consensus, the sections about CIs, media presence and 
education, the Chinese government is permanently present (Heberer, 2008, p. 164) in 
China´s soft power policies.  
  
Another important aspect is that Chinese soft power is composed of different elements, 
which extend beyond the original definition of the concept and of its cultural derivates. 
Culture includes education, it also includes media such as television and movies. In the 
next section, these elements mentioned will be transferred to the East Asian content, and 
then complemented by additional, not necessarily cultural, notions that also form part of 
China´s (soft) power arsenal. 
 
2.1.2 China´s role in East Asia  
 
This section will analyze China´s position in East Asia, as a regional and as an emerging 
power. China’s rise in the last decades in East Asia has generated several consequences 
that are as diverse as the reasons for the country´s positioning. 
 
Whitney and Shambaugh state that its growth into a rising power “is reshaping the 
strategic map. (…) The region is also experiencing a shift in power, both in terms of U.S.-
China relations and key regional relationships. The emergence of China as a major power 
has strengthened the region´s role as a global economic engine and altered the regional 
balance of power.” (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 1)  
 
Another important consequence is the impact of Chinese culture on East Asian countries, 
which is an issue not normally included in literature, but nevertheless related to the 
analysis of emerging powers´ rise. According to Li, “China´s increased influence in East 
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Asia in the past decade is primarily attributable to its soft use of power in foreign policy.” 
(Li, 2009, p. 43). Therefore, China´s cultural presence and its growing soft power in East 
Asia cannot be separated from its classification as an emerging power.  
 
One example of how the East Asian country´s soft power is growing is the growing 
willingness of school and university students, as well as business people, to learn the 
country´s language because of its usefulness and the possibility of it replacing other 
languages as the lingua franca (Clemens, 1998, p. 146). The financing of the CI and of 
cultural policies through the government has had a major impact on creating 1. Cultural 
presence through films, series and local cultural activities 2. Future generations of 
Chinese speaking, maybe even Chinese educated, people 3. A cultural attraction that may 
help China overcome its weakness in other areas 4. A combination of cultural soft power 
with the ideological (China as a growth model) and economic (non-interference, China 
as a donor) one. 
 
The factor that has driven China´s rise in East Asia is its role as a regional power (United 
States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 59) through which it 
can exert far more influence than if it were a purely emerging power. China had been that 
type of power before (Henderson, 2010, p. 8), which is why falling back into that role 
happened swiftly, with the country turning into “East Asia´s leading regional growth 
locomotive” (Dittmer, 2010a, p. 2). China can be classified as a regional power34 for 
different reasons, according to the categories mentioned in the last chapter. 
 
First, it is in East Asia, its neighborhood, where it exerts most of its influence. China is 
also well connected to its surroundings (Snyder, 2009, p. 1), including Southeast Asia and 
its border regions (Chellaney, 2006, p. 241).35 
  
Secondly, the country acts on a bilateral (Heberer and Rudolph, 2010, p. 110) and 
multilateral basis (Kurlantzick, 2005, p. 423) especially in ASEAN 36  (United States 
Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 8 and Smits, 2014, p. 20), in 
                                                 
34 See section 1.2.4 of the first chapter for the definition of regional powers. 
35 It is well connected, and its influence is growing with “Southeast Asia increasingly accepting it as a key 
player in the region” (Chellaney, 2006, p. 241).  
36 Association of Southeast Asian Nations. China has promoted ASEAN + 3, which includes Japan and 
South Korea (Hauser, 2009, p. 14). 
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APEC since 1991 (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, 
p. 8) and at the East Asia Summit.37  
 
Thirdly, China is working on its ability to act as a representative for Asia. For a long time, 
it “regarded itself (with some justification) as being isolated and surrounded. This resulted 
from Mao´s policies toward China´s neighbours, and from the rivalry and ambitions of 
other powers in Asia during the preceding decades” (Kennedy, 1988, p. 576). The future 
possibility of China controlling East Asia and beyond depends on its ability to achieve 
more political, economic and cultural potential as an international actor. 
 
As a regional power, China has achieved great influence and leadership in its own region, 
where it has built an amalgam of relationships as well as cooperative agreements, which 
have been very effective in acting against possible coalitions. For example, when Taiwan 
has tried to lobby for its own policies, China has pressured others at the cultural, political, 
and economic level to adhere to the One-China policy. One practical example is that a CI 
is only opened in a country without close links to the island (Lai, 2006, p. 10 and 
Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 30). 
 
China´s regional power status is sometimes questioned and regarded “as somewhat 
ineffective in dealing with regional problems” (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 6). 
This relates to the variety of issues that the country has been confronted with, including 
North Korea´s actions in recent years, which it has not resolved. Also, China competes 
for regional power with the strength of Japanese and American presence in the region 
(Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 6-8).  
 
Literature concerning China´s position as an emerging or regional power barely mentions 
its cultural (soft) power, especially if and how it has contributed to the country´s rise in 
East Asia. But, if historical influences in the region are analyzed, it can be shown that 
China has been a crucial presence, due to the expansion of Confucius thoughts in the 
whole region. For example, South Korea adopted Confucian traditions and its social 
structure absorbed Chinese social structures, which in combination resulted in giving a 
higher meaning to origin, ancestors, and other traditions (Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 164-165). 
                                                 
37 A group of countries in the Pacific that includes Australia, Russia as an observer, ASEAN, Japan and 
South Korea, but not the US (United States Congress Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 8). 
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Derived from research and from China´s palpable power resources, the preliminary 
conclusion can already be drawn that the country has soft power in the diplomatic area, 
for example through multilateral negotiations and in the cultural area, with the appearance 
of a network of cultural as well as language infrastructure in East Asia.  
 
After having extensively discussed China´s status as an emerging regional power, its soft 
power policies, along with its presence internationally and in East Asia, I will now turn 
my attention to South Korea, before comparing both countries to each other. 
 
2.2 South Korea: Middle power 
 
This segment will start with the analysis of why South Korea is a middle power38 in East 
Asia and not a regional or emerging one. 
 
Already during the early 1980s the country was participating in international politics as 
one of the Asian Tigers.39 At the beginning of the 1990s, while still being called a Newly 
Industrialized Country (Kang, 1991, p. 68), Korea quickly became a world leader in areas 
such as information technology (The Academy of Korean Studies-Center for International 
Studies, 2012, p. 36). Now it is one of the most powerful countries worldwide.  
 
South Korea is not classified as an emerging power since it lacks supremacy in purely 
economic or political factors, a regional and international leadership role, and the capacity 
to form lasting blocks around topics related to, e.g., environmental issues (Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 59 and Kim, 2012a and 2012b). It has instead 
positioned itself as a middle power in East Asia, where the country is surrounded by 
emerging powers, industrialized countries and North Korea (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 64). 
Shim and Flamm mention that the country “has only limited leeway within its foreign 
policy and must maneuver constantly between the more powerful regional actors” (Shim 
and Flamm, 2012, p. 5).40  
 
                                                 
38 See section 1.2.4 of the first chapter for the definition of middle powers. 
39 South Korea, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 178). 
40 The same authors state that “South Korea is quite capable of keeping up with other assumed regional 
powers, yet is widely perceived to be only a minor player in regional and global politics.” (Shim and Flamm, 
2012, p. 6) and that “[a]t this stage the lack of acknowledgement from peer nations therefore appears to be 
the main obstacle to considering South Korea a regional power.” (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 17) 
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By hosting a G20 summit (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 2), the Forum on Aid 
Effectiveness (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 4), the Olympic games (The Academy of 
Korean Studies, 2009, p. 164)41 and a football World Cup South Korea has left a mark as 
a bridge between different countries, and a leader in the economic and diplomatic area 
(The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 2 and p. 4 and Kim, 2012a and 2012b). South Korea 
also uses niche diplomacy, which is “the capacity of middle powers to increase their 
global, influence and acceptance through the employment of their specific capabilities” 
(Flemes, 2007, p. 11). It has created institutions aimed at aiding people in other countries, 
for example through voluntary programs coordinated by KOICA42 (Koreanischer Kultur- 
und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 264 and Korea International Cooperation Agency, 
n.d.).43  
 
South Korea has already managed to leave behind the limitations of its middle power 
status (Snyder, 2009, p. 6), in aspects such as cultural soft power in the East Asian region 
and beyond. Its culture has become a pivotal part of the country´s economy. With “few 
natural resources to exploit, Korea has depended on its human capital (...) to develop. (...) 
[F]oreign ideas were readily imported (...) then innovated upon so that they took on 
distinctively Korean forms.” (Seo, 2011, pp. 99-97). 
 
Having stated why South Korea is a middle power in East Asia, the limitation it faces and, 
at the same time, the leverage it has at hand, the next segment will analyze its power 
resources in that region. 
 
2.2.1 South Korea´s power resources and implementation of its soft power strategy: 
The Korean Wave 
 
A diversity of factors has determined the type of power South Korea developed. In the 
past, it was called a Hermit Kingdom due to its inward policies and refusal to subject to 
others´ demands (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 201 and Kang, 
                                                 
41 The country has been amply promoting the Winter Olympics it will host in 2018 in Pyeongchang, as part 
of its public diplomacy strategy (MOFA, 2012, p. 251). 
42 Korean International Cooperation Agency. 
43 See Korea International Cooperation Agency (n.d.) for the programs that KOICA has summarized, since 
2009, under the keyword “World Friends Korea”. 
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1993, p. 47). Significant influences,44 such as Chinese45 and Mongolian presence (Kim 
and Jaffe, 2010, p. 18 and The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 103 and pp. 112-
113), reached the kingdoms of Gojoseon (7th century, or earlier–108 b.c.), Baekje (10 
b.c.-660 a.c.) (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 58 and p. 76), Silla (57 b.c.–935 
a.c.), Goryeo (918-1392) and Joseon (1392-1910) (Koreanischer Kultur- und 
Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 196-199).  
 
After becoming an imperial power at the beginning of the 20th century, Japan started an 
incursion into Korean territory, eventually annexing the country in 1910, exploiting it 
economically (Lee, 2005, pp. 40-45 and Croissant, 2008, p. 286), socially and politically 
(Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 201-202). 
  
The Korean War, which erupted after the end of World War II, meant US American 
presence in the territory. Afterwards, South Korea kept growing with the help of thriving 
industries and corresponding infrastructure, among other aspects (Lee, 1996, p. 17). That 
growth has continued through treaties such as FTAs, and close economic relations with a 
number of countries (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 5). Shim and Flamm state that 
“approximately 60 percent of the world is now part of South Korean ‘economic territory’ 
in terms of gross domestic product (GDP). In this sense, the country can be described as 
a ‘truly’ global economic actor” (Shim and Flamm, 2012, p. 5).  
 
Korea´s usage of economic power is one of the power tools most frequently situated in 
the spotlight. As it happens, the biggest chaebols46 Samsung,47 Hyundai,48 and LG49 have 
subsidiaries all over the world, where they act with government support. 
                                                 
44 Examples of foreign influence are South Korea´s religious beliefs and Confucian tradition that all, except 
shamanism (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 55), came from different cultures and 
regions (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 34). 
45 For example, there was an active commerce of books and other luxury goods between the Silla and Tang 
dynasties (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 92). 
46 Enormous conglomerates with brands spanning over different areas of business and corporate investment 
(Steers et al., 1989, pp. 2-3 and p. 34). 
47 Created in 1938, the company started as a rice trade business and had already by 1987 expanded into 
semiconductors and modern technology (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, pp. 119-121, pp. 122-123 and p. 125 and 
Kang, 1993, p. 86). 
48 Founded in 1946, the company began its activities in the area of construction. It later stepped into 
transportation, commerce and finance (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2009, p. 196 and Kang, 1993, p. 
89). 
49 Founded in 1947, LG first produced cheap cosmetic products and afterwards switched to small electronic 
devices (i.e., radios). Nowadays, it is a world leader in modern technology, cellphones, household 
appliances (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, pp. 132-135 and Kang, 1993, p. 92), and oil refining (The Academy of 
Korean Studies, 2009, p. 197). 
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President Park Chung Hee allowed these conglomerates to monopolize their respective 
markets in the 1960s and 1970s (Kang, 1993, p. 79) by guiding them “toward the sectors 
considered strategic for the national economy” (Castells, 1992 p. 38), which is how they 
were able to influence the country´s development (Croissant, 2008, p. 292). With time, 
South Korea became a liberal and democratized country equipped with an economic 
model which allowed it to continue its industrialization (Croissant, 2008, p. 291). 
 
Fukuyama states that the Korean model cannot be easily copied due to specific cultural 
roots and strong government intervention that will not function in other countries 
(Fukuyama, 1995, pp. 178-182) and because it was built up by authoritarian regimes 
(Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, pp. 14-15). Still, developing countries 
such as Uganda are adopting the “Saemaul” model designed in the 1970s to help Korea 
develop it rural sector (Kim, 2014, pp. 40-41).  
 
In the area of diplomacy, South Korea has promoted its values, e.g., nonintervention, 
through intensive development aid (Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d.). It has 
for example invested in “the knowledge-sharing program (...) to share Korea´s 
development experience with the emerging and the developing world.” (The Brookings 
Institution, 2010, p. 6). 
 
As a middle power, one of the tools that has suited South Korean foreign policy the most 
has been cultural soft power. The next two segments will analyze how that tool has been 
institutionalized and how the Korean Wave has become South Korean culture´s face in 
East Asia. 
 
Cultural institutions 
 
Several institutions related to South Korean soft power have grown or have been created 
since the 1990s (Chung, 2011, p. 55). Some are private, others funded by companies or 
through combined efforts. According to Kim, so many actors are involved in South 
Korea´s public diplomacy that they have become rivals and that there is not always a 
“clear delineation of the division of functions among them.” (Kim, 2012c, p. 539) At the 
highest level are the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and the Ministry of Culture, 
Sports & Tourism (MCST); “the distinction between them in the division of labour on 
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international cultural relations is blurred.” (Fisher, 2014, p. 6) Activities by MOFA 
related to Korea´s national brand include cultural agreements, cultural events, e.g., 
performances or celebrations in other countries within the Korean embassies (MOFA, 
2012, p. 260), promoting language learning and awarding scholarships (MOFA, 2013b). 
 
The Korea Foundation, created in 1991 (Kim, 2011c, p. 130), and MOFA´s main channel 
of action, “supports the airing of Korean soap operas” (Chung, 2011, p. 49). The 
foundation further “specializes in cultural exchanges with other countries” (MOFA, 
2013b) as well as in academic exchanges and Korea-related activities such as the 
international “Korean Festival”, and other film and food festivals (MOFA, 2012, p. 25).  
 
Since 2009, KOCIS — the Korea Cultural Information Service — “has been responsible 
(…) for Korean Cultural Centres, which disseminate information on, and promote 
engagement with, Korean culture and life” (Fisher, 2014, p. 6). The information service 
is responsible for online contests that invite winners to the country to experience Korean 
culture first hand; one example from 2014 was called “Fall in Love with Korea” (Wi and 
Paik, 2014). 
  
The Korea Culture & Tourism Institute (KCTI) carries out studies analyzing cultural 
issues and gives suggestions. One example is that “Korea´s cultural diplomacy/cultural 
exchange approach should strive to establish an international image of a country that 
communicates through culture and promotes diversity.” (Fisher, 2014, p. 12) 
 
The Korea Arts Management Service (KAMS), “is funded by the MCST to provide 
assistance to Korean contemporary and traditional arts organisations and practitioners to 
make the performing arts sector in particular more competitive” (Fisher, 2014, p. 9).  
 
Another entity within the cultural sector is the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), 
which combines several agencies, including the Korea Culture and Content Agency, the 
Korea Game Industry Agency and the Cultural Contents Center (Fisher, 2014, p. 15). 
 
The Presidential Council (created in 2009) (Fisher, 2014, p. 14) coordinated efforts50 by 
                                                 
50 See Presidential Council on Nation Branding (n.d.-a) for a brief outline of the Council´s activities from 
2009 until 2012.  
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different actors (Kim, 2011b, p. 148) to enhance Korea´s brand worldwide, such as the 
Global Korea scholarship,51 volunteers (Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d. 
and Fisher, 2014, p. 8), aid-giving, tourism and even Taekwondo (Dinnie, 2009, p. 4 and 
Kim, 2011c, p. 126). The council oversaw Korea´s international nation brand index 
internationally, after the country realized that its ranking did not compare to its existing 
power (Kim, 2011c, p. 125 and Kim, 2011b, p. 148).52  
 
The King Sejong Institute (SI)53 that started functioning in 2010 (Im, 2013, p. 38)54 
resembles other language institutes such as the CI. The King Sejong Foundation is to the 
SI what Hanban is to the CI. It was created in a joint effort by the Presidential Council on 
Nation Branding and by the Presidential Council on National Competitiveness, and 
coordinates the institutes together with MCST. The Foundation also helps international 
scholars broaden their knowledge of South Korea, by funding different activities (Im, 
2013, pp. 38-39). 
 
The different institutions mentioned serve different goals, all in the name of nation 
branding and of cultural soft power, but. as will be seen in the next segment, the Korean 
Wave, or Hallyu, has become the true face of Korea´s cultural soft power.  
 
Cultural soft power: The Korean Wave 
 
“The Korean culture craze in Asia has led many Asians—especially the younger 
generation—to view Korea as the epitome of cool. If one lived in Asia, one would 
probably be inclined to think that Korea´s brand power ranked within the world´s top five” 
(Kim, 2011b, p. 155). This sentence exemplifies why South Korea is currently exceling 
with its cultural soft power. Ryoo even calls the country “Asia´s pop culture leader” 
(Ryoo, 2009, p. 139).  
 
In the past, the country was known because of the Korea War or confused with North 
                                                 
51 “Which unifies since 2010 all of the government´s initiatives on scholarships, including development 
assistance, training for foreign students, educational scholarships for studies in Korea” (National Institute 
for International Education, n.d.). 
52 Internationally, nation branding is measured through indexes such as the Anholt-GfK Nations Brand 
Index (Kim, 2011b, p. 155).  
53 The Institute is named after King Sejong of the Joseon dynasty (1418-1450), during whose reign the 
Korean alphabet Hangeul was created (Lee, 2005, p. 36). 
54 See King Sejong Institute Foundation (2016) for an exemplary map of where these Institutes are located.  
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Korea, therefore projecting a hardly beneficial image, but with government support (Kim, 
2011c, p. 124) South Korea´s cultural policies started succeeding at the beginning of the 
20th century (Seo et al., 2013, p. 9). At that time, Korean dramas, or K-dramas, reached 
East Asia, thus the Korean Wave started. The term “Hallyu” is synonymous with it and 
was first coined in China in the 1990s (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 152 and p. 165). It means 
“Korean pop culture—television, movies and music—that has spread across Asia and to 
other parts of the world” (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 164).  
 
Hallyu can be divided into two phases. The first one began in 1997 and ended in the 2000s, 
reaching East Asia as well as countries of Southeast Asia; the second one, the Neo-Korean 
Wave (Seo, 2011, p. 39) started in the 2000s and continues nowadays, accessing all of 
Southeast Asia and the rest of the world (Wi and Sohn, 2013).  
 
According to Kim, Hallyu is connected to several important aspects, i.e., economic power, 
government participation, cultural institutions and media presence, which is why it can 
additionally be divided into four stages that represent its impact on consumers.  
 
“In the first stage, foreigners become avid consumers of Korean dramas, movies, 
and music (...). The second stage involves (...) buying products that are directly 
derived from Korean pop culture and visiting Korea (...). In the third stage, foreign 
customers buy Korean electronics and other everyday items made in Korea (...). 
In the fourth and final stage, the foreign consumer admires Korean culture and 
prefers the Korean lifestyle” (Kim, 2011b, pp. 153-154). 
 
Hallyu is now able to reach a more diversified audience, it is “riding on the ‘Digital Silk 
Road’–a new way of sharing cultural content beyond barriers of race, culture, and region 
(…). [T]his globalization (…) has moved from its Internet beginnings onto offline 
platforms throughout the world” (Kim, 2011a, p. 16).  
 
Korean series, or K-dramas form an important part of the Korean wave. They have 
obtained a cutting advantage as they inspire awe and create a liaison to the audience (Seo, 
2011, p. 72), which is further facilitated by the way they are presented that allows 
audiences to understand them (Kim, 2013). Like other branches of the Korean Wave that 
started in the 1990s, “the general look and structure of the industry was most similar to 
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Japanese television (...). Despite all the similarities, Korean dramas (…) [evolved] in 
significantly different directions than Japanese dramas” (Russell, 2008, pp. 102-103).55  
 
At the beginning of the 1990s K-Pop, or Korean pop, appeared (Kim, 2011a, p. 10 and 
Russell, 2008, pp. 144-147). Its roots, besides J-Pop (Japanese Pop), are mostly R&B and 
hip-hop (Kim, 2011c, p. 73) as well as boys and girl groups (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, pp. 
169-170). Shim locates the beginning of K-Pop in 1992, when a group called Seo Taiji 
and Boys first became known for its alternative musical style that appealed to younger 
generations (Shim, 2006, p. 36). The genre thrived in Asia since “globalization vitiated 
the hitherto high walls of cultural protectionism in East Asia and elsewhere. (...). Japanese 
[and] Taiwanese walls of protection against South Korean cultural products (…) 
weakened considerably in the 1990s and 2000s.” (Lie, 2012, p. 353) 
 
Lyrics in English, good songwriting, choreographies that can be easily copied and a 
mixture of rhythms are attracting bigger crowds worldwide (Seo, 2011, pp. 51-59 and 
Klung, 2013, p. 48). Lie states that K-Pop “fill[ed] a niche that was relatively open for 
clean, well-crafted performers (…). K-pop exemplifies middle-class, urban and suburban 
values that seek to be acceptable at once to college-aspiring youths and their parents” (Lie, 
2012, p .355). 
 
Before the Korean Wave, movies made in South Korea were unfamiliar to the 
international public (Russell, 2008, p. 4). Russell mentions in his book about Hallyu that 
they were always measured against the quality of their American counterparts until one 
blockbuster, Shiri, attracted international attention by outshining its competitor at that 
time, Titanic, in Korean cinemas (Shim, 2006, p. 33, Seo, 2011, pp. 80-81 and Koehler, 
2013a, p. 7). Starting then, the film industry began catering to different tastes and genres 
including family, detective, and horror movies (Russell, 2008, pp. 51-56 and pp. 67-68 
and Ra, 2012, pp. 222-223), providing “greater sophistication in visuals, music, and genre 
elements, with the results that Korean films are now recognized for their originality” (Seo, 
2011, p. 85). 
 
                                                 
55  After Japan´s colonization of South Korea, its “music, movies and television were all off limits, 
considered too painful a reminder of a difficult time. For decades it was like the biggest pop culture force 
in Asia did not exist (...). Despite the ban, Japan still made its culture felt in Korea, if only unofficially.” 
(Russell, 2008, p. 120)  
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The country has earned its international reputation (Seo, 2011, p. 15) through “strong 
plots that can win over overseas audiences [through] a deep understanding of foreign 
cultures and intercommunication with Korea´s own unique emotions and sensitivity” (Seo, 
2011, p. 82). Attraction generated by Korean movies has sparked remakes in the US56 
and China (Seo, 2011, p. 13 and pp. 80-84). 
 
Korean movies, directors, actors and actresses (Seo, 2011, p. 79) have won awards at 
international festivals (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 173) including Berlin, Venice and Cannes 
(Seo, 2011, p. 88). The movies Chunyangjeon (2000), Thirst (2009) and Old boy (2004), 
Actress Unknown (2001) and Pieta (2012) have garnered international acclaim 
(Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 108 and Seo, 2011, pp. 80-82). 
In 2016, once again a movie by director Park Chan Wook, The Handmaiden, was 
nominated for the Palme d'Or at Cannes Film Festival (Kim, 2016). 
 
Korea´s own film festivals, PIFF in Busan57 and those in Jeonju and Pucheon (Russell, 
2008, p. xiv and p. 85 and Seo, 2011, pp. 85-88)58 have grown accordingly, attracting 
more and more international attention (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 
2012, p. 109 and p. 112).  
 
Korean movies, dramas and pop music generate an influence beyond cultural factors. The 
public feels attracted to South Korean products after watching dramas or movies and may 
want to learn Korean, travel to and study in the country. The mechanism of soft power 
attraction works in the following way: people become interested in Korean productions 
or music (Kim and Jaffe, 2010, p. 169) and start connecting with others who share the 
same tastes and an admiration for current trends in the country. Simultaneously, 
technological products are shown as part of K-dramas; afterwards the interested public 
wants to buy them (Chung, 2011, p. 18). 
 
“[M]ultinational corporations have recognized the global economic values of K-Pop 
artists, and (...) those companies have taken interest in the rising popularity of K-Pop as 
                                                 
56 The Lake House, My Sassy Girl and The Uninvited are all remakes of Korean movies Il Mare, My Sassy 
Girl and Tale of Two Sisters (Koehler, 2006, p. 10). 
57 According to Russell, by “exposing Korean movies to the world and developing connections between 
producers and filmmakers all over Asia, PIFF played an integral role in the rise of Korean movies” (Russell, 
2008, p. 75). The festival started in 1996 (Ra, 2012, p. 221). 
58 Puchon International Fantastic Film Festival-PiFan. 
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its contents have reached all over the world through the Internet” (Korean Culture and 
Information Service, 2011b, p. 9). Samsung and LG have particularly benefited from the 
Korean Wave through sponsored content shown internationally. A constant fan base all 
over the world faithfully buys the products as soon as they appear on Korean television; 
“overseas viewers´ tastes for Korean dramas both directly and indirectly influence the 
material, emotional and symbolic benefits sought by the Korean government and Korean 
businesses” (Kim, 2013).  
 
During the last two decades, the Korean government has actively supported the growth 
of Hallyu by adapting its laws as needed (Chung, 2011, pp. 48-49 and Kang, 1993, p. 
108). Screen quotas (Ryoo, 2009, p. 142) for domestic production with the goal of 
disabling unequal competition (Mackey, 2010, pp. 111-112) and growing infrastructure, 
such as studios and training for staff involved in K-drama, are all part of the government´s 
support (Chung, 2014, p. 12). It has made it clear that culture is part of the “three priorities 
(…) economic renewal, the happiness of the people and a cultural renaissance. The focus 
of the latter was to be the Hallyu, cultural heritage and cultural life” (Fisher, 2014, p. 5). 
 
The Korean government “has committed significant resources and energy to position the 
Korea brand as a vibrant dynamic democracy, creative and open to the world” (Dinnie, 
2009, p. 1). One of the first steps it took towards supporting cultural policies was the 
creation of a “Cultural Industry Bureau” in 1994 (Shim, 2006, p. 32). In 1999, “the Basic 
Law for the Cultural Industry Promotion” followed (Shim, 2006, p. 34 and Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 32, p. 67). The office of Public Diplomacy (Fisher, 
2014, p. 7) supplements the government´s work. The establishment of further institutions 
to exert more soft power (The Brookings Institution, 2010, p. 7) is encouraged.  
 
KOFICE — the Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange — for example, 
was created with the aim “to orchestrate all governmental and private endeavors 
pertaining to the Korean Wave” (Nam, 2013, p. 221). Examples of international activities 
have been the 9th Drama Conference of Asia, the 4th, the 5th Hallyu Now Seminar and the 
Korean Wave Industry Leaders Forum 2015; several stakeholders from across the region 
were invited and topics discussed included exporting Hallyu, connecting it to tourism, K-
dramas and the cultural content industry (Korea Foundation for International Culture 
Exchange, 2014a, 2014b and 2015). 
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Additional efforts include the Cultural Partnership Initiative, “a special intercultural 
exchange program every year to promote Korean culture worldwide” (Chung, 2012, p. 
38). Experts from, e.g. African and Latin American countries with knowledge in diverse 
fields such as culture travel to Korea to receive an intensive training. While being there, 
they get in touch with local culture (Chung, 2012, pp. 38-39). MCST coordinates this 
initiative with the Korea Culture and Tourism Institute and with other organizations 
related to the field of expertise of the foreign specialists (Chung, 2012, p. 39).  
 
International media presence 
 
In international media the Korean Wave is present through Yonhap news, Arirang TV 
and the Korean Broadcasting System (KBS). Yonhap is the country´s news agency, with 
at least 49 worldwide offices (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, p. 55). 
Arirang focuses on current news, cultural programs and modern Korean culture, including 
the Korean Wave, which can be accessed via television, cellphone apps or online (Yang, 
2012b, pp. 42-43). KBS was founded in 1961 (Koreanischer Kultur- und 
Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 55). Korea´s other main TV stations, MBC (Munhwa 
Broadcasting Corporation) and SBS (Seoul Broadcasting System) were created, 
correspondingly, in 1969 and 1990 (Koreanischer Kultur- und Informationsdienst, 2012, 
pp. 55-56 and Chung, 2011, pp. 59-65). Korean TV channels are also supported by 
chaebols such as Samsung, LG, Hyundai, Daewoo, Saangyong and Kia Motors (Yang, 
2012b, p. 44).  
 
This last segment analyzed South Korea´s soft power arsenal, especially the Korean Wave, 
which can be considered its strongest tool, especially because Hallyu combines several 
elements such as media, education and, most importantly, culture. Yet one question 
remains. How has the country used them to position itself in East Asia? 
 
2.2.2 South Korea´s role in East Asia  
 
In the past, South Korea did not dominate in any of the power areas within its own region, 
where Japan, China, and even the US have been permanently present. Cultural assets and 
soft power have changed that. Hallyu is as a much a tool as the economy or military 
weapons are. After K-dramas became popular in China, they quickly reached Japan and 
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afterwards all of East Asia (Chung, 2011, p. 16 and Onishi, 2005). Nowadays dramas are 
immensely popular in Vietnam (Russell, 2008, p. 215 and Chung, 2011, pp. 24-25), in 
Thailand (Mark Russell and Korean Economic Institute of America, 2012), the 
Philippines,59 Malaysia and Indonesia (Chung, 2011, pp. 25-27 and p. 52 and Whitney 
and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 9). One recent example of a hugely popular drama in East Asia 
is a 2016 military-themed romantic K-drama Descendants of the sun, which has gained 
millions of followers (Wong, 2016). 
 
Korea has been seeking artists from different Asian countries to include them in its music 
industry. Singers from the US (Korean Culture and Information Service, 2011b, p. 8), 
Canada, (Russell, 2008, pp. 156-157) China and Thailand (Kim, 2011a, p. 9 and p. 28) 
are trained in South Korea and then sent to represent K-Pop in other countries (Seo, 2011, 
pp. 70-71). They are crucial for closing language gaps, while opening possibilities for 
market expansion. Producers from other countries, for example the US, are also included 
in the training and production phase to ensure international reach (Seo, 2011, pp. 63-64). 
 
And not just K-Pop is including foreign artists. Television shows are applying the same 
formula (Ebora, 2014, pp. 24-25). “The presence of international personalities on 
television programs (...) has helped both Korean and non-Korean viewers learn more 
about Korea. With every issue discussed, audiences can get a better understanding of the 
Korean perspective of the world” (Ebora, 2014, p. 25). 
 
Popularity has had an impact on other areas related to the K-phenomenon, which have 
become as famous as movies, songs or dramas. With the beginning of Hallyu, sales 
“soared for Korean popular culture-related products such as books, magazines, DVDs, 
and accessories” (Chung, 2011, p. 18). I will show some examples of how Korea´s culture 
has opened these markets in East Asia, resulting in a spillover effect that has proven of 
crucial benefit to its own cultural as well as economic power. 
 
After the boom created by K-dramas, even make up became fashionable (Leong, 2014) 
just because of its Korean origin, with products quickly gaining popularity in China and 
in Japan (Suk, 2013, pp. 31-33) “With the help of top idol stars as the face of these brands 
                                                 
59 Where “Koreanovelas” have become popular (Chung, 2011, p. 23). 
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(...) Korean beauty stores are now people´s go-to places for trying the Korean celebrity 
style (Suk, 2013, p. 32). The same has happened with clothing. Pieces worn actresses or 
actors are sold out in the region because of the popularity of certain dramas. Korea´s 
industry has reacted by selling its products locally (Seo, 2011, pp. 62-63). “In this way, 
the Korean Wave has had a multiplicative effect in encouraging many foreigners to 
embrace various elements of Korean culture.” (Kim, 2011b, p. 153) 
 
The popularity of Korean TV animation has grown regionally and internationally (Park, 
2012, p. 1). This fact is remarkable for a country whose animations only became 
successful in the mid-1970s, that did not have success till the 1990s, and was facing strong 
competition from Japanese and American products; the latter were often themselves 
animated by Koreans who worked for companies such as Pixar (Park, 2012, pp. 6-7 and 
Lee, 2013, p. 10).  
 
Pororo and Pucca are two of the most popular animated figures to stem from Korean 
studios. Both have widened the niche of animation for smaller children (Lee, 2013, p. 9). 
As soon as that industry grew (Ra, 2012, p. 223), the Korean government financed a 
festival and included animation in its categorization of cultural industries while, 
characteristic for Hallyu, online platforms were divulging information about it (Park, 
2012, p. 8, Lee, 2013, p .5 and p. 9).  
 
In the area of gastrodiplomacy, thousands of Korean restaurants were opened that 
specialized in chimaek (which means chicken with beer) after it was eaten by the main 
female character of one K-drama, My love from another star (Chung, 2014, pp. 4-6 and 
Wan, 2014). Another drama, Daejanggeum,60 about a royal cook, also sparked a wave of 
Korean food fans, with restaurants carrying that name being opened in East and Southeast 
Asia (Chung, 2011, p. 27).  
 
“The Korean government aims at accelerating the further globalization of the national 
cuisine (…) [its] bold new goal is to make the domestic fare one of the world´s five most 
favorite foods within a decade, and increase the number of Korean restaurants around the 
world” (Seo, 2010, p. 11). Seoul initiated a campaign called “Korean Cuisine to the 
                                                 
60 Also known as Jewel in the Palace. 
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World”, with the goal of augmenting the quantity of Korean restaurants worldwide 
(Rockower, 2012, p .239). One fund “will be used to promote Korean cooking classes in 
internationally acclaimed cooking schools and help support Korean culinary students with 
grants and scholarships to attend culinary schools and international food fairs” (Rockower, 
2012, p. 239). There is also the Korean Food Foundation which coordinates most efforts 
(Lee, 2015) and the Korean Cuisine Committee (Kim, 2011c, p. 127). 
 
Through the interest in the Korean Wave, the country has become one of the most popular 
tourist destinations in its region. People are visiting shooting locations of movies and 
dramas, traditional houses, monuments, as well as cities (Koreanischer Kultur- und 
Informationsdienst, 2012, pp. 63-69) wishing to experience themselves the locations they 
saw online or through television (Chung, 2011, p. 69 and Chung, 2014, p. 7). In Japan, 
for example, an “agency offers Korean Wave tour packages connected with Korean 
concerts and shopping in cooperation with Korea´s duty-free shopping centers.” (Seo, 
Lee, Hong, and Jung, 2012, p. 11). 
 
The gaming industry is also appealing to younger audiences. This branch started growing 
in the 1990s (Baek, 2012, p. 197). No devices comparable to PlayStation or to Nintendo 
consoles stem from South Korea, and still, the development of smartphone apps (Huang, 
2011) online, mobile, video (Baek, 2012, pp. 202-203) and role games (Kim and Jaffe, 
2010, p. 266 and Huang, 2011) is tightly dominated by Koreans. While online streaming 
can serve multiple purposes, for example watching music videos on YouTube, this 
“online pattern extends beyond just music in Korea to videogames, movies, and even 
comic books” (Russell, 2008, pp. 182-183).  
 
Some countries in the region have started reacting towards South Korean success (Russell, 
2008, p. 130). “Government officials in Taiwan, China, and other Asian countries have 
talked of putting quotas on Korean content or otherwise restricting it if Korea does not 
import more of their programs.” (Russell, 2008, p. 130). According to them, the country´s 
growing presence is endangering their local products and culture; they accuse the South 
Korean government of carrying out cultural hard power policies, and Hallyu is sometimes 
understood as an extension of US cultural presence (Ryoo, 2009, p. 148). Lie explains 
that in the case of K-Pop, “the (…) industry, despite being a content-rather than 
technology-led enterprise, seems to share many of the common South Korean practices 
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of doing business” (Lie, 2012, p. 359).  
 
Continued backlash (Seo, Jung, Joo and Lee, 2013, p. 12) sheds light on the fragility of 
the Korean Wave and the possibilities of its demise in the future (Seo, 2011, p. 95). For 
now, the country is “advantageously seen as ‘non-offensive’, a political tabula rasa” 
(Leong, 2014).  
 
2.3 Preliminary conclusions 
 
This chapter examined China´s and South Korea´s international positioning and also their 
roles in East Asia. 
 
China has positioned itself as an emerging power in its own region. It is the dominant 
regional power, a position it acquired through the deployment of different power tools. 
Economic power has enabled the country to expand its soft power presence. For Khanna, 
it is common in East Asia that economic growth and culture are situated in a circle where 
culture has created more growth, which has in turn enhanced culture - the author calls it 
“cultural pride” (Khanna, 2009, p. 266). Yet, cultural soft power has not been the only 
factor that has allowed China to position itself in the region, but instead can be understood 
as an element of its foreign policy as well as a catalyzer for other types of power, for 
example diplomatic soft power. 
 
South Korea´s case is different. With Japan, China, North Korea and the US present, the 
middle power position in its own region has evoked a niche diplomatic approach, and the 
deployment of cultural soft power (Ryoo, 2009, p. 149). Hard power has remained 
relegated. Specializing on a soft power approach, South Korea has managed to rise as a 
cultural power in East Asia. 
 
China´s and South Korea´s soft powers are similar in the fact that there exists a strong 
governmental presence in each policy that is decided on. Both countries also share that 
they evoke threat reactions by other East Asian countries. The “China threat” theory states 
that a rising China will repeat the actions of other countries that have emerged before 
(Narlikar, 2010, p. 23). The theory is supplemented by the fact that China has not 
respected its own principles of non-intervention and sovereignty. The South Korean 
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“threat “stems from its strong cultural presence in East Asia, which has created a feeling 
of cultural hegemony.  
 
Besides these conclusions, some of the goals mentioned in the introduction, such as the 
conceptionalization of soft power, were approached in this chapter.  
 
For Nye, greater powers are the only ones who effectively exert soft power in the 
international system. He almost solely focuses on the US, or explicitly talks about how 
“[g]reat powers try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their 
national interests” (Nye, 2012), while not mentioning other countries. In this chapter, it 
could be seen that South Korea, as a middle country, strategically utilizes its soft power 
to position itself in East Asia. According to Russell, the country is “at the forefront of a 
variety of changes that are (or will be) affecting all of Asia and the rest of the world.” 
(Russell, 2008, pp. 216-217) I want to prove with this research that soft power can be 
helpful to acquire more power regionally and internationally, leaving behind a Western-
centered analysis of the concept (Rawnsley, 2014, p. 163). 
 
Nye has not sufficiently defined the differences between hard and soft power. Only in 
more recent research, the theory was created in the 1990s, did the author reach the 
conclusion that hard power might be soft. I proved that the opposite is also possible. One 
example is China´s development aid, which is linked to economic presence and then again 
to political pressure. Another one is the South Korean “threat” theory.  
 
How much control governments have over their own resources matters much in the East 
Asian context. The Chinese and the South Korean cases provide enough examples. Soft 
power cannot be completely manipulated because other countries´ populations are those 
who “process” what they receive from elsewhere. Governmental presence could hinder 
the expansion of soft power as it endangers free cultural flows. According to Nye, 
“postmodern publics are generally skeptical of authority, and governments are often 
mistrusted. Thus it often behooves governments to keep in the background and to work 
with private actors.” (Nye, 2004a, p. 113) 
 
Finally, according to Nye, (cultural) soft power works best when cultures are similar. East 
Asia shares common Confucian, Buddhist, Taoist and shamanistic believes which include 
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filial piety and a belief in the importance of education, a fact that supports that statement. 
What would happen to that same cultural soft power in other world regions?  
 
The concept of emerging powers was also expanded in this chapter. It normally does not 
include culture as a possible category for a country to rise, yet South Korea has proven 
the opposite in East Asia where it has quickly risen as a dominant cultural presence.  
 
3. Latin America meets East Asia 
 
This chapter starts with the changes that have happened in Latin America, especially in 
more recent years, and investigates the increased East Asian presence in the subcontinent. 
One justification for that type of analysis is stated by Nolte who observes the necessity to 
“include outside powers in the analysis of regional orders and regional power relations in 
a more systematic manner.” (Nolte, 2010, p. 898) According to that same author it is 
crucial to see “the relationship between region and powerful actors from outside and from 
within as one key area for further research” (Nolte, 2010, p. 898). 
 
Through the following analysis, I will determine whether China and South Korea have 
positioned themselves as emerging powers in Latin America by using soft power 
strategically as a foreign policy tool, also whether they have replicated their strategies 
and position, in their own region, within the subcontinent.  
 
Factors that I will analyze are that soft power has been so far almost exclusively studied 
with an emphasis on the US or on other great powers, without offering a framework for 
smaller countries that wish to deploy it as a foreign policy tool to increase their 
international standing. Another relevant issue is that, according to Nye, a common 
cultural background creates a basis for soft power to have a greater impact on the 
corresponding countries. With Latin America and East Asia being distant geographically 
and culturally, how have soft power dynamics developed there? 
 
The concept of emerging powers, again, will be analyzed, taking into account that 1. A 
rise through cultural policies has barely been considered by literature, which is why I 
want to prove that it is in fact possible to become an emerging power through its use 2. 
China and South Korea are middle and emerging powers in their own region, but are both 
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relatively new actors in Latin America, which makes them “emerging” actors. Will these 
new powers replicate the position they have in their own region? Or will they turn into 
another type of power, e.g. small and great powers, once they act in a different local 
context? 
 
3.1 Latin America. From US backyard to independent subcontinent 
 
No analysis of Latin American politics, or of other actors in the region, can completely 
exclude the US. Ever since the north American country became a hegemonic power, its 
presence has had a tremendous impact on the subcontinent.  
 
But, just as with US dominance in the rest of the world, the first problems with its hard 
power were felt after the end of the Cold War (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, 
p. 187), when “America decided (...) that it preferred democracies: providing vivid 
confirmation (...) that Latin America´s political destinies had been directed by American 
preferences” (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 108). In the aftermath of 9/11, when the eyes of the 
world turned towards the Middle East (Ellis, 2006, p. 6), Latin America became less and 
less relevant for the hegemon (Leiteritz, 2013, p. 75 and Mols, 2010, p. 27), with the 
growing impression by governments in the region “that their positions were not taken into 
consideration on a wide range of international issues from the Iraq war to immigration 
policy.” (China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 8)  
 
At the same time, changes were happening regionally, with socialist governments being 
elected in several countries (Ellis, 2006, p. 6 and China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, 
p. 8 and Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 185). A “factor that propelled 
them into power was widespread disillusionment with the effects of American domination 
in the region (…). By the end of the 1990s (…) pro-American sentiment had evaporated, 
followed by the election of a series of populist and left-leaning governments in Venezuela, 
Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Bolivia.” (Mahbubani, 2008, p. 109) 
 
Some countries allied with Venezuela and its leadership in the creation of ALBA, the 
“Bolivian Alternative for the Americas” (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 
188). ALBA opposed “ALCA”, in English the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTTA), 
an initiative proposed by the US since the 1990s (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, pp .2-3). 
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Others chose to remain close to the US (China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 16).  
 
Yet, even with these political changes occurring, the US remains the main commercial 
partner for many Latin American countries (Philipps, 2010, p. 194). It has signed FTAs 
throughout the region, including NAFTA with Mexico (Fernández Jilberto and 
Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 15). In the cultural area, even countries who criticized US military 
interventions consume everything American culture offers such as movies, clothing style 
and music. One explanation for that type of cultural soft power is that those who are at 
the receiving end of soft power do not care about US interventions or the country´s hard 
power as they either do not know much about the country´s history or feel unaffected by 
it. Which means that, if US products are popular, they will buy them without further 
consideration about their origins.  
 
For this to happen, Latin American and US American cultures did not have to be close 
from the start. The language is different (apart from English-speaking countries in the 
Caribbean), as are the historical origins and development paths. But it should not be 
forgotten that, for at least the last six decades, Latin American media, politics along with 
the population have been oriented towards absorbing as much American products as 
possible. The country´s status as a hegemon, the biggest economy in the world and a hard 
power giant, created the existing attraction. People do not want to go to the US because 
they love drinking Coca Cola, but because of how they could benefit from the country´s 
economic power. People learn English because they know that their employment and 
educational chances, as well as the possibility to leave for the US, could skyrocket. 
 
In the meantime, less US presence has left enough space for extra-regional actors, e.g., 
from East Asia, to act proactively (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 3 and Hosono and 
Nishijima, 2001, p. 1), taking away part of its hard and soft power success from the past. 
With the hegemon distracted, they have increased their power dimensions (Mora, 1997, 
p. 41 and Sun, 2013) since the 1990s (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People´s 
Republic of China, 2004). Two of the actors that have taken advantage of the new 
dynamic have been South Korea and China.  
 
The next segment will evaluate both countries´ emergence in the region, and if they have 
done so through the deployment of soft power. 
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3.2 Chinese presence in Latin America 
 
China´s current position in Latin America can be described as such: it is “taking 
advantage of (…) Washington´s unwillingness to pursue ‘good neighbor’ relations in 
Latin America with much enthusiasm” (Mahbubani, 2008, p .225) and it has become the 
most important trade partner for many countries in the region. The main one for “Brazil, 
Chile and Cuba; and the second one for Argentina, Costa Rica and Peru. It is (…) the 
main provider of imports for Paraguay and the second for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Peru” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 34, own 
translation). 
 
China´s history with Latin America dates back several centuries, even if its “growing 
interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a fairly new phenomenon that has 
developed over the past several years” (United States Congress Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 16).  
 
There is some dissent in literature about whether China was present in the subcontinent 
before Spanish colonization. According to publications dating from the beginning of this 
century, Chinese reached Latin America before the subcontinent was discovered and 
colonized, taking advantage of maritime power in the 15th century (Khanna, 2009, p. 303, 
and Menzies, 2002, p. 410 and pp. 460-461). There have also been efforts, from the 
Chinese side, of proving an early connection between Latin America and China. “For two 
decades, Chinese investigators (...) have studied the link between ancient China and Pre-
Columbian America. In 2006, they traveled to Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia, in the footsteps 
of what is known as the ‘journey of the Yin to the east’ ” (Castro Obando, 2015). These 
theories are largely based on supposition (Slack, 2010, p. 7) and on contrasting Chinese 
and international hypotheses (Xu, 2008, pp. 31-32); it is widely accepted that the 
extensive exchange between China and Latin America developed later.  
 
In the following paragraphs, I will shortly analyze the historical presence of Chinese in 
Latin America, due to its importance for the subcontinent´s relation with the country.  
 
According to Look Lai, there have been three clearly discernible periods of Chinese 
immigration: “the early colonial period (pre-19th century); the classic migration period 
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(19th to early 20th centuries); and the renewed immigration of the late 20th century to the 
present.” (Look Lai, 2010, p. 1) The early colonial period included commercial links 
between China and Latin America and centered on products such as silver; Mexico served 
as a bridge between East Asia, Southeast Asia (especially the Philippines), Europe and 
Latin America (Gordon, Morales and Muñoz, 2015). 
 
It was during the second period that the massive coolie trade took place (Look Lai, 2010, 
p. 2, Xu, 2008, pp. 32-33 and Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 134). According to Look Lai, the 
term means “Chinese indentured-worker migrations to the plantations of slave and ex-
slave America, especially to Cuba and Peru, and sometimes to the (...) British, French, 
and Dutch West Indies in the 19th century.” (Look Lai, 2010, p. 2). The reason behind 
that Chinese workforce was the need for replacement of the African slaves that were 
diminishing in number (Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 131). 
 
Migration flows accompanied the historical situation in China — including the Opium 
Wars and Maoism (Look Lai, 2010, p. 3 and Eng Menéndez, 2013, pp. 132-133). They 
were also determined by the natural resource that was being extracted locally. For 
example, some Chinese went to Cuba when there was a demand for work in local 
plantations, and to Peru, which was exporting guano (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 68) and 
looking for hacienda workers (García and González de Castejón, 2004, p. 32 and Reyes 
Matta, 2012, p. 207).61 
 
The waves of immigrants also depended on the political atmosphere in different Latin 
American countries, and on the economic situation that accompanied it (Hu-DeHart, 2010, 
p. 91 and p. 97, and Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 130). For example, when a government was 
open to other countries migration would be encouraged (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 143). 
In Peru, the “Ley china, allowed the introduction of an indentured work force from China 
thanks to an extremely lucrative commercial enterprise which replaced the slave trade.” 
(Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 143). When the governments decided otherwise, Chinese 
immigration would be stalled (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 148).  
 
In several countries there were aggressions against Chinese living there, as “sooner or 
                                                 
61 According to García and González de Castejón (2004, p. 32), in the years around 1860 about 100.000 
Chinese workers were brought to Peru to work at these haciendas. 
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later negative reaction from those around them would arise, resulting in outbreaks of 
sinophobia (...) ranging from angry discourse to physical violence and extreme measures 
of ethnic cleansing” (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 65).  
 
Those Chinese that overcame difficulties, created their own communities in different 
countries, including Chinese quarters (Lausent-Herrera, 2010, p. 146 and p. 172) and 
Chinatowns (Robinson, 2010, p. 110 and pp. 118-119). Those who had been indentured, 
under contract or that had gone to Latin America in search of new opportunities, later 
pursued other types of occupations when the conditions were right. “[T]he Chinese 
quickly and effectively established themselves as small manufacturers, shopkeepers and 
retail merchants, at the same time providing services such as laundry, tailoring (...) food 
preparation and hotels” (Hu-DeHart, 2010, p. 71). 
  
Chinese immigration did not stop after the East Asian country became more powerful. 
Instead, the last and current wave of Chinese migration started. Although the quantity is 
not the same, nowadays Chinese are migrating to Latin America as part of international 
firms (Kurlantzick, 2006, p. 6 and Lausent-Herrera, 2012, p. 391), as government staff 
(Ellis, 2009, p. 275), among other reasons. Ellis considers that more recent immigration 
“is likely to expand the presence of Chinese culture in the region, from entertainment to 
foods to style. Although Latin America may continue to be dominated by US culture” 
(Ellis, 2006, p. 19).  
 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Chinese government initiated official and pragmatic 
relations62 as part of its strategy to reach out to the subcontinent (Mora, 1997, pp. 35-42). 
“Because of China´s support for the region´s revolutionary groups (...) Beijing [had been] 
(…) unable to establish normal diplomatic or economic/trade relations with any country 
except Cuba” (Mora, 1997, p. 40).  
 
With China´s growth as an economic as well as political power and its status as an 
emerging and regional power, the country started competing directly with established 
powers (Sun, 2013). While the US gradually lost control over its “backyard”, the East 
                                                 
62 The East Asian country does not differentiate between partners, if they are autocratic, democratic, small, 
middle or great powers (Nolte, 2010, p. 883 and 900, Chellaney, 2006, p. 63 and China-Latin America Task 
Force, 2006, p. 7 and p. 18).  
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Asian country was carrying out closer South-South relations (Oviedo, 2006, p. 397 and 
Leiteritz, 2013, p. 69) with it. At the beginning, though, none of these dynamics was 
massive, as “Latin America was of marginal interest to Beijing´s foreign policy priorities. 
The region seemed impenetrable and distant, largely because of China´s general lack of 
knowledge concerning [its] culture, language, politics, and socioeconomic conditions” 
(Mora, 1997, p. 36 and Jacob, 2010, p. 140).  
 
The complex relations that exist nowadays with Latin America started forming after 
China´s entry to the WTO that afterwards led to initiatives such as the strategic 
partnership model, which focuses on economic factors (Oviedo, 2006, p. 400). One of the 
main reasons for countries to be chosen by China as strategic partners is “because they 
are key powerbrokers in the region, as bilateral actors as well as leaders in regional 
organizations like UNASUR, ALBA or BancoSur, with significant influence over other 
smaller countries.” (Dominguez and Stenman, 2009, p. 22)  
 
FTAs focus on the trade63 of resources from Latin America, frequently in exchange for 
low quality products from the Chinese side (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 
2010a, p. 33, Leiteritz, 2013, p. 73 and Oliveira, 2012), “the bulk of which are labor-
intensive, low-technology, and low-value added. Key products here are textile and 
apparel, footwear, machinery, and plastics” (Philipps, 2010, p. 184). Meanwhile, a slow 
transition can be observed towards trade in sectors related to, e.g., “automobiles, (…) 
steel, telecommunications, and electronics” (Philipps, 2010, p. 184).  
 
China´s pragmatic foreign policy, which includes win-win deals, (Leiteritz, 2013, pp. 71-
72 and Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 26) has offered Latin America the 
possibility to open its own markets. But, there have been some strings attached. On the 
one hand, the countries in the region could be walking right into a resource trap (Santiso, 
2007a, p. 14) by not building their own industries in more advanced sectors but exporting, 
for example, strictly agricultural products (Ellis, 2009, p. 12). On the other hand, China 
will and might already have begun to face the same challenges in Latin America as in 
East Asia, where local populations are reacting to its presence. Fernández Jilberto and 
Hogenboom speak of different China effects, depending on the country analyzed within 
                                                 
63 Already in the 1980s had trade occupied the top most priority for China´s relations with Latin America 
(Mora, 1997, p. 44). 
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the subcontinent (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012a, p. 181). 
 
Some industries are being affected by competition (United States Congress Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 2008, p. 16), and resources are becoming scarce, while 
environmental problems have arisen (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 26) 
because of massive Chinese-funded infrastructure and economic projects (Gallagher, 
2010, p. 7 and Ellis, 2009, p. 150).  
 
One way to counteract problems arising from extended economic relations are political 
and diplomatic exchanges. One example is Chinese presence in regional Latin American 
organizations. It includes membership, observer status at and investments in the 
Interamerican Development Bank (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 
34), the Latin American Integration Association64 (Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 
2012b, p. 11) the OAS (Ellis, 2009, p. 3) and exchanges with Mercosur (Philipps, 2010, 
p. 180). Active participation in issues related to APEC,65 the Pacific Basin Economic 
Council (PECC) (Hauser, 2009, p. 14), FEALAC66 (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 11)67 
has kept growing.  
 
Political visits could be attributed to the One-China policy (Leiteritz, 2013, p. 75 and 
Strauss, 2012, p. 148). China has long wanted to achieve one political goal through its 
diplomacy, which is to keep pushing Taiwanese presence back from Latin America (Mora, 
1997, p. 42), where the island still has at least half of its worldwide supporters (Khanna, 
2009, pp. 126-127, Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 7 and Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 33).  
 
China has become an emerging power in the region, through its economic policies, 
presence in multilateral organizations, as well as growing political ties with the 
subcontinent. It has received the recognition as a growing power through its participation 
in regional political and multilateral dynamics, as part of BRICS (Biblioteca del Congreso 
                                                 
64 ALADI. 
65 Only Chile, Mexico and Peru (Berríos, 2012, p. 139) are full members of APEC, which has allowed them 
to benefit from closer ties with East Asia (García and González de Castejón, 2004, p. 56 and Jacob, 2010, 
p. 147). 
66 Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation. 
67 Since the creation of FEALAC, “almost all (…) Latin American countries” (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, 
p. 1 and pp. 19-20) have participated in it; cooperation takes place through multiple channels, including 
cultural issues (Hosono and Nishijima, 2001, p. 20). 
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Nacional de Chile, 2010a, p. 34), and as a competitor of established powers.  
 
China´s economic strength towers over all other factors (Mora, 1997, p. 48). Political 
exchanges, diplomatic arrays or development aid, mostly accompanied by the building of 
infrastructure, or both at once (Ernst & Young, 2012, p. 16) can be understood as 
accompanying initiatives. What role does cultural soft power play in all of this? How is 
it connected to the economic factor, to political and diplomatic initiatives? Has it helped 
China turn into an emerging power in the subcontinent? I will analyze these questions in 
the next subchapter. 
 
3.2.1 Chinese soft power in the region 
 
China´s cultural soft power in the region is not recent, starting even before official 
political relations with the region formed. In the 1940s and 1950s, the country “hoped to 
win sympathy of educated Latin Americans (...) and convince them that the Chinese 
revolutionary experience and strategy were applicable to their situations. The individuals 
were targeted because of the great influence they exerted in their own countries. In short, 
along a combination of diplomatic channels and economic resources” (Fernández Jilberto 
and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 11). China had, already at that time, realized the importance 
of cultural and ideological diplomacy (Mora, 1997, pp. 38-39). 
  
Hanban´s current activities within the subcontinent make it possible to state that CIs are 
the Asian country´s ambassadors of culture in Latin America. Their main activities 
include language courses, cultural knowledge and expert advice on China. 
 
One big step towards creating specific programs by the CI for its bureaus in Latin America 
was taken in 2014, when a regional center for the coordination of Hanban´s activities in 
the region was created in Santiago de Chile. Meetings of all CIs located in Ibero-
American countries had been taking place for years. For example, “[t]he 2010 Joint 
Conference of Confucius Institutes in Iberia was held in Chile. More than 100 delegates 
from 25 Confucius Institutes in 10 countries, Chinese embassies to 10 countries and 14 
partner universities and colleges in China attended the conference” (Hanban (Confucius 
Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 61).  
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Confucius Institutes are located at universities, but academic exchange between China 
and its Latin American counterparts remains limited. “Much of the cooperation between 
educational institutions in China and Latin America remains focused on science, 
vocational, or technical education.” (Inter-American Dialogue, 2012) One reason being 
that East Asia has only recently appeared on the subcontinent´s radar, when compared to 
other regions (Jacob, 2010, p. 140). Another one is that there “has been no systematic 
policy network involving the state, domestic companies and academic institutions to 
design and promote an Asia-Pacific policy” (Berríos, 2012, p. 148).  
 
The Community of Chinese and Latin American Studies (CECLA), located in China and 
created in 2015 by academics from that country and from Latin America (Comunidad de 
Estudios Chinos y Latinoamericanos, n.d.), is an active actor within the educational sector 
in areas ranging from research to exchange to cultural activities, business, politics and 
education. CECLA created the Guanghua Fund in 2015, which is “its first public fund to 
generate exchange between young Chinese and Latin Americans.” (Castro Obando, 
2016a) The fund takes advantage of Latin America´s cultural year in China in 2016, which 
enables using public diplomacy elements related to that event, to bringing both sides 
within the academic sector closer together (Castro Obando, 2016). 
 
Chinese presence has had another source in Latin America: soft power related to China´s 
massive growth since the beginning of the 20th century. It took several years for the local 
population to accept the Chineseness in the products that they were buying, as well as for 
the government to realize that Chinese culture should be promoted for soft power sake 
and to improve the country´s international position.  
 
Recently, Chinese cultural products and brands Made in China have acquired more 
prominence within the Latin American landscape.  
 
For example, Chinese technological brand names used to be discarded due to the low 
quality associated with them. Nevertheless, companies, i.e., ZTE and Huawei (Silk and 
Malish, 2006, p. 123), have become active actors in countries such as Brazil, both winning 
important contracts in the country (Ellis, 2009, p. 55). “Telefónica, the leading Spanish 
firm with a regional Latin American franchise, (...) offered Huawei facilities to enter the 
Latin American market in a move to sell products for all of (…) [its] Latin American 
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subsidiaries.” (Blázquez et al.,2007, p. 70) Huawei has been successful in Colombia, 
where it is supplying local companies Movistar and Colombia Móvil (Ellis, 2009, p. 164). 
 
China´s cultural soft power in Latin America is intrinsically related to the country´s 
economic situation and steady growth. It is difficult to know how much the Chinese 
government realizes and adapts its strategies, and how much it is interested in, for 
example, the CI offering more courses related to business (culture), investment and others. 
Yet, this connection is vital to understand how Chinese cultural soft power is working.  
 
The strong interaction between the cultural and economic spheres is reflected in the 
country´s soft power capacity. Economic possibilities could attract more people to 
Chinese cultural initiatives to show them that, by learning the language and knowing the 
culture, they are able to participate in the Chinese miracle. But, a combination of 
economic and soft power could only become a reality once the government does not 
strictly separate, as it is currently doing, culture from power factors such as politics and 
economy.  
 
In the next part of the chapter, I will discuss soft power from the point of view of a middle 
power. South Korea had almost no influence on the Latin American landscape before the 
last decade. 
 
3.3 A growing presence in the subcontinent: South Korea´s foreign relations with 
Latin America 
 
The first step towards bilateral relations between South Korea and Latin America was 
taken at the end of the 1940s, and taken advantage of during the Korean War. South 
Korea´s progressive growth in the following decades was accompanied by more solid 
relations and exchanges with the subcontinent, for example in the area of manufacture 
(Giné Daví, 2008).  
 
During the 1990s, the East Asian country became a member of the United Nations and an 
important economic actor. At the same time, the East Asian crisis hit those Latin 
American countries that had profited from closer relations to the region´s countries, as 
they were not able import resources at the same pace they had done before (García and 
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González de Castejón, 2004, 100). Trade with South Korea almost fell to half of its 
normal volume, while investments and other financial transactions had to be stopped 
(Giné Daví, 2008).  
 
Nevertheless, South Korea began positioning itself internationally as a middle power in 
the subcontinent (Velarde, 2015, p. 41), for example by emphasizing diplomatic and 
economic relations, which included the first official visit of a South Korean president to 
Latin America (Kim Young Sam) (Chacón, 2011, p. 3).  
 
Important middle power initiatives such as MIKTA, of which Mexico also forms part, 
and the Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean also became a reality. KLAC 
“was founded on August 21st, 1996 with the mission of improving and deepening (…) 
economic, social and cultural realms between Korea and Latin America and the 
Caribbean.” (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006) The Council 
creates exchange with Latin American countries in topics related to trade, diplomacy, 
political relations, business and culture (Korean Council on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 2016), among others. The Council has even signed MOUs with several (inter-) 
regional institutions (Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2006). 
 
Additionally, South Korea has either a permanent or an observer status in the PECC, OAS, 
FEALAC, IDB since 2005 (López Aymes, 2012, p. 4 and Giné Daví, 2008), and 
ECLAC68 since 2007; these institutions serve the purpose of amplifying interregional 
cooperation (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 33 and Giné Daví, 
2008), as does APEC (Inter-American Development Bank, 2011, p. 29).  
 
The country has become an important actor within FEALAC, where it has “not only 
participated, but played a leading role (…) as: Regional coordinator for East Asia (2004-
2007), Co-Chair of Working Group on Economy and Society (2010-2011) and Co-chair 
of Working Group on Politics, Culture, Education and Sports (2010-2011)” (MOFA, 
2012, p. 101). In 2012, the first “High-Level Forum between Korea and the Caribbean” 
took place (MOFA, 2012, p. 101), broadening South Korea´s area of possible diplomatic 
influence. The country has also cooperated with the Central American Integration System 
                                                 
68 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. 
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founded in 1993; an alliance that resulted in a MOU (MOFA, 2012, p. 102).  
 
Economically speaking, South Korean interests in Latin America resemble China´s. Its 
economy relies on natural resources (Lee, Kim and Shirley, 2011, pp. 252-255) for the 
continuous development of its industries, which include high technologies and other areas, 
i.e., shipbuilding. “[I]t is not only China in the Pacific basin that represents an important 
market for Latin American exports with potential to grow. Asian countries such as Japan, 
the Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (…) are interesting 
trade partners for Latin American economies.” (Jacob, 2010, p. 146) This is reflected in 
the fact that, nowadays, several FTAs have already been signed between Korea and Latin 
American countries (MOFA, 2012, pp. 97-98), including with Chile in 2002 (Giné Daví, 
2008 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 33).69  
 
Where China has its official strategic partnerships, South Korea has strategic relations 
with its closest partners, with whom the country cooperates closely. Politically, Latin 
America offers to South Korea a new group of countries to partner up with on an 
international level, around topics such as intellectual property or human rights. The fact 
that the East Asian country (Snyder, 2009, p. 4) and the subcontinent have been close to 
the US for decades, might also matter. Common ideological believes, i.e., neoliberalism, 
democracy and respect for human rights, are areas where a closer relationship could 
develop. 
 
There is no “Seoul Consensus”, but the East Asian country´s growth model provides 
“valuable lessons coming from its successes in mass and elite education, information 
technology, transport infrastructure and clean energy technologies” (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2011, p. 25). South Korea, as a middle power, can offer the 
experience of transitioning from developing to developed and from a producer of cheap 
products to one of high technology (MOFA, 2012, p. 105).  
 
The following analysis of South Korean foreign policy tools will demonstrate that Nye 
and other soft power experts have been systematically neglecting smaller and middle 
countries´ capacity of building soft power. I will also show that countries can emerge, in 
                                                 
69 See Inter-American Development Bank (2011) for more information about bilateral agreements and 
cooperation initiatives between South Korea and several Latin American countries.  
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their own or in other world regions, through (cultural) soft power. 
 
3.3.1 South Korean soft power in the region 
 
South Korea has emerged in Latin America through cultural soft power. 
 
That cultural rise happened within a region that had not before been strongly interested 
in East Asia and which had been influenced by American cultural presence. The Korean 
government has tried to reduce geographical distance by financing programs that support 
cultural events throughout the subcontinent. One example is the “Mutual Cultural 
Exchange Program” to promote more bilateral contacts (MOFA, 2012, p. 251 and pp. 
254-255). The “program gives an opportunity for more than 130,000 Koreans to 
experience other cultures and helps them to gain a deeper understanding of cultural 
diversity” (MOFA, 2012, p. 256). Cultural exchange on a bilateral level also takes place 
through Joint Cultural Commissions, which have brought Korea closer to several Latin 
American countries, including Ecuador and Colombia (MOFA, 2012, p. 257). 
 
But governmental efforts have not single-handedly caused the phenomenal growth of 
Korean culture in Latin America since the beginning of the 2000s. So many Latin 
Americans are now interested in learning Korean that the SI is offering different language 
course levels (Lee, 2012) and has opened additional branches in the subcontinent. So-
called “Hangeul schools” teach the language by focusing on the Korean alphabet, which 
is “a valuable cultural asset that encompasses the Korean people´s culture, history, and 
tradition in a concise form” (Song, 2012, p. 55).  
 
The rise of Korean as the “it”-language has been caused by the presence of Korean 
cultural products in Latin America. As mentioned before, for some authors Hallyu reaches 
other countries in four stages (Kim, 2011b, pp. 153-154).70 As will be seen in this chapter, 
some Latin American countries have already reached the second stage, by surpassing 
mere consumption while associating cultural products with the country they stem from.  
 
I will start the analysis of Korean cultural products in Latin America with K-Pop. Fans 
                                                 
70 See the second chapter of this study, segment 2.2.1 “Cultural soft power: The Korean Wave”. 
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are attracted to the voices, and the esthetics of singers, boys or girl groups. Learning K-
Pop lyrics and dances, imitating (Seo et al., 2012, p. 10) and understanding them is one 
of the elements that have powered Korean language learning.71 South American (…) fans 
hold regular meetings online and offline to share information about the most recent 
albums and concerts or promotional activities of their favorite singers” (Seo, 2011, p. 50). 
According to the Samsung Economic Research Institute, “companies need to turn their 
attention to K-pop fans in (...) Latin America (...). [They] should devise an overseas 
marketing strategy that includes K-pop management companies´ use of SNS platforms” 
(Seo et al., 2012, p. 11).72 
 
K-dramas are also attracting younger generations who watch them 73  via internet or 
(MOFA, 2012, p. 259) on their favorite TV channels, in countries varying from Cuba 
(Limb, 2013) and Venezuela, to Costa Rica and US territory Puerto Rico (Chung, 2011, 
p. 34). They began airing in the region about 14 years ago (Seo, 2011, p. 74). “In Mexico, 
Winter Sonata, My Lovely Samsoon, All about Eve, Autumn in My Heart, (...) and Four 
Sisters aired on the country´s public network Mexiquense” (Chung, 2011, p. 34). In 2007, 
SBS partnered with Telemundo, which is present throughout Latin America, with the goal 
to export K-dramas to the subcontinent´s market (Lee et al., 2011, p. 257). In Peru, several 
dramas have been shown on TV Perú (Chung, 2011, p. 34 and 2013, p. 9) and Channel 7 
(Seo, 2011, p. 74). K-dramas proved to be popular in regional channels such as Mundo 
Fox and Red Guaraní, where they are even actively competing against local TV content 
through higher ratings (up to 200% more) than other productions (Chung, 2013, p. 9). 
 
This may be related to the fact that there are “[g]overnment measures to sustain (…) 
[them] (…) included subsiding production costs of some films and TV dramas, as well as 
facilitating the broadcast of Korean TV drama series in Latin America”74 (Fisher, 2014, 
p. 15.) They are also liked because they “explore themes and values that the Korean 
people share with many other cultures that are (...) traditional, collectivist, and 
hierarchical” (Kim, 2011b, p. 155).  
                                                 
71  Peruvian K-Pop fans, for example, are very active. One “flash mob turned into a Korean cultural 
experience with Korean food, dancing, and even a Taekwondo demonstration.” (Seo, 2011, p. 49) 
72 SNS meaning Social Networking Service(s). 
73 See Chung (2011, pp. 32-33) for a map of countries in which K-dramas are watched. 
74 “[T]he Korea Foundation supports the airing of Korean soap operas free of charge; as a result, Autumn 
in My Heart and Winter Sonata were dubbed into Spanish for broadcast in eleven countries (...) while Jewel 
in the Palace was shown in eight Central and South American countries” (Chung, 2011, p. 49). 
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While it cannot be considered a product, interest in Korean education is also part of 
Hallyu. However, university programs in Latin America that center on Korea remain 
limited.75 Some examples are the Korean education program and a degree in Korean 
studies offered in Mexico, a lecture offered in Cuba and, “Korean language programs or 
lectures on Korean studies (...) run by universities in seven Latin American countries, 
including Cuba, Mexico, Brazil, and Guatemala” (Lee, 2012). These efforts could be 
further developed, for example by “creating professorships at foreign universities, 
sending visiting professors, and research[ing] on Korean studies” (MOFA, 2012, p. 260), 
financing scholarships, lectures, materials and language programs, extending invitations 
to experts and researchers, among the options that the Korea Foundation and MOFA offer 
to countries worldwide (MOFA, 2012, p. 261).  
 
There is also the possibility of expanding regional meetings dedicated to Korean studies 
in the subcontinent, the so called “Encuentros de Estudios Coreanos en América Latina” 
(EECAL), which started in 2003 (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2013). About 32 
professors from all over the subcontinent were invited to the first event hosted by EECAL 
in Argentina (Velarde, 2015, p. 42). Since then, they have taken place every two years, 
in different Latin American cities. Goals are to strengthen academic networks, existing 
cooperation and integration between the subcontinent and South Korea, as well as to 
research political, economic and cultural issues (Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2013). 
Case studies have also included Cuban-Korean exchanges, the Colombian FTA with 
Korea, Korean culture in Buenos Aires (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, 2015), 
ASEAN, education, online presence, Confucianism, and religion (Velarde, 2015, p. 42). 
 
Another important aspect of South Korean soft power is its cultural presence in Latin 
America through immigration. Compared to the Chinese case, not as many ethnic 
Koreans live in the subcontinent and immigration started much latter than in the case of 
other countries. The first wave (previously just a few individuals had chosen that path) of 
Koreans reached the subcontinent at the beginning of the 20th century, for work at local 
plantations; a second wave arrived shortly after the end of the Korean War (Mera, 2006). 
A third wave of Korean immigrants reached Latin America in the 1960s (Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 32). They “moved to cities (….) and devoted 
                                                 
75 See Velarde (2015, p. 43) for an exemplary list of Korean studies that exist in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico. 
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themselves to commercial activities” (Mera, 2006). Most of these Korean emigrants left 
for countries in South America, including Brazil and Argentina (Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2012, p. 32). Further re-emigration to other countries in the region 
also took place. 
 
The relatively small number of Koreans living in Latin America has managed to take 
advantage of Hallyu by multiplying business activities, selling diversified products, e.g., 
Korean food (Mera, 2006), and attracting fans from different countries. As will be seen 
in the following chapter, Koreans in Chile have even contributed to the growth of Hallyu, 
and with that, of Korean cultural soft power. 
 
In the last part of the analysis of South Korea´s presence in Latin America, I will compare 
the country´s position within the region with that in East Asia, to analyze the following 
topics: how South Korea has positioned itself in a region that is not its own, the role the 
government plays in how cultural soft power has developed there, the smart power or 
other power combinations that are present in the country´s foreign policy and if soft power 
functions better between countries that are already culturally close. 
 
Comparison of South Korean presence in East Asia and in Latin America 
 
The characteristics of a middle power become visible through South Korea´s foreign 
policy vis-à-vis Latin America, as they do in East Asia. For instance, the country is 
actively participating, through niche diplomacy, in diplomatic and development aid 
related issues and developing different channels of interactions with Latin American 
countries, be it through MIKTA, APEC, or the G20. A middle power is expected by others 
to abide by the international rules and to not grow into a dominating or hegemonic power 
(Lee et al., 2011, p. 249), which is why the use of soft power, cultural or not, adapts more 
to South Korea´s international image, and why it has enabled the country´s rise in East 
Asia, and in Latin America. 
 
The subcontinent generated new opportunities for the country to overcome its limited 
middle power status, for example by hosting conferences on environmental protection, 
on human rights or on conflict prevention, or by collaborating on local initiatives with the 
help of its volunteer programs. One related initiative has been World Friends KOICA 
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Advisors, through which “[a]dvisors specialized in public administration, education, 
health, agriculture, etc. are dispatched to partner countries for knowledge transfer and 
policy advice.” (Korea International Cooperation Agency, n.d.) 
 
The spillover effect of K-Pop, K-dramas, K-movies and other elements that started the 
Korean East Asia was unexpected in Latin America. It is South Korea´s main tool in the 
cultural area, and one example of why Nye´s thesis of how cultural closeness is required 
for soft power to work, cannot be sustained. If Latin American and East Asian cultures 
are different, why has soft power now got a stronghold there? Is it the Asianness in 
Korea´s soft power, which has drawn Latin Americans to it? I will expand that analysis 
when focusing on the case study Chile.  
 
South Korea has adapted its cultural soft power to different contexts due to government 
participation (Kim, 2012c, p. 550) and simultaneously due to internet presence, television, 
fan clubs, among other elements (Ko et al., 2014, p. 314). The country´s, mostly cultural, 
soft power in Latin America has therefore expanded to the point of accentuating the 
separation between soft power supported by the government and that which has grown 
by itself (MOFA, 2012, pp. 101-104). 
 
Korean government efforts and the massive influx of Korean cultural products have 
created in East Asia what could be dubbed as a “Korean threat”. Japan and China have 
already started to limit the presence of K-dramas or movies in their markets, out of fear 
of a cultural domination. This is not the case in Latin America due to several factors. As 
a new actor, it can even be considered a “counterbalance to the presence of other major 
economic powers such as Japan and China, under the assumption that even while 
acknowledging Korean industrial superiority compared to Latin American counterparts, 
there are commonalities with developing countries. This may influence the perception 
that Korea is a more trustworthy partner” (López Aymes, 2012, p. 2).  
 
Additionally, not much interest in or knowledge of South Korean politics or for that fact, 
of its history is shown, for people to think about a cultural domination in the future. South 
Korea is a middle power, an inconspicuous status that allows it to move forward (López 
Aymes, 2012, p. 2) without as much resistance as other countries would experience. It is 
an example of Nye´s disregard for the role of smaller countries´ soft power. 
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3.4 Preliminary conclusions 
 
The previous chapters have underlined the differences and commonalities of Chinese and 
South Korean presence in Latin America.  
 
China´s position as an emerging power is powerful enough for it to compete with local 
regional powers, i.e., Brazil and the US. It does have, accordingly, greater responsibilities 
accompanying it. South Korea is an emerging power that takes advantage of middle 
power diplomacy and elements shared with its foreign policy in East Asia. The country 
has, due to its rise in the cultural sector, the possibility to dominate as a cultural emerging 
power and thus surmount its traditional role as a middle power.  
 
In the Chinese case, the soft power employed is part of its foreign policy package, yet not 
the main determinant of its rise. Its position as an economic powerhouse strengthens its 
ability to influence and to attract (Smits, 2014, p. 4 and Gallagher and Porzecanski, 2009, 
p. 12). Cultural soft power merely accompanies the strategic interest expressed by Latin 
Americans towards that country. The South Korean case is different because its soft 
power element of culture has reached people first, and then attracted their attention 
through the existing ties between Korean cultural products, for example with Korean 
technology or education.  
 
“Hallyu provided a small state like South Korea, the opportunity to positively 
influence the awareness of Korean culture and educational development in different 
states in Latin America. At the same time, it also provided the Korean state with the 
possibility of a new consumer group of Hallyu interested people and a new market 
for exporting its culture and products. In these ways, the cultural phenomenon 
provided the (…) government with an additional mechanism that brought the 
economies, education, government, and peoples of both Latin America and South 
Korea together” (Ko et al., 2014, p. 322). 
 
While Nye holds the view that close cultural traditions or a common culture, make it 
easier for a country´s soft power to succeed, they are not a prerequisite. Neither China 
(Wen, 2012, p. 30) nor Korea have deep cultural roots or common political or historical 
traditions with the subcontinent, besides issues such as collaboration during the Korean 
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War or Maoist China´s influence guerilla movements within the subcontinent (Dosch and 
Goodman, 2012, p. 6). Hallyu´s common roots in American culture, though, might have 
an impact on why the second country is accepted culturally. Latin Americans are more 
accustomed to US cultural presence, as a deduction these same elements that they 
perceive in South Korean cultural soft power might have presented the country with an 
advantage its competitors do not have.  
 
Both East Asian countries offer models of growth: The Beijing Consensus in the Chinese 
case, the “Miracle of the Han River” for South Korea. With its cultural soft power 
enabling it to position itself in the region and to impact worldwide, South Korea can also 
be understood as a growth model based on soft power for smaller, middle and emerging 
countries. 
 
Differently to East Asia, the knowledge about both countries history and its influence on 
their culture, as well as the role of their governments, is not well known or may not be 
considered of interest for the local population.76 Neither of these countries was part of US 
presence during the Cold War, which allows them to start with a clean slate that generates 
space to expand different power relevant areas such as investments (Villamizar Lamus, 
2011, pp. 83-84) or cultural industries. 
 
Finally, China and South Korea apply a different combination of soft and hard power to 
the subcontinent, equilibrating both tools accordingly. China uses both hard and soft 
power in Latin America. The former (particularly its cultural element), is not the decisive 
factor for the country´s rise in the region, instead, economic power is, especially the part 
that concerns “culture, commerce, cooperation and investment” (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, 
p. 86, own translation). 
 
Soft power is the decisive factor in the South Korean case: niche diplomacy, aid, sending 
volunteers, and especially culture. The country´s smart power is, clearer than in the 
Chinese case, part of the soft power spectrum and has enabled it to rise within Latin 
America. 
                                                 
76 The Tiananmen incident for example, “had comparatively little impact on Sino-Latin America relations, 
mostly because a majority of Latin American countries did not criticize or pressure Beijing.” (Mora, 1997, 
p. 47) 
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4. Case study Chile77 
 
This chapter will center on the case study Chile. The main goal is to provide empirical 
support to the research carried out within the previous two chapters, which focused on 
Chinese and South Korean soft power in East Asia and in Latin America. 
 
The analysis of the last two chapters demonstrated that China and South Korea are in fact 
emerging powers. Thus, the research for the case study Chile will be initially based on 
these results, taking into account that China´s rise does not depend on cultural soft power, 
while South Korea´s does. Relevant questions are: How are both countries perceived in 
the South American country? Is culture, or are rather economic factors, the determinants 
of a growing relation between Latin American countries, and China and South Korea? 
Another crucial aspect is to continue with the research goals of conceptionalizing soft 
power and expanding the definition of emerging powers.  
 
The following research will show an example of how power resources, particularly soft 
power, can be divided into different categories. Three benchmarks have been created 
based on literature, on interviews carried out during a field study in Chile, data obtained 
from personal contact (e-mails), observations, 78  and on online statistics. Another 
determinant for their creation was the method of content analysis, because it allows to 
directly derive categories from theory and from the literature examined. These 
benchmarks are called: official cultural soft power by the government, non-governmental 
(unofficial) cultural soft power, and combined efforts which include companies and 
universities. Indicators include educational programs, presence of Chinese and South 
Korean culture in media, cultural institutions such as the Sejong and Confucius institutes, 
among others.  
 
The chapter will start with a short analysis of Chile´s importance for and relation with the 
Asia-Pacific region and its bilateral relations with China and South Korea. Thereafter, the 
                                                 
77 See this study´s first chapter for additional information about the case study, for example about the 
methodology and approach employed for the research. 
78 Opportunities for observation were given through the participation in a Seminar by the Chilean Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs on bilateral cooperation, a visit to the CI of the Catholic University in Santiago de Chile 
and a visit to Barrio Recoleta, where much of the Chinese and South Korean commercial and cultural 
activity in Santiago takes place. Each of these observations will be portrayed in the relevant benchmark and 
indicator. 
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focus will be on the operationalization of soft power. 
 
4.1 Chile-China and Chile-South Korea 
 
Some countries in Latin America have developed limited bilateral relations with East Asia. 
Others, i.e., Brazil, Peru and Colombia, are further along the way in diversifying their 
partners in the political, commercial and cultural areas. They have exceeded an export-
import based bilateral relation. Chile is one of them.  
 
The country is leading worldwide in the number of FTA´s signed with different countries 
(Toro, 2010, p. 66), 79  and in exchanges with the Asia-Pacific region (Hosono and 
Nishijima, 2001, p. 18). Diversifying its exports and imports, by selling natural resources 
and other internationally recognized products such as wine, has formed part of the 
country´s actions since the 1990s when the government started its “re-insertion into the 
global economy as well as international politics, after its prolonged political and 
economic isolation” (Fernández Jilberto, 2012, p. 87).  
 
Commercially speaking, it is now seen as a bridge “situated to make the strongest claim 
for this position: it has effectively leveraged a combination of geographical locations, 
good physical infrastructure, government and business infrastructure, and an interlocking 
network of free-trade agreements.” (Ellis, 2009, p. 41) 
 
Chile and East Asia cooperate in numerous organizations and institutions, i.e., APEC 
(Fernández Jilberto and Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 10), FEALAC and Red Académica de 
América Latina y el Caribe sobre China (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 
2015b, and Fundación Chilena del Pacífico). The South American country has also 
become an important actor within APEC (Wilhelmy von Wolff, 2005, p. 171).  
 
Chile was one of the first countries in the region, and worldwide, to recognize the People´s 
Republic of China in after its founding (Manuel R., 20.05.14).80 At that time, the 1950s, 
“Chinese-Latin American relations (…) were predominantly politically motivated and 
                                                 
79 See Organization of American States–Foreign Trade Information System (2016) for the trade agreements 
that Chile has signed so far. 
80 Manuel Rivera, M.A in East Asian history, works as a professor and researcher at Universidad Alberto 
Ibáñez in Santiago de Chile. 
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(…) driven by quid pro quo strategies.” (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 7) Steps that were 
taken to deepen the bilateral relations with its East Asian partner (Fernández Jilberto, 
2012, pp. 93-95), included exchanges with the Maoist regime (Kennedy, 1988, pp. 525-
526) before Pinochet´s coup d’état, and continuing diplomatic contact afterwards (Mora, 
1997, p. 43, China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 21). Chile was also the first 
country within the subcontinent where a Chinese cultural institute was instated in the 
1950s, first in supporting China´s entry into the World Trade Organization, first to 
recognize China as a market economy and first in the subcontinent to sign a FTA with the 
East Asian country (Embajada de Chile en China, n.d. and Fernández Jilberto and 
Hogenboom, 2012b, p. 14). 
 
Bilateral relations, which were already strong before, between these two countries 
deepened through that same FTA, which entered into force in 2006 (Roett, 2010, p. 201 
and Organization of American States–Foreign Trade Information System, 2016). China 
is now Chile´s main commercial partner and the South American country is one of the 
top three preferred investment and trading partners by China in the subcontinent 
(MercoPress, 2012). 
 
The importance of Chilean-Chinese relations can be stated as follows: 
 
“Chile is currently positioned to play the leading role in the expansion of Latin 
America´s trade relationship with China. (…) The number of Chilean 
businessmen in China (…), the number of Chinese businessmen in Chile, and the 
number of Mandarin language schools and China-oriented business classes in 
Chile, positions [it] as an intellectual center of gravity for Chinese businesses …” 
(China-Latin America Task Force, 2006, p. 14).  
  
Korean-Chilean relations have a different dynamic. After South Korea´s independence 
and after the end of the Korean War, Chile quickly established diplomatic relations with 
it in 1962 (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2012). They were soon 
reinforced, and Chile and South Korea have since then been constant partners, 
collaborating on multiple issues, including political, economic, cultural and social ones. 
Most recently, Korea´s Hallyu has led to a strong presence in television and other media, 
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through K-Pop concerts in the country81 (Karina P., 19.05.14),82 and through the trade of 
Hallyu-related merchandise.  
 
Korean trade with Chile has been constantly growing, especially after the FTA between 
both countries (Dosch and Goodman, 2012, p. 9) was signed in 200383 (Organization of 
American States–Foreign Trade Information System, 2016). 84  Cooperation has been 
expanded towards the areas of natural resources, technological exchange and the creation 
of chambers of commerce.  
 
Collaboration also takes place within international and regional institutions (Fernández 
Jilberto, 2012, pp. 91-92). Juan Masón states that Chile is one of the most stable countries 
in Latin America, that it has positioned itself internationally and still lacks leadership 
skills. It has left behind its status as a development country, which changes its commercial 
and business possibilities (Juan M., 26.05.14).85 These are elements that would enable a 
categorization as a middle power and emphasize its commonalities with South Korea. 
 
4.2. Operationalization of soft power 
 
The current chapter focuses on operationalizing the concept of soft power by adopting 
the results of the case study research which resulted from interviews, observations and 
desktop as well as literature research carried out in and outside Chile, and on analyzing 
how China and South Korea have risen there and in Latin America. 
 
Chile was chosen as a case study due to the easy access to information about the South 
American country through statistics on culture, cinema, commerce, and others published 
regularly by the government. Information by the Chinese side about its presence in Chile 
is not always readily available. Frequently, data are not up-to-date, or websites cannot be 
                                                 
81 See Benjamin (2014) for a graphic of the growing number of K-Pop concerts worldwide. Chile is 
mentioned within Latin America as the number one country for this type of event, when the numbers from 
2010 till 2013 are analyzed.  
82 Karina Piña Pérez is the executive director of Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico and an expert in cultural 
and educational exchanges between China and Chile. 
83 Entry into force in 2004 (Organization of American States–Foreign Trade Information System, 2016). 
84 That FTA, combined with another treaty signed with Japan, is considered to have created “surging 
agricultural exports across the Pacific” (Khanna, 2009, p. 164). Giné Daví describes it as paramount for a 
growing number of FTAs between Asian and Latin American countries, also for Korea´s growing exchange 
with the region (Giné Daví, 2008).  
85 Juan Masón works at the Korea desk of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile in Santiago de Chile. 
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accessed. South Korean online presence was already mentioned several times in this study. 
It enables a constant influx of new information, academic and non-academic about the 
East Asian country. 
  
Obtaining information about South Korea through interviews resulted in complications 
as China experts are more numerous in Chile and they are present in different sectors, 
while experts on South Korea are not; the notable exception are those who have 
specialized in East Asia and include the latter country as part of their research or of their 
area of work. The combination of all data and research lead up to the information used 
for and the analysis carried out as part of the categorization, operationalization as well as 
conceptualization of soft power. Additionally, other sources, e.g., statistics by the United 
Nations or regional centers for Latin America, books and articles by international authors 
along with websites were consulted for the case study. 
 
State of research: Measuring soft power 
 
An important effort by IR authors of operationalizing soft power can be found in Whitney 
and Shambaugh (2009). This index measures public opinion and the development of soft 
power in East Asia (Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 2). It “questions how (…) nations 
view each other´s popular culture, commercial prowess and brands, intellectual influence, 
and appeal, universities, diplomatic reputations and political systems” (Whitney and 
Shambaugh, 2009, p. 7). Soft power is divided into several categories, i.e., cultural 
(movies, tourism), human capital (language learning, universities), diplomatic 
(international leadership, trust), political (political system), and economic soft power 
(Whitney and Shambaugh, 2009, p. 2, pp. 8-10 and pp. 35-36).86 
 
Research carried out in the United Kingdom resulted in the creation of an index87 that 
focuses on the enhancement of the country´s own soft power. “[B]y its very nature, soft 
power is a relative and intangible concept that is inherently difficult to quantify. The 
relational nature of soft power, where the perceptions of one country may vary 
                                                 
86 See Whitney and Shambaugh (2009, pp. 15-17) for examples of the tables and charts created by the 
authors to represent the categories included in the index for the case study China. 
87 See McClory (2010, pp. 9-13) for different categories and elements used within the index, e.g., tourism, 
foreign aid and number of foreign student, how these elements were measured, and which sources were 
used. 
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substantially from another, also makes cross-national comparison difficult” (McClory, 
2010, p. 1). Sample countries from different world regions, including BRICS, great and 
small powers were chosen for the index (McClory, 2010, p. 8). It is based on both 
subjective and objective indicators88 and incorporates the factors that impact the most on 
different countries´ soft power and Nye´s definition of the three pillars that generate this 
type of power (McClory, 2010, p. 1 and pp. 3-5).  
 
Ernst & Young created a “Rapid-growth markets soft power index” for emerging market 
economies. Some of the categories used as benchmarks or indicators include: tourism, 
universities (rankings), immigration, language (enrollments) and media exports (films, 
books, etc.) (Ernst & Young, 2012, pp. 7-9 and p. 20). The publication mentions that “soft 
power is a relative and intangible concept that is inherently difficult to quantify (…). 
[W]here the perceptions of one country may vary substantially from another (…) cross-
national comparisons [are] difficult.” (Ernst & Young, 2012, p. 6).89  
 
Pew surveys on world opinion of countries and topics are useful inputs for measuring soft 
power. One example by the Pew Research Center is a publication from 2013 about the 
US´ and China´s global image. Questions in this study included “Is the U.S./China 
a…Partner”, “Does the U.S./China consider your country’s interests?” and “Who Is 
World’s Leading Economic Power?” (Pew Research Center, 2013, pp. 3-4 ).90 In the 
category of cultural soft power, the survey concludes that “Chinese pop culture is not well 
liked in much of either Africa or Latin America (…), Chinese music, movies and 
television is disliked by majorities in six countries, including in Brazil (75%), [and] 
Argentina (68%) …” (Pew Research Center, 2013, p. 29). 
 
Yan and Xu wrote an article that proposes a Chinese supplement to measuring soft power. 
According to them, discussion and research in China about soft power has been too 
limited, neglecting aspects such as: its conceptionalization, how it could be increased, the 
elements it contains, its quantification, and its operationalization (Yan and Xu, 2008, pp. 
16-17). The authors explain that “China´s soft power cannot become stronger if there is 
                                                 
88 Objective indicators are weighted more than subjective ones. 
89 See Ernst & Young (2012, p. 10 and p. 14) for the final results of this index and for a comparison of 
emerging market´s soft power. 
90 See Pew Research Center (2013, pp. 24-31) for examples of the data and of results related to China, 
including public opinion in Chile. 
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not a way to wage weaknesses and strengths against each other, something they consider 
can only be done through quantitative research” (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 18). 
 
In “Sino-U.S. comparisons of Soft Power”, the authors choose to measure soft power 
through three categories, namely international appeal, external mobilization capabilities 
and internal mobilization capabilities. The three categories are divided into several 
indicators, which include the appeal of a political system and cultural attraction (Yan and 
Xu, 2008, p. 16 and p. 21).91 The authors conclude that “it is in the realm of cultural 
attractiveness where China is the least effective. (…) [N]o policy readjustments 
whatsoever can possibly narrow the popularity discrepancy between Chinese folk music 
and Western music (…). So, playing the cultural card as a shortcut will only end up in 
getting half the result with twice the effort.” (Yan and Xu, 2008, p. 25) 
 
Anholt has included in his online index about nation branding the categories: people, 
products, governance, tourism, culture, immigration and investment. The research 
included the questions “How highly do people in” XX country “Rank the culture of XX 
country?”. Latin American countries Argentina, Chile and Brazil as well was East Asian 
countries China, South Korea, and Japan were used as case studies (Anholt, 2009). This 
online index shows how perceptions can be ranked and operationalized in different 
cultures and contexts.  
 
The benchmarks I created for this study are based upon the efforts by these diverse authors, 
especially the categorization of soft power. 
 
Benchmarks used for the case study Chile 
 
The first benchmark (soft power use by the government) analyzes the cultural soft power 
which is carried out by the Chinese and the South Korean governments in Chile. This 
category is divided into three indicators: treaties and MOUs, cultural institutions, and 
cultural events. The second benchmark (non-governmental soft power) observes cultural 
soft power from the point of view of actions by non-governmental actors in Chile; this 
category consists of three indicators: Chinese and South Korean immigrants, cultural 
                                                 
91 Films, educational appeal, etc.  
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institutions and cultural events. The third and last benchmark (combined efforts) stresses 
actions by the Chinese and South Korean governments and public actors, and is again 
divided into three indicators: education, media presence, South Korean and Chinese 
companies.  
 
The differentiation between government and non-governmental actions serves the 
purpose of analyzing to what degree governmental presence within cultural soft power 
impacts on how the latter is received in other regions, and which tools are available for 
the actors using that type of power. 
 
The benchmarks´ indicators carry the same argumentative weight. Each contains a set of 
data or information from the interviews and is an argumentative structure by itself. All of 
them will be measured against the hypothesis of China´s and South Korea´s rise in Latin 
America through soft power. Other factors, such as cultural distance, the role of culture 
for emerging powers and Nye´s uncertain differentiation of power tools will be included 
in the analysis when fitting.  
 
4.2.1 Soft power use by the government 
 
The previous chapter stated that both the Chinese and the Korean governments are active 
participants in the countries´ foreign policy; consequently, they intervene in (cultural) soft 
power. Chinese soft power depends more on government support, while Korea´s Hallyu 
has been successful with the help of different types of actors. I will start the 
operationalization of soft power with the role that government action plays in the case of 
both East Asian actors. 
 
a. Treaties and MOUs  
 
Measuring the impact of cultural soft power while only relying on the number of treaties 
signed in that sector would not ensure a thoroughly objective indicator. It is therefore 
important to investigate, quantitatively and qualitatively 1. How many treaties have been 
signed, especially in the last 15-20 years in which soft power has consolidated its position 
within international relations theory 2. Their contents–do they mention the same issues 
throughout the years, or have they changed? Which elements of culture have been 
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included? Do they fit into the concept of soft power? And 3. if there have been more 
cultural treaties within the period analyzed than they were, numerically, before China and 
South Korea began rising in Latin America.  
 
In the Chinese case, the number of treaties in the cultural sector has been relatively 
constant, although decreasing since the 1990s. Six cultural, and related, treaties came into 
force in 1982, 1985, 1988, 1989, 1992 and 2008 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
Chile, n.d.-a). This means that only one governmental cultural treaty has been signed 
since China started emerging in Latin America.  
 
The first one was related to cultural exchange between both countries (1983-1984), as 
was the second one (1985-1986). The third, fourth and fifth treaties continued the same 
approach, creating the background for cultural exchange till 1993 (Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-b) Topics include the presence of artists and of 
expositions, translating literature, educational programs, intellectual as well as sports and 
student exchanges (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile & Ministerio de 
Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, n.d.-a).  
 
Afterwards, no more cultural treaties were signed between both countries till the sixth 
one in 2008 (treaty for the protection of cultural goods). Instead, efforts were made on ad 
hoc programs (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-b). One of them was the 
“Memorándum en las materias de entendimiento entre Chile y China”, a pilot project 
within Latin America that marked the beginning of teaching Mandarin Chinese within the 
Chilean educational system (Asociación de Profesores de Chino Mandarín en Chile and 
Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 17).  
 
A MOU in education was also signed simultaneously with the FTA between China and 
Chile, during an APEC meeting. At that time just two teachers were sent to the south 
American country, but efforts rapidly reached Chilean regions (Working Paper I, Seminar 
bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14). The FTA itself, albeit a commercial treaty, does include 
contents of educational and cultural importance.  
 
First, culture is mentioned as an important area for more future cooperation (Fábrega-
Lacoa, Fábrega-Lacoa and Piña Pérez, 2011, p.21). Second, the document highlights the 
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urgency to sign treaties in the educational area, fourth, it proposes to support efforts by 
institutions and organizations related to education, and fifth, it outlines the creation of 
exchange possibilities for professors as well as students, educational projects, study 
programs, among others (Fábrega-Lacoa, Fábrega-Lacoa and Piña Pérez, 2011, p.23).  
 
MOUs between Hanban´s CIs and local universities are also signed, but their contents are 
generally not made public.  
 
Those treaties in existence have yet to be expanded and their goals clearly stated for soft 
power to have a clear base on which China can rely on and to generate more impact in 
Chile. M.W.,92 affirms that the relationship with China lacks content, which means much 
is said, but not carried out. That fact is particularly visible when compared to the Chilean 
relationship with the US, where academic, scientific and technological exchange, visas, 
travels, globalization, internet and other topics are highly relevant (M.W.,14.05.14).  
 
One example of how culture might be placed in the front line, are White Papers by the 
government (Fabricio R., 22.01.15).93 The Chinese White Paper about Latin America 
from 2008 analyzes how closer ties and historical events between both sides can be 
achieved (Verónica N., 03.06.1494 and Wen, 2012, p. 26).  
 
In the South Korean case, the main cultural treaty and the only one to be listed online 
assigned by Chile, was enacted in 1984 (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-
c). Its contents parallel those included in the Chinese cultural treaties of that time, such 
as sporting events, scholarships, exchange of artistic presentations, etc. (Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile & Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, n.d.-b).  
 
Like in the Chinese case, coordinated efforts and a thought through strategy on the field 
are missing (Karina P., 19.05.14), which could lead to a diffusion of soft power efforts. 
Furthermore, commercial treaties (i.e., the FTA between Chile and the country) (Leiteritz, 
2013, p. 72 and Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, n.d.-c) outnumber those in 
                                                 
92 M.W., who is employed at an institution related to Chilean-Asian Pacific relations in Santiago de Chile, 
asked to remain anonymous. 
93  Fabricio Rodríguez is an expert in Chinese-Latin American relations and a researcher at Arnold-
Bergstraesser-Institutin Freiburg im Breisgau. 
94 Verónica Neghme is an Asia Pacific expert and former director of the Instituto de Estudios del Pacífico 
y del Índico at Gabriela Mistral University in Santiago de Chile. 
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the cultural and social sector, which could limit Korean culture´s reach in Latin America. 
  
South Korea has already published several documents on a yearly basis which have 
included chapters on Latin America showing diverse areas of foreign policy, including 
commercial and diplomatic aspects. As an example, the Diplomatic White Paper of 2012, 
mentions South Korean projects in Chile. For instance, the government “supported 37 
cultural events promoting Korean culture to foreigners at 26 Korean embassies, including 
those in Chile, Ecuador (…) and Spain” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 
2012, p. 255).  
 
For this indicator, the following conclusions can be reached:  
 
Both countries signed treaties in the past, in an effort to make their actions official. There 
persists a discrepancy between the contents of the treaties, i.e., cultural exchanges, and 
the range of activities carried out.  
 
The East Asian countries also have in common that economic and commercial treaties 
outnumber cultural and social ones. While it is impossible for a country to put its cultural 
efforts over everything else, if both East Asian countries intend to grow their soft power, 
they might have to equip their foreign policy with a stronger cultural presence.  
 
China and South Korea have neglected culture in favor of other interests, e.g., commercial 
activities. Nevertheless, the latter´s cultural efforts have grown beyond those 
acknowledged in official documents. There is more movement within the cultural sector, 
which is the country´s leverage and main soft power tool. 
 
Analyzing treaties served as an indicator of how the elements China and South Korea 
have established as part of their cultural foreign policy have permeated Chile. This 
theoretical aspect, because it is primarily dictated by the governments, can then be 
compared to the cultural soft power that has reached Chile and to how local perception 
has been. This measurement of power conversion can be applied to the next two indicators 
and to their counterparts within the benchmarks to follow. 
 
 
80 
 
b. Cultural institutions 
 
Both China and South Korea have representative cultural and language institutions 
created by the government.  
 
There are two CIs in the Chinese case, as well as Confucius classrooms at different 
schools.95 The Institute at the Catholic University in Santiago (Pontificia Universidad 
Católica de Chile) was created in 2008.96 In 2011, it began organizing the Chinese Bridge 
competition and in 2012 HSK exams, at the time of its creation, 87 students were enrolled 
there (Instituto Confucio Universidad Católica, n.d.-c). Since then, it has taught more than 
1500 people, with an average of 200 each year (Opening ceremony Regional Center CI, 
12.05.14). This CI does not limit itself to university students, but also focuses on other 
groups. For example, it also teaches business people, diplomats and government officials, 
among others (Opening ceremony Regional Center CI, 12.05.14).  
 
The CI of Santo Tomas University in Viña del Mar was created in 2008 (Instituto 
Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, n.d.). A steady rise in the number of students can be 
observed there too (Asociación de Profesores de Chino Mandarín en Chile and Instituto 
Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 4). While there were just 43 in 2008, that 
number rose to 118 in 2009, then 472 in 2011 and reached approximately 834 in 2013, 
while attendance to cultural workshops rose from 24 students in 2008 to 458 in 2013 
(estimate) (M. Fernanda Aliaga T., personal communication, August 30, 2013). 
 
The CI expanded its course offering in 2015, afterwards making it possible to learn about 
business with China, and about traditional and modern culture through, for example, 
fashion (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015a). According to Mary Acosta, 
that same institute produces a constant flow of information about activities related to 
China (Mary A., 15.05.14)97 and it organizes events such as movie festivals (Instituto 
Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2016), sports competitions, New Year celebrations 
and even a congress for Mandarin Chinese teachers in Chile (Asociación de Profesores 
                                                 
95 By 2012, at least 31 schools in Chile were teaching Mandarin Chinese to their students (Asociación de 
Profesores de Chino Mandarín en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 17). 
96 And inaugurated in 2009. 
97 Mary Acosta is an international cooperation and business development manager, expert in Chilean-South 
Korean and Chilean-Chinese bilateral business relations in Santiago de Chile. 
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de Chino Mandarín en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 2012, p. 
8 and p. 37). 
 
In addition to the CIs, the Chinese government has sponsored other initiatives, i.e., the 
Centro de Cultura China, created in 2005, which teaches Mandarin Chinese as well as 
Spanish, provides translations and carries out cultural activities (Centro de Cultura Chino, 
n.d.). The Center is located in Providencia, which is an exception since most infrastructure 
related to Chinese culture and to the area of education remains centered in and around 
Santiago. It forms part of China´s governmental or governmentally supported language 
and culture infrastructure in Chile, but will not be further be taken into consideration due 
to its relatively small impact on the field study (Centro de Cultura Chino, n.d.).  
 
Other organizations and institutions play an important role in bringing China closer to 
Chile. One example is the Chinese People´s Association for Friendship with Foreign 
Countries. The CPAFFC first started in 1954 and has since then created its own regional 
organizations, one of which is the China-Latin America and Caribbean Friendship 
Association (CHILAC, sometimes also CHILAFA), which was founded in 1960 (Chinese 
People´s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, n.d.-a and n.d.-b). 
 
In the South Korean case there is less cultural infrastructure, at least for now. The only SI 
in the country, at Diego Portales University, has similar goals to those of the CI, i.e., 
language learning and increasing cultural knowledge. It offers advanced courses on either 
cultural-Korean, for example K-drama analysis or academic-Korean (Centro Asia 
Pacífico Universidad Diego Portales, 2013). One example of another institution besides 
the SI, is the Instituto Coreano de Cultura in Chile, which is sponsored by the Korean 
embassy (Mary A., 15.05.14). The “Korean Cultural Centers” that the Korean 
government has created, are only present in Argentina, Brazil (Ministry of Culture, Sports 
and Tourism, n.d.) and in Mexico (Velarde, 2015, p. 44). 
 
Institutions such as KOICA 98  or the Korea Foundation (Marcos J., 05.05.14) 99 
complement the existing but limited, governmental infrastructure in the cultural area 
                                                 
98 Korea International Cooperation Agency. 
99 Marcos Jaramillo, professor and director of the Asian Studies Center at the Catholic University in 
Santiago de Chile. 
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(Agencia Chilena de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, n.d.). 
 
The reason why people learn Korean stems, as mentioned in this same indicator and in 
interviews, from a strong interest in Korean culture (Mary A., 15.05.14) after having 
experienced it online or through other media. The quick rise in the number of people 
interested in the country´s language and culture can then be attributed to the Korean Wave.  
 
As was the case with the previous indicator, soft power can be measured through the 
institutions that the Chinese and the Korean governments have created. They serve as a 
benchmark of the cultural infrastructure that exists in Chile (the theoretical aspect of soft 
power that was mentioned in the last indicator) and of the actual soft power that has 
reached that the country. That latter has ultimately had an influence over the rise of both 
countries within Chile and within the Latin American continent.  
 
c. Cultural events  
 
It cannot be measured how many cultural events there have been on the Chinese or on the 
Korean side or how many people have attended them. Instead a substantial analysis of the 
types of cultural events that take place in Chile and of their impact on soft power is needed 
for this indicator. 
 
I will first analyze China. One official event in 2014 by that country´s government was 
an international seminar about decentralized cooperation between Chilean and Chinese 
regions and cities;100  it brought together governmental as well as non-governmental 
actors and led to the signing of a MOU between the Chinese People´s Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries and its Chilean counterpart (Asociación Chilena de 
Municipalidades). The goal was to achieve a concrete institutional arrangement to support 
existing efforts. Topics discussed were: education and culture, trade and investment, land 
management, Chinese medicine and tourism (Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de 
Chile; Asociación Chilena de Municipalidades; The Chinese People's Association for 
Friendship with Foreign Countries, Cruzando el Pacífico, 2014, and Seminar bilateral 
cooperation, 27.05.14).  
                                                 
100 “Seminario Internacional: Cooperación Descentralizada e Integración: Nuevos desafíos para la relación 
bilateral entre Chile y China”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile, 27.05.2014. 
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The objectives of the working group “Educación y Cultura”101 were to reinforce teaching 
and learning Mandarin Chinese and Chinese culture within schools in Chile, and also to 
“collaborate with the teaching of Spanish to Chinese speakers” (Ministerio de Relaciones 
Exteriores de Chile et al., 2014 and Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14).  
 
In 2015, the Year of Chinese culture “Año de la Cultura China” took place in Chile. It 
was organized by the Chinese embassy in Santiago (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de 
Chile, 2015b). The year began with a concert presenting Chinese music and included “a 
variety of large-scale cultural events to mark the 45th anniversary of the two countries' 
ties.” (ChinaCulture, 2014)  
 
2016 was Latin America´s cultural exchange year in China, accompanied by Chinese 
cultural presence throughout the continent, in addition to Latin American activities taking 
place in China (Castro Obando, 2016b). “Under the framework of CELAC-China Forum, 
the (…) Year of Cultural Exchange (…) host[ed] a wide variety of cultural activities to 
promote Chinese and Latin America culture, advance mutual friendship and 
understanding, and push forward bilateral cooperation to new heights” (ChinaCulture, 
2016). Cultural years enable China to carry out massive initiatives that involve multiple 
actors, and which position its public diplomacy and soft power agenda at the front line.  
 
Another event that takes place at the CI in Santiago is the Blue Porcelain competition,102 
which can be compared to a talent show of Chinese singing, dancing and martial arts;103 
the event has been highly praised by the participants and by the press (Hanban (Confucius 
Institute Headquarters), 2012 and Opening ceremony Regional Center CI, 12.05.14).  
 
In recent years, there were two paramount events related to Hanban. One was the “2010 
Joint Conference of Confucius Institute in Iberia”, which Chile hosted, and which brought 
together “delegates from 25 Confucius Institutes in 10 countries, Chinese embassies to 
10 countries and 14 partner universities and colleges in China” (Hanban (Confucius 
Institute Headquarters), 2011, p. 61). Another one was the official opening ceremony for 
                                                 
101 I was able to attend the seminar and to form part of the working group, after being invited by the 
Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico. 
102 Concurso Porcelana Azul. 
103 Martial arts are an important part of Chinese soft power in Chile because, as Fiona Cai and Manuel 
Rivera mentioned Kung Fu is often one of the first things Chileans associate with China (Fiona C., 15.05.14 
and Manuel R., 20.05.14).  
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the CI´s Regional Center in Latin America, which is located in Chile, in 2014 (Hanban 
(Confucius Institute Headquarters), 2014, p. 61). Its purpose is to coordinate efforts by 
different sectors and institutes in the subcontinent, which in 2014 were 29 in total 
(Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14 and Centro Regional de 
Institutos Confucio para América Latina, n.d.).  
 
One yearly event, since 2011, is the Chinese Bridge competition (Asociación de 
Profesores de Chino Mandarín en Chile and Instituto Confucio Universidad Santo Tomás, 
2012, p. 11). Chilean participants have managed to reach the international round of the 
competition (Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14). Winning the 
national competition and maybe afterwards the regional or international one will 
guarantee scholarships by the Chinese government, attracting participants. This generates 
educational soft power. 
 
It is visible from these events, and others that follow the same formula, that the Chinese 
government is present in almost every step the country takes, regarding its cultural soft 
power in Chile, and in extension in Latin America. 
 
After analyzing China, I am going to focus on South Korea. The country´s government 
thoroughly reports, online and offline, about cultural events taking place in Chile, 
enabling a constant following of the activities.  
 
The Korean embassy in Santiago organizes different events, catering to the public, 
students and even companies and showcasing the country´s culture. Examples since 2011 
have been a forum to enhance cultural closeness, K-Pop dance and song contests, 
celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between both countries, 
a food and a film festival, K-Pop concerts, the Asia Week 2013, a video competition, a 
seminar about Korean literature and Chile´s educational system in 2015, and language 
courses offered free of charge in a conjoint effort with the Catholic University (Embajada 
de la República de Corea en Chile, 2015).  
 
This indicator exemplifies events created in Chile by the Chinese and South Korean 
governments, which are related the soft power initiatives by both countries. By itself, the 
indicator appears to be inconspicuous, but when compared to the next benchmark and its 
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indicator about events without government intervention, the difference between both East 
Asian country´s soft power in Chile will become clear. Even though both the Chinese and 
the South Korean government promote events that include different cultural aspects, it 
will be seen that the latter acts like a coordinator rather than the sole creator of soft power.  
 
d. Summary  
 
This benchmark about governmental cultural soft power in Latin America has shown 
several aspects of Korean and Chinese rise in the region. 
 
Both countries´ cultures are increasingly creating an impact on Chile. Korean diplomacy 
forms part of its middle power foreign policy strategy, which the country has cultivated 
in the south American country, through cultural events on a governmental level. South 
Korea can be considered an emerging power through culture, and Hallyu plays an 
important part. 
 
China, which has been present for a long time in Chile, does not depend on cultural soft 
power to attract, as its growth into an international power and the commercial ties it has 
created with Chile suffice for it to position itself in the country. Nevertheless, is has 
fostered cultural exchanges, institutions and events, which would initially seem to 
indicate a growth through cultural soft power. This is a hint as to why Nye´s 
differentiation of soft and hard power is not sufficient. Even if China were to expand its 
cultural presence and even if it states that its main goal is to do exactly that, it does not 
follow that the tool has enabled its rise in Chile, and in Latin America.  
 
4.2.2 Non-governmental soft power 
 
The following paragraphs will analyze diverse actions carried out by private institutions 
or by the public that have resulted in the presence of China´s and South Korea´s soft 
power in Chile. 
 
a. Chinese and South Korean immigrants 
 
The complexity of analyzing immigrants from China and from South Korea, and their 
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descendants within Chile requires choosing well which methodology to adopt. One option 
could be to consider quantity. That type of indicator would focus on connecting the 
number of immigrants to their growing or diminishing impact on both East Asian 
country´s soft power in Chile.  
 
The other option is to explore the quality of migration, which analyzes the impact 
immigrants generate in Chile and its society. I choose this aspect because finding reliable 
sources with coinciding numbers regarding East Asian migration to Chile is difficult. In 
some cases, information is missing from Chilean statistics, in other from Chinese or 
Korean ones. Within those, different categories are used: resident Chinese, recently 
arrived Koreans, types of visa given to Koreans, Hong Kong Chinese, South Koreans and 
Chinese who have acquired the Chilean nationality (Farías, 2010).  
 
A commonality between them is a higher number of Chinese present in Chile, in all 
categories and periods mentioned. Examples are the OECD migration database which 
states that in 2000, 231 Chinese migrated to Chile, while in 2011 1575 did; in the Korean 
case, 104 people did so in 2000 and 453 in 2011 (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, n.d.). Other databases, e.g., those by Chile´s “Departamento 
de Extranjería y Migración Chile” 104  reflect the same tendencies (Departamento de 
Extranjería y Migración Chile, 2014). 
 
According to another source, in 2008 there were approximately 4000 Chinese in the 
country (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008b). For 2009, Ellis estimates 
approximately 7000 ethnic Chinese (Ellis, 2009, p. 36). Farías stated that in 2009, 4599 
Chinese were living in Chile, plus 20.000 nationalized citizens and about 1000 Taiwanese 
(Farías, 2010). The data are, altogether, too diverse for a thorough analysis. Knowing the 
exact number of Chinese in Chile would require an extensive new body of research.  
 
The Chinese colony in China is very active in the city of Iquique since the Pacific War,105 
                                                 
104 Official translation: “Alien Status Office”. 
105 During the War of the Pacific, the southern part of Peru became Chilean territory (García and González 
de Castejón, 2004, p. 33). One of Chile´s admirals who was on the frontline during an incursion into Peru, 
spoke Chinese and became very close to the Chinese population that had been on the other side (Reyes 
Matta, 2012, p. 207). Mistreated Chinese subsequently allied with Chilean troops to combat the Peruvian 
ones in 1878 and established themselves in the north (Eng Menéndez, 2013, p. 133), after Peru lost the 
territory (Strauss, 2012, p. 170). 
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and in Punta Arenas, in the southernmost part of the country (Javiera F., 14.05.14106 and 
Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2008b). Other Chinese descendants live in 
Santiago and in major cities where they have formed several institutions that will be 
highlighted as part of this benchmark. Later Chinese migration has followed mostly due 
to commercial interests (Karina P., 19.05.14), or through students that decide to study in 
Chile (Fiona C., 15.05.14).107 Many Chinese have arrived in Chile searching for job 
opportunities, for example in Chinese restaurants, but remain alienated from Chilean 
society due to factors such as missing Spanish skills (Farías, 2010).  
 
Chinese culture has been incorporated into Chileans´ daily lives for a longer time than 
recent cultural products from other East Asian countries. Reyes Matta claims that their 
cultural impact should be looked upon (Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 206-208) because 
immigrants represent one important source for combined efforts in the cultural sector, for 
example by helping change the imagery that persists in the subcontinent, and vice versa 
(Reyes Matta, 2012, pp. 205-206). 
 
The Korean case is different from the Chinese one. 
 
“[F]rom 1962 small, isolated groups of immigrants began to set themselves up in Brazil, 
Bolivia, Paraguay and Chile. From the outset, this wave of immigration was characterized 
by overland remigration between these countries” (Mera, 2006). More Korean 
immigrants arrived in Chile in the 1970s as well as in the following decade. “[A]n 
agreement was signed by Chile and South Korea which exempted Koreans who wished 
to settle in Chile from visa requirements” (Mera, 2006). According to Palacios S., only 
six families arrived at the beginning of the 1970s and several Koreans moved to Santiago 
in the 1980s (Palacios S., 2011). 
 
Because many returned to their home country afterwards, the number of Koreans in Chile 
sank, only to grow again in the 1990s when “a small community had finally come into 
existence, by 1997 it amounted to 350 families, about 1500 people in all” (Mera, 2006). 
104 Koreans migrated to Chile in 2000, 453 in 2011 (Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, n.d.). That same year, about 2100 Koreans were estimated 
                                                 
106 Javiera Flores, coordinator for Asia Pacific at Central University in Santiago de Chile. 
107 Fiona Cai is a China expert in Santiago de Chile. 
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to be living in Santiago (Palacios S., 2011). The Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs states 
that in 2014, there were about 2725 Koreans living in Chile (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Korea, n.d.). As can be seen from these data, Korean migrants were not only 
less in number than the Chinese ones, but they established themselves much later in the 
south American country. 
 
Currently, the South Korean community in Santiago de Chile, the biggest in the country, 
has mainly settled around Patronato (Mera, 2006, Ortiz, 2014 and Mary A., 15.05.14). 
During the field research in Chile, I visited that area. One street is predominantly filled 
with Korean stores: supermarkets (Mera, 2006), a K-drama store, a bakery, Korean 
clothing, a Korean hairdresser, the store “Corea Mall”,108 and several restaurants, e.g., 
“Seoul”, “Chicken Store” or “Sukine” (Visit to Recoleta/Patronato, 17.05.14). Through 
efforts by Korean migrants, even a newspaper “NewsCorea” can be found in Santiago 
(Ortiz, 2014). 
 
Similarly to the Chinese, Koreans first created their own companies in the “clothing and 
commercial textile production” (Mera, 2006). Afterwards first and second generation 
overseas Koreans diversified their businesses, now working in real estate and centering 
on Patronato, where several buildings have been built to create more space for the Korean 
colony´s needs, such as selling clothing, modernizing the existing business model, 
facilitating transport, contact with clients and potential buyers (Palacios S., 2011).  
 
Cultural soft power should not leave out the “human” side of power, as culture is not an 
abstract governmental construct. Measuring the impact of migration in a country is 
important for soft power, since how ethnic Chinese and Koreans engage with it reflects 
how the tool is perceived locally. Moreover, local Chinese and Koreans act as catalyzers 
of soft power as they make culture known to Chileans.  
 
It can also be concluded that Korean culture has expanded in Chile, to the point of 
impacting on the role of the existing infrastructure, specifically in the capital. South 
Korea´s more recent cultural presence has made it possible for migrants to profit from it 
on a larger scale than the Chinese one which has been present in Chile for several 
                                                 
108 Which sells K-Pop and K-drama related merchandise. 
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generations, which means that cultural soft power has helped it rise. 
 
b. Cultural institutions 
 
This indicator is going to evaluate cultural institutions that exist in Chile and which have 
not been created neither by the Chinese nor by the South Korean government. Since there 
is not much infrastructure by Koreans, except the Korean school and the Sejong Institute, 
this indicator will mention Chinese institutions and others for which South Korea is 
merely a focus.  
 
In the Chinese case, a relevant non-governmental cultural and educational entity has been 
Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico. One interviewee mentioned this institution as one of 
the few experts within Chile on educational efforts related to learning Chinese (Mary A., 
15.05.14). Its goals are to bring both countries closer together, essentially by training 
Chileans and through online courses designed by the NGO (Corporación Cruzando el 
Pacífico, n.d.-d). In 2013, about 1000 students, mostly from high schools, were enrolled 
in a course for introduction to Chinese, called “Introducción del Chino Mandarín” (Karina 
Fernanda Piña Pérez, personal communication, October 10, 2013).  
 
The organization informs the public through seminars, as well as conferences in different 
universities in and outside the country, in cooperation with institutions varying from Latin 
American universities to Chinese ministries. Topics are, e.g., Chinese as a foreign 
language in Latin America and language tourism (Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico, n.d.-
a, n.d.-b and n.d.-c). The Corporation´s work also includes facilitating internships and 
scholarships for language courses109 and creating “public-private alliances” (Biblioteca 
del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b). 
 
Furthermore, there is Red Chile China (Mary A., 15.05.14 and Corporación Cruzando el 
Pacífico, n.d.-b). The binational network and research initiative has been launched in 
several Chinese cities, with the help of Chileans living in the East Asian country (Red 
Chile China, 2014). It aims at enabling “collaboration and exchange in academic and 
                                                 
109 An example is “Conoce y emprende con China”, with its triple element of business, language learning 
and cultural background information (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b, Cruzando el 
Pacífico, n.d.-a, n.d.-b, n.d.-c and n.d.-d). 
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cultural, education and business areas” (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 
2015b, own translation).  
 
Another institution is the Sociedad de Beneficencia China, created by Chinese immigrants 
in 1893, years after the War of the Pacific had ended and some of them had moved to 
Santiago (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013b). By 2010, Sociedad de 
Beneficencia China had about 2000 members (Farías, 2010). Since its beginnings, the 
organization has helped nationals solve issues such as monetary problems in Chile (Farías, 
2010). Other objectives are to help interested Chileans get in contact with East Asian 
counterparts (yet, the organization does not engage in commercial activities), and to invite 
the public to celebrations, e.g., the Chinese New Year (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional 
de Chile, 2013b).  
 
The Centro Cultural “Casa de la Cultura China” was created in 2013,110 with about 20 
people enrolled in its Chinese courses, and a waiting list of more than 80 (Rodrigo Riveros 
Arias, former director of the cultural center, personal communication, October 4, 2013). 
While most of the infrastructure relating to East Asian language and cultural studies can 
be found in the region of Santiago, this center is in Tarapacá, in the north of the country 
(Centro Cultural “Casa De La Cultura China”, n.d.). 
 
The “Insituto Asiático de Cultura: Escuela de Negocios Asiáticos” focuses on business 
and culture in (East) Asia. It teaches entrepreneurs and wants to promote Chilean 
initiatives in Asia, which will latter result in the creation of local jobs (Instituto Asiático 
de Cultura, n.d.). One activity carried out in China has been “Viajes de Negocios a China 
para Pymes” (Business trips to China for SMEs–Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, 
own translation), with the specific goal of creating opportunities there and training 
Chileans in language and commerce, among other skills. Support is offered for up to a 
year after return (Instituto Asiático de Cultura, 2015). 
 
Institutions that are not considered cultural can facilitate exchanges and help expand 
connections with business, besides helping stagnating efforts diversify. Commerce 
chambers in Chile include the Asia Pacific Chamber of Commerce founded in 2002 
                                                 
110 According to information received per e-mail, it was created in 2013 but, according to its website, that 
happened in 2007 (Centro Cultural “Casa De La Cultura China”, n.d.). 
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(Cámara de Comercio Asia Pacífico, n.d.), the Cámara Chileno China de Comercio, 
Industria y Turismo111 founded in 1997 (Cámara Chileno China de Comercio, Industria y 
Turismo, 2012), the Korea Trade Promotion Corporation (KOTRA) (Korea Trade 
Promotion Corporation–Korea Business Center, n.d.) as well as the Chilean-Korean 
chamber of commerce founded in 1990 (Cámara de Comercio Chileno Coreana, n.d.). 
 
ProChile has worked on engaging Chile with China and with South Korea, in the areas of 
market access for small Chilean companies. It “has offices in each of the [foreign] 
ministry´s bureaus in China, integrated with the activities of the ministry, in order to 
support the dealings of Chilean businesses in China” (Ellis, 2009, p. 43). One event took 
place in Santiago in 2015, in the form of a binational seminar (ProChile, 2015a), another 
one in Seoul — “Seoul Food and Hotel 2016” — a trade fair organized with the goal of 
attracting Chilean investors, namely in the areas of food, beverages of all types and 
hospitality, among others (ProChile, 2015b).  
 
Fundación Imagen de Chile/Imagen País and FEALAC should also be mentioned here. 
Fundación Imagen de Chile was founded in 2009; it enhances and promotes Chile´s 
nation brand, mainly through research in areas such as commerce and marketing, and 
supervision of international media that mention the country (Fundación Imagen de Chile, 
n.d.). FEALAC has already included cultural topics in its agenda (M.W., 14.05.14). 
 
Comparison 
 
After having analyzed governmental and non-governmental indicators about cultural 
organizations in Chile, I will compare different aspects, namely: their success in 
promoting soft power, the differences in the programs or courses they offer, the attraction 
they exert on potential students and the potential of growth they have. Lastly, I will 
analyze if they have helped China and South Korea rise in Chile. 
 
As for their success in promoting soft power, both types of institutions complement each 
other. For example, the CI puts an emphasis on traditional culture and on language, while 
private institutions offer other options, such as business courses. As mentioned previously, 
                                                 
111 Chilean Chinese business, industry and tourism chamber. 
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Korean culture and with it the Korean Wave, are not dependent on government or 
institutional arrangements. The wave disseminates online (Chung, 2011, p. 38) and has 
quickly promoted cultural soft power, which explains the explosive growth of people 
interested in it and why there might be less local initiatives to create language and cultural 
institutions Governmental efforts complement Hallyu. 
 
Chinese soft power programs depend on the country´s budget or on political factors, all 
of which might affect it. Should the country´s economy start dwindling, then the cultural 
factor might pay the price. Thus, institutes, private or public have done well in 
diversifying the programs and courses they offer.  
 
In the long run, having more institutions is beneficial for both China and South Korea´s 
position in Chile, and the same can be said for Latin America. Nevertheless, relying on 
governmental institutions to expand cultural soft power, which is a tendency in the 
Chinese case, will appear to strengthen soft power, but it is not a fundamental factor in it. 
As can be seen in the South -Korean case, there are less institutions present (private or by 
the government), but the Korean wave has been disseminated by internet and through 
other channels.  
 
Soft power is not determined by more or by less institutions, their role is that of a 
coordinator of different efforts, they help “market” or expand nation branding. They also 
help combine efforts from locals, one example being the Corporación Cruzando el 
Pacífico, and by doing that they reveal how much interest there is in some topics, such as 
business or language. They serve as an indicator to the Chinese and to the South Korean 
government of where soft power is already present, and of where more presence is needed.  
 
c. Cultural events  
 
This indicator consists of some examples and of an analysis that aim at clarifying the 
importance of non-governmentally sponsored and organized public events. More 
examples will be mentioned within the third benchmark, as part of soft power initiatives 
by universities, by Chinese and South Korean companies or within the indicator of media 
presence by both countries. 
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China´s tradition plays an important role in the recognition of the country on an 
international level (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, p. 80), which confirms its impact on cultural 
soft power efforts. As will be seen throughout the rest of the chapter, most soft power 
related events are carried out by the government and are coordinated by both Chilean CIs. 
Consequently, it is difficult to find any events not carried out by the government, which 
is why just one example is mentioned, that is the very successful exposition of the 
Terracotta Army in Santiago (M.W.,14.05.14 and Fernando R.M., 16.05.14). 112 
Villamizar Lamus writes that for Chile, it “was the exposition with the highest number of 
visitors in history” (Villamizar Lamus, 2011, p. 80).  
 
On that note, the Chinese soft power case is an exceptional one: Even if the country did 
not promote its culture actively, and even if events remained bound to the government, 
people would still be attracted to it and to the country´s power (Karina P., 19.05.14). I 
mentioned in the last chapter that China´s history and direct control by the CP over 
different issues, e.g., culture, do not matter enough in Latin America to create a feeling 
of threat. Chile´s pragmatic approach (Fernando R.M., 16.05.14), explains why interest 
in history and politics and the interest in commercial and cultural issues (Karina P., 
19.05.14) remain disconnected to each other. Cultural events accompany China´s soft 
power, but do not determine its growth.  
 
South Korean events are mostly oriented towards Hallyu or towards modern culture. 
Compared to Chinese ones, several can be enumerated because they are not completely 
controlled by the government, and because there are more local initiatives. One example 
was the Korean gastronomy week that took place in 2010 in Chile, in which Korean chefs 
prepared different national dishes, and a class on Korean cooking culture was included 
(Embajada de la República de Corea en Chile, 2010).  
 
Another important event was Music Bank Chile in 2012 (LG Chile, 2012). Together with 
Mexico (Mérida, 2014) and Brazil in 2014 (Knabben, 2014), Chile formed part of the 
series of concerts which were accompanied by events related to the Korean Wave. 
Organized by LG, Music Bank invited several K-Pop artists and attracted thousands of 
Chilean fans (Romero, 2012).  
                                                 
112 Fernando Reyes Matta is the former Chilean ambassador to China as well as professor and director of 
the Center for Latinamerican Studies on China at Andrés Bello National University (Santiago de Chile). 
94 
 
Hallyu is constantly present in Chile. In 2014, the band CNBLUE finished its world tour 
there (RPP Noticias, 2014), boy group SHINee´s concert in the same year attracted fans 
from all over South America (Reyes, 2014), and in 2016, the group B1A4 carried out one 
concert in Chile (Lee, 2016). 
 
Korean soft power could become exactly the type of cultural effort which can position a 
country and its brand, if strategically carried out and continued. The question here is: 
What if the country did not use its soft power, but instead relied on other foreign policy 
efforts? While it is already Chile´s fourth most important trade partner, the country would 
not have achieved its existing fan bases, the interest in its language, the growing sales of 
its products, were it not for its cultural soft power.  
 
Events in Chile related to Hallyu are needed as an indicator because they show how much 
the Korean Wave has permeated society. If they were to disappear, that would be a sure 
sign of a shrinking soft power. The fact that many of them, concerts for example, were 
held because of flash-mobs or organized by Chileans themselves demonstrates that the 
Korean Wave has helped South Korea position itself in the country, and that this has 
happened through nothing other than culture. 
 
d. Summary 
  
Similarly to the previous benchmark, the second one enables a deeper analysis of China 
and South Korea´s rise through soft power in Chile.  
 
Chinese culture has been known in Chile for a long time, and that presence has enabled 
the country to offer diverse opportunities to get in touch with its traditional culture, 
including multiple cultural and language learning opportunities. China´s positioning in 
different spheres of Chileans´ daily lives enables it to not have to rely as much on cultural 
soft power as South Korea. Consequently, culture does not serve its main purpose, albeit 
its constant expansion through governmental efforts.  
 
One of the conclusions reached through this benchmark is that Chinese cultural soft power 
would still attract Chileans even if it remained more distant, if there were stronger 
governmental influences, etc. Not China´s culture has made the country such a 
95 
 
remarkable actor within the South American country, but the attraction that stems from it 
being an emerging and regional power.  
 
South Korea needs cultural soft power for its rise in Chile and, more generally, in Latin 
America. The country is still lagging in its actual presence, while dominating in the online 
placement of its soft power efforts, because Hallyu has outbalanced the spheres of 
governmental control. South Korea can very much benefit from private cultural endeavors. 
Hallyu-related products and other South Korean cultural endeavors have benefitted ethnic 
Koreans and their descendants who have profited from selling Korean products to 
interested Chileans, which means that for them, the Korean Wave equals growing profit 
opportunities.  
 
4.2.3 Combined efforts 
 
This third benchmark analyzes local initiatives, financed by a mix of public and private 
efforts, that are related to soft power. It also includes the general public. That approach 
reflects the liberal approach to IR theory mentioned in the first chapter of the study 
(complex interdependence), as it investigates different actors, besides the state, who 
collaborate on topics that include commercial or environmental interests, possibilities for 
cooperation, agenda-setting, and others.  
 
This benchmark is divided into three indicators. 
 
a. Education: Universities, research centers and schools 
 
Throughout texts by Nye and authors who study this foreign strategy tool, education plays 
a networking role within soft power. Universities and research centers combine expertise, 
the government, private and public efforts in a most visible way. Education furthers 
initiatives ranging from scholarships to student exchanges and cultural centers, which 
enhance a country´s national brand and its soft power.  
 
In the last chapter, I mentioned the small number of study programs in the subcontinent 
that focus on one of the two countries or on Asia in general (Manuel R., 20.05.14). Chile 
fits the Latin American standard when compared to Argentina and Mexico, two of the 
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countries with the most advanced research facilities on East Asia (Javiera F., 14.05.14 
and Velarde, 215, pp. 43-44). Centers within universities in the country are important, 
considering that they function as research, language and teaching institutions that enable 
creating classes and study programs related to the focus areas.  
 
As for the programs that do exist in Chile, classes are offered within the Centro de 
Estudios Asiáticos113 at the Catholic University in Santiago de Chile (Marcos J., 05.05.14 
and Manuel R., 20.05.14). One example is the interdisciplinary “Academic Certificate on 
Asian Studies”, (“Certificado Académico en Estudios Asiáticos”, own translation) which 
consists of several optional courses that can be turned into study credits (Centro de 
Estudios Asiáticos Universidad Católica, n.d.-c).  
 
The center aims at increasing knowledge about Asia, in Chile and in Latin America. It 
works on an interdisciplinary basis, including collaborations with Asian counterparts. 
Cooperation and research exchange form a crucial part its work, also publications, 
seminars and trainings (Centro de Estudios Asiáticos Universidad Católica, n.d.-a). The 
Center has organized, since 2008, the so called “Seminario International de Estudios 
Coreanos”, with the support of Korean companies114  and of the Korean government 
(Velarde, 2015, p. 43).115 Courses at bachelor, master and doctorate level on Chinese law 
are taught at the Faculty of Law, with the goal of teaching students the Asian way of 
thought (Marcos J., 05.05.14).  
 
The Central University of Chile116 in Santiago has created an international center, an 
office for Asia Pacific and a program called “Programa China es Central”, which offers 
language courses, scholarships and training in business related activities–including 
Chinese courses catering to specific needs, for example knowledge of marketing 
strategies (Universidad Central, n.d.-b).  
 
At Andrés Bello National University117 the Center for Latinamerican Studies on China118 
                                                 
113 When I interviewed Marcos Jaramillo, the director of the Center, he commented that negotiations were 
taking place with the University to create master studies related to, for example, China (Marcos J., 05.05.14). 
Until mid-2016, this had not yet been the case.  
114 E.g., Samsung and Daewoo. 
115 The Korea Foundation. 
116 Universidad Central de Chile. 
117 Universidad Andrés Bello. 
118 Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China. 
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was created in 2011. Its objectives are to help Chileans understand China and to show its 
international impact, on a political and economic level (Centro de Estudios 
Latinoamericanos Sobre China, n.d.). It has organized seminars such as “Pensamiento 
griego/pensamiento chino: ¿Qué traen Platón y Confucio al siglo XXI?”119  in 2014 
(Fernando R.M., 16.05.14 and Centro de Estudios Latinoamericanos sobre China de la 
Universidad Andrés Bello, 2014).  
 
The Center for International Studies within the Universidad del Desarrollo carries out 
research in specific areas, e.g., China´s foreign policy and economic reform, Chile´s and 
Asia Pacific international relations, and Chinese language and culture (Universidad del 
Desarrollo, n.d.). Another important endeavor by the university is its program 
“Embajadores del Futuro”, which takes bachelor students to China and shows them the 
country from different perspectives, including historical, cultural and economic ones 
(Universidad del Desarrollo, 2015b). 
 
In 2011, a diploma course called “Diplomado en Asuntos Asiáticos” was offered that 
centered on China, on Japan, and on other countries in Asia through a multidisciplinary 
approach.120 The course included seminars and networking opportunities (Universidad 
del Desarrollo, 2011).  
 
The Catholic University of the Most Holy Conception,121 in the Bío-Bío region, created 
the Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia Pacifico (CEDAP) in 2005. Its goal is to bring 
the Latin America and Asia Pacific together (Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia 
Pacifico, n.d.). Events have included the third China Week in 2015, which put an 
emphasis on cultural presentations, language learning and Chinese business etiquette, 
together with commercial exchange opportunities (Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia 
Pacifico–CEDAP, 2015).122  
 
Diego Portales University has its Centro Asia Pacífico UDP, embedded within the Faculty 
of Economics and Business, which carries out several activities, mainly focused on Latin 
                                                 
119 “Greek thought–Chinese thought: What will Plato and Confucius contribute to the 21st century?”. 
120 Culture, IR, economy, and others. 
121 Universidad Católica de la Santísima Concepción. 
122 See Centro de Estudios y Desarrollo Asia Pacifico (2015) for the program of the China Week 2015. 
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American and Asian business relations. One important event is the Asia Week,123 with 
the participation of different actors, i.e., chambers of commerce, and the CI of the 
Catholic University. Activities in 2015 included language courses, sports and movie 
festivals (Centro Asia Pacífico Universidad Diego Portales, 2015 and Universidad de 
Santiago de Chile, 2013). The Center also offers academic programs such as 2010s 
“Estrategia de Negocios en China” (Business strategies in China, own translation), an 
executive program aimed at entrepreneurs, “Business Circle CEAP” is an initiative that 
embodies a network and a research facility (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 
2010b). The only SI in Chile is also located within this center (Centro Asia Pacífico 
Universidad Diego Portales, n.d.). 
 
The University of Chile´s124 Institute of International Studies created a Center for Asia 
Pacific125 that researches security, regional dynamics, politics and economy. One diploma 
course was offered in 2013 by the Faculty of philosophy and humanities, with a focus on 
China´s economy and culture (Universidad de Chile-Instituto de Estudios Internacionales, 
n.d. and Velarde, 2015, p. 43).  
 
Gabriela Mistral University126 created the Instituto del Pacífico y del Índico in 1982, 
placing emphasis on Chile´s role and that of Chileans in the Pacific region. It published 
newsletters as well as other documents related to its regional focus (Universidad Gabriela 
Mistral, n.d.).127  
 
The University of Santiago128 expanded its academic offer in 2011, by creating a unit of 
oriental and traditional Chinese medicine within its faculty (Universidad de Santiago de 
Chile, 2011). In 2014, the same university opened the Chilean-Korean Study Center 
Program (ChKSCP), which is founded by the Korean government (Chilean-Korean Study 
Center Program, n.d.-a). The center “has established three courses at undergraduate and 
graduate levels, as well as offering opportunities for studies abroad and academic grants” 
(Kim and Yi, 2015). It also publishes papers periodically, and might offer a “Diploma on 
                                                 
123 See Centro Asia Pacífico Universidad Diego Portales (2015) for the program of the Asia Week 2015.  
124 Universidad de Chile. 
125 Centro de Asia-Pacífico. 
126 Universidad Gabriela Mistral. 
127 According to one of the interviewees, the institute had ceased to exist by 2014 (Manuel R., 20.05.14), 
but apart from the interview with him, no information could be found on that topic. 
128 Universidad de Santiago de Chile. 
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Korean Studies” in the future (Chilean-Korean Study Center Program, n.d.-b). 
 
Besides research centers that exist within Chilean universities, there are others on a 
national and regional level. The Fundación Chilena del Pacífico is one example. It even 
signed a MOU with the Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean in 2005 
(Korean Council on Latin America and the Caribbean, 2016). 
 
ECLAC, which has its headquarters in Chile, has fostered exchanges between China and 
the south American country, for example by inviting former Chinese Prime Minister Wen 
Jiabao to speak about China´s “peaceful development” and its loyalty to developing 
countries, at a conference in Santiago de Chile in 2012 (Wen, 2012, pp. 25-31). Another 
event was the “International Seminar China and Latin America. Multidisciplinary 
approaches about a complex relationship” (own translation) in November of 2015 
(Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe, 2015).  
 
FLACSO 129  created in 1957 and nowadays present throughout the region (Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, n.d.), has also carried out research about Asia 
Pacific and organized events. One of them was “China: ajustes, cambios y el largo plazo. 
La mirada desde Chile” for which it partnered up with Andrés Bello National University. 
The aim of the seminar was to debate changes taking place in China´s government at that 
time and how they were related to the country´ economic situation (Facultad 
Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2014).  
 
Chile collaborates with Latin American universities through the Red Académica de 
América Latina y el Caribe sobre China (Karina P., 19.05.14 and Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2015b). Its main goals are to exchange information, create own 
interdisciplinary content and enable the participation of multiple actors from different 
sectors (Red Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, n.d.-a). The network 
regularly organizes seminars, including one in 2014 called “América Latina y el Caribe 
y China: condiciones y retos en el siglo XXI” (Red Académica de América Latina y el 
Caribe sobre China, n.d.-b) and a continuation of that same seminar in 2016 (Red 
Académica de América Latina y el Caribe sobre China, 2015a).130 
                                                 
129 Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. 
130 Tercer Seminario Internacional “América Latina y el Caribe y China: condiciones y retos en el siglo 
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Not only universities or research centers are important elements of soft power, so are 
schools.131 The Confucius Classrooms132 project started in 2011 at the Instituto Nacional 
school in Santiago and is the continuation of efforts by the Chilean government. One 
program by the Ministry of Education called “Proyecto de Enseñanza de Chino Mandarín” 
had already started in 2008, after the CIs had opened their doors in Chile (Biblioteca del 
Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2013a) and afterwards helped “add (…) Chinese into the 
foreign language elective courses of secondary schools in May 2009” (Yang, 2011). 
These classrooms are supported by Hanban, which means that they mirror the CIs 
(Embajada de la República Popular China en la República de Chile, 2011). 
 
Chinese teaching and learning at schools has been so successful that an increasing number 
of students are successfully passing the Young Chinese Learners Test (YCT), more 
teachers are being sent to the country and more schools want Chinese to be taught there 
(Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14 and Biblioteca del Congreso 
Nacional de Chile, 2013a). The Chinese government immediately reacted to the efforts 
by Chilean students, inviting them to language camps in the East Asian country (Working 
Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14). 
 
One Confucius Classroom opened more recently, in March 2015, with the support of the 
CI at Santo Tomas University. It is situated at the Instituto Chile Asia Pacífico133 in 
Valdivia. Students carry out studies of Mandarin Chinese, take the HSK exam, apply for 
scholarships, among other activities (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015a). 
Another Classroom was created at the Colegio Yangtsé. The school “has been sponsored 
by the Chinese Embassy since 1987” (ChinaCulture, 2015). Chinese is taught there from 
age 5 to 13,134 as a supplementary class and in combination with cultural activities. Only 
the school´s name is Chinese, and it cannot be considered bilingual (Marcela Rojas 
Cantillana, school director, personal communication, November 11, 2013). 
 
As could be seen in the previous paragraphs, the Chilean government encourages 
Mandarin Chinese learning. Another example is the program “Conoce y emprende con 
                                                 
XXI”. 
131 See Working Paper I, Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14 for examples of schools in Chile that are 
teaching Mandarin Chinese (2005-2014), they were 18 in total in 2014. 
132 First mentioned in the second chapter of this study, segment 2.1.1, “Confucius Institutes". 
133 Chile Asia-Pacific Institute. 
134 Classes are provided up to 8th grade in the Chilean educational system. 
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China” (roughly meaning “learn about and embark on a journey/innovate with China” 
(own translation) ), launched by the Instituto Nacional de Juventud in cooperation with 
Corporación Cruzando el Pacífico (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2015b). 
The program offered scholarships from 2014 until November 2015, for online and on-site 
Chinese culture and language courses (Biblioteca del Congreso Nacional de Chile, 2014).  
 
The “Programa Idiomas Abren Puertas”135 by the Ministry of Education, seeks to further 
Chinese language teaching in schools throughout the country. It supports the goal of 
making that language part of the standard curriculum of schools (Working Paper I, 
Seminar bilateral cooperation, 27.05.14).  
 
South Korean language teaching is mostly carried out by the SI and at private academies, 
or online. There are no “Sejong Classrooms”, yet, but there is at least one Korean school 
in the country that teaches Korean on a first or second language basis. Finding 
Information about the school is difficult, since it can only be accessed through social 
media, or via its website in Korean (Colegio Coreano en Chile (칠레한국한글학교), n.d.).  
 
South Korean soft power in the educational sector is surpassed by the Chinese one, a fact 
that is on the one hand related to historical factors. China has simply been present for a 
longer time. On the other hand, Chinese studies have proliferated due to the country´s 
position as an international emerging power and due to Chile´s economic interests 
towards it. Yet, in both cases there is a lack of infrastructure, which would enable both 
East Asian countries to better expand their soft power resources. Measuring the role of 
educational programs and of schools facilitates the analysis of how lack of soft power 
could be tackled through more programs financed either by the government (including 
the Chilean one) or through initiatives by the private sector.  
 
b. Media presence 
 
Media presence happens through a combination of efforts, sometimes by the state, by 
companies, via internet or through fans who strive to know more about the East Asian 
countries. Mouth-to-mouth propaganda by itself could not have promoted soft power in 
                                                 
135 Pprogram “Languages open doors”. 
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Chile, were it not for China´s and South Korea´s use of television, radio and internet 
resources.  
 
There has been a growing presence of K-dramas in Chilean television´s prime time slots. 
Chile is considered “one of the main Latin American countries where Korean soap operas 
have flourished since early on” (Limb, 2013). The collaboration between channels KBS 
and TVN136 (Embajada de Chile en Corea del Sur, n.d.), created an early institutional 
basis for media exchange between the South American and the East Asian country.  
 
Cable and private channels are now periodically showing K-dramas. Examples are Vía X 
(Limb, 2013) and Mega, which showed Boys over Flowers (Ortiz, 2014 and Molina, C.A., 
2012). ETC TV has included K-dramas (Brilliant Legacy), alongside a wide spectrum of 
Japanese programs (Molina, 2013 and ANMTV, 2013). Additionally, Korean broadcasts 
such as Arirang TV, can be watched in Chile through service provider GTD Manaquehue; 
other providers in Latin America that show Arirang TV are in Argentina and Brazil (Yang, 
2012b, p. 44).  
 
K-dramas are offered prime-time slots due to two factors: the general openness of 
Chileans towards other cultures (Juan M., 26.05.14 and Javiera F., 14.05.14) and the fact 
that South Korea has managed to create an international appeal which is attracting 
Chileans, for example due to the absence of violence in K-dramas (Karina P., 19.05.14).  
 
K-Pop radio broadcasts in Latin America are first and foremost online initiatives. China 
Radio International and KBS World have Spanish language channels. The former 
transmits completely in Spanish (China Radio International Online en español, n.d.), 
while KBS World uses the same channel for different languages. Kpop Replay is an 
online radio station that reports about Korean celebrities, but also plays J-Pop and theme 
songs from anime series (Kpop Replay n.d) The station began transmitting in 2015, and 
was created by Korean culture experts in Chile (Kpop Replay, Facebook message, 
personal communication, January 21, 2016). 
 
Online radio is connected to the analysis of how the Korean Wave has reached other 
                                                 
136 Televisión Nacional de Chile. 
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world regions, including Latin America, through social media, apps (Instagram, Kakao, 
Line, VApp, etc.), YouTube, blogs created by fans, and drama sites. Having access to the 
newest K-Pop news, drama videos and Instagram accounts of Korean singers gives fans 
a sense of empowerment and of closeness that cannot be achieved through events or 
language schools alone. This situation could be compared to how Japanese culture 
influenced generations through anime and mangas. According to Juan Masón, Japan was 
actually the opening door for Korea to enter Chile. Anime became too mainstream for 
some fans, so they decided to search for something new, which is how their preferences 
changed towards Korean culture (Juan M., 26.05.14).  
 
Chinese soft power has underestimated online presence and the possibility it offers to 
nurture soft power in ways that language or culture courses by themselves could not. One 
possible explanation to why China has been reticent or insecure about promoting its brand 
online, is strong governmental control over contents generated online. Chinese movies 
and documentaries might appeal to an older generation or at least to people more 
interested in traditional culture (Fiona C., 15.05.14). Notwithstanding, Chinese and 
Taiwanese dramas are beginning to appear in Chilean television. Cable channel Vía X, 
for example, has been showing Happy Noodle (mainland China) and Office Girls 
(Taiwan) as part of its program (Vía X, 2014a and Vía X, 2015). 
 
One publication from 2014, “Películas ‘estrenadas’ por año distribuidas por procedencia 
y nacionalidad: Periodo 2001-2013”, by the Chilean government, lists the countries of 
origin of movies shown in Chile´s cinemas in the years 2001-2013 (Consejo Nacional de 
la Cultura y las Artes, 2014). It sheds some light on Chinese and South Korean presence 
in Hollywood-dominated Chilean movie theaters. From 2001 to 2013, the number of East 
Asian movies shown was as follows: in 2001 there were three Hong Kong movies and 
one Taiwanese, in 2002 one Chinese, in 2003 one South Korean, in 2004 two Chinese 
and one South Korean, in 2005 three Chinese and two South Korean, in 2006 two South 
Korean and two from Hong Kong, inn 2007 two Chinese and two Korean, in 2008 one 
Chinese and one Hong Kong movie, in 2009 one Korean, in 2011, no East Asian movies 
were shown, in 2012 and in 2013 one Japanese movie per year was shown (Consejo 
Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes, 2014).  
 
In summary, Chinese movies (including Hong Kong) dominate the Asian movie scene in 
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Chile. Successful ones were for example: Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Hero 
(Consejo Nacional de la Cultura y las Artes, 2014). Finding South Korean movies in local 
theaters is not easy. An explanation might be that fans watch them online or at film 
festivals, download or buy them at Recoleta.137  
 
Since soft power´s goal is to reach local audiences and to attract them towards a specific 
culture, and by extension country, being present in media, and especially, being able to 
compete with, for example the USA or local programs, means achieving exactly that. 
Thus, measuring media as an indicator, and establishing how competitive a country´s 
brand is and where it is lacking, enables a deeper analysis of how soft power can be 
directed, so that it will grow in the future.  
 
What does media presence reflect about the rise of China and South Korea in Chile? 
China´s role in the media landscape is not remarkable, except for having an advantage 
within the movie market and that can be taken away by South Korea, or by other countries 
that now how to position themselves through media. As can be seen from South Korea´s 
dominating cultural soft power in television, radio and internet, the country has used the 
tools at its disposition and achieved an online and offline presence, which guarantees that 
its soft power is received locally.  
 
c. South Korean and Chinese companies 
 
The reputation of a country´s companies is an indicator of how that same country is being 
branded internationally. This is especially the case when companies are deeply associated 
with one country´s government, which is financing them and which is at the same time 
controlling soft power. South Korean and Chinese companies, most of them financed by 
the corresponding governments (M.W., 14.05.14), participate in disseminating both 
countries´ cultural soft power in Chile.  
 
Companies are active actors in cultural soft power, where they can either play a passive 
role, or create their own content. As was mentioned in the previous chapter, cultural 
appeal can turn into an interest in other products (spillover and cross-promotion). That 
                                                 
137 Korean and Chinese dominated area of Santiago. 
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connection can be facilitated by already known brand names.  
 
By using publicity and marketing strategies, on- and offline, these companies position 
their brands locally. One example of an event sponsored by LG was Chile´s K-Pop 
festival in 2012, in which several K-Pop artists participated. The company previously 
created a contest for Chilean K-Pop fans to take part in and to win VIP tickets to the main 
event (LG Chile, 2012). Companies profit from Hallyu (Leong, 2014) and so does soft 
power because being a part of the wave may attract fans and others who want to buy their 
products after, for example, seeing them in K-dramas. South Korea´s cultural soft power 
is being directly affected by the branding of its companies, they are active actors and 
catalyzers and create a spillover effect towards the economic (soft) power, on which the 
East Asian country can also count.  
 
China´s companies have only recently begun creating their own branding. Consequently, 
names such as Lenovo, Huawei or ZTE are not always recognized as Chinese or do not 
enjoy the same product placement success that Korean ones do.138 Even though China 
does not need culture to rise, branding its own companies by creating an association to 
the country´s tradition and culture directly affects cultural soft power and would help the 
country move away from being a purely economic soft power.  
 
d. Summary 
 
This last benchmark about Chinese and South Korean soft power in the form of mixed 
governmental and private efforts accentuated both East Asian countries´ rise in Chile.  
 
China is more present within the educational, national and regional research sector than 
South Korea is, a fact that confirms the former country´s status as Chile´s closest 
economic as well as commercial partner. Having that commercial power has led to the 
growth of Chinese study programs and research centers, which is why the country does 
not need more soft power initiatives, besides efforts by Hanban. South Korea could, for 
example, promote its worldwide leadership in education as part of its soft power arsenal 
(Kim, 2012c, p. 550), for the local infrastructure to have an incentive to grow. 
                                                 
138 Due to the reputation of producing bad quality products that still accompanies China (Javiera F., 
14.05.14). 
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At schools, Chinese is considered as important as other international languages. The 
Chinese and Chilean governments finance Confucius Classrooms, as well as classes 
taught in public schools. The same way that Chinese economic relations with Chile 
influence the importance of Mandarin Chinese at an academic level, they also do at 
schools, where the language is sought after due to the possibilities that arise from learning 
more about the East Asian country. Korean is rarely a subject, which means that students 
have to continue searching for alternatives to learn the language 
 
When media is included as an indicator within the benchmark, the panorama changes. 
Here, South Korea dominates in television and internet presence, yet online access to 
Korean media might also keep Chilean moviegoers away from Korean movie screenings, 
which could explain why China is more present there. 
 
Even if that country does not dominate Chilean media, it will still have positioned itself 
in the South American country as an emerging power–but not through cultural soft power. 
The reason is economic attraction, which has propelled Chileans´ interest towards 
wanting to do business with China (Fiona C., 15.05.14 and Javiera F., 14.05.14). Mary 
Acosta states that many are not learning Chinese because of an interest in the country´s 
“movies or the Great Wall” (Mary A., 15.05.14, own translation), while in the Korean 
case, culture this is the main trigger (Mary A., 15.05.14).  
 
Finally, some Chinese and South Korean companies form part of the mix of actors that 
export soft power to Chile. Korean ones have been active in promoting soft power, 
collaborating with the government, sponsoring events, etc., which would allow them to 
take advantage of the spillover effects of Hallyu. Chileans tend to know South Korean 
culture first, before turning their interest towards that country´s companies.  
 
Branding has not helped in the Chinese case, because not much is known locally about 
that country´s brands, although they are universally present. Simultaneously, companies 
such as Huawei and ZTE have found a growing market in Chile, from where they have 
participated in multiple business activities including internet, telephone and other modern 
technologies (Ellis, 2009, p. 40). People might just buy them because they are cheaper 
than their counterparts (Karina P., 19.05.14).  
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4.3 Conclusions drawn from the case study 
 
This chapter encompassed Chinese and South Korean soft power in Chile through three 
benchmarks: governmental, nongovernmental as well as mixed cultural soft power efforts 
present in the South American country. The purpose was to analyze the hypothesis that 
both East Asian countries have risen in Latin America due to soft power, and to 
operationalize that concept.  
 
South Korea has risen through cultural soft power in Chile. Its efforts in that area have 
kept growing, despite being at a disadvantage due to China´s powerful position and its 
history of cultural contacts with Chile. Hallyu has been the main stimulus for that growth. 
The country has created a modern cultural phenomenon that attracts people to it, as has 
happened with Korean products that are being sold in Chile and which have benefitted 
Korean communities who have been carrying out more commercial activities.  
 
South Korean culture is reaching Chilean population through mouth-to-mouth 
propaganda, a very strong online presence as well as flexibility within the government´s 
cultural sector. The former acts as an intermediary but not necessarily as a regulator. 
Through Hallyu, South Korean commercial and cultural foreign policy have started to 
intertwine. For instance, South Korean companies (chaebols) have benefitted from a 
spillover effect created by it. Due to its cultural rise, even if South Korea became 
economically stronger or weaker this would not cause as much harm to its presence as 
the possible weakening or disappearance of the Korean Wave. 
 
China has not risen through cultural soft power in Chile, especially because commercial 
activities represent its main foreign policy tool there. Besides being an emerging power 
and a regional power in its own region, China´s reputation surpasses the foreign policy it 
carries out. Chileans are being attracted by its economic strength as well as its constant 
growth (Verónica N., 03.06.14, Karina P., 19.05.14 and Javiera F., 14.05.14). The 
Chinese economy has become a soft power tool that doesn´t depend on cultural or other 
soft power elements. 
 
This type of economic soft power has not been included in the country´s soft power efforts, 
which have been culturally-biased, despite it having been stated that “in the conceptual 
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development of ‘soft power’ in China, economic relations appeared as part of scenarios 
of understanding” (Reyes Matta, 2012, p. 199, own translation). Researching if China has 
purposely created a strategy for expanding its economic soft power is a task that cannot 
be achieved within this research. According to the arguments mentioned and to the 
sources consulted, it has been a byproduct rather than the intended outcome.  
 
An important consideration for the future is the sustainability of China´s (unintended) 
economic soft power, should the country´s international strength weaken, together with 
its reputation and negotiating abilities as an economic giant. On the one hand, cultural 
soft power may stay the same, but economic soft power will eventually be affected. On 
the other hand, a shrinking economic soft power might affect cultural soft power which, 
if less governmental resources are available, will begin its downward turn.  
 
Nye´s differentiation of hard, soft or smart power is not sufficient to explain if and how 
China is attracting through economy, rather than through culture. His categories remain 
limited to political systems, ideology and culture. In more recent literature, the author 
states that economic success could influence Chinese soft power, the same way cultural 
factors do, but when analyzing China´s power resources, he lists economic separately 
from soft power (Nye, 2015, pp. 48-62, p. 69 and p. 83). In summary, his theory alone is 
not able to explain where economic power fits into. This study concludes that the same 
power enabled China´s rise in Latin America, and can thus be considered soft power. 
 
Nye mentions in his texts that cultural distance makes it more difficult for soft power to 
impact. This does not affect either China or South Korea. The former has not had to 
impact through culture. The latter has reached younger generations, which are more open 
to other cultures, and adults who have been captivated by Korean content on TV. People 
have felt attracted to that country, even if the culture is different.  
 
Why Chinese modern cultural soft power is not achieving the same results as the Korean 
one relates, according to Fernando Reyes Matta, less to China´s “Asian” culture or 
difficult language, but more to the lack of innovation and creativity that persists in the 
cultural sector. Only when the government notices that there could be an economic benefit, 
for example from the popularity of Chinese art, it does offer its support (Fernando R.M., 
16.05.14).  
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Transferability of the case study to the subcontinent 
 
The analysis of the case study Chile is representative for Latin America, even though the 
country´s relations with China and South Korea might seem unique. There are so many 
nations in the subcontinent, such as Mexico which opposes Chinese commercial activities, 
Venezuela, which depends on Chinese aid, and Peru, with much cultural presence from 
both East Asian countries, yet, if one considers the categories established in the second 
and third chapter, China and South Korea have emerged in the whole subcontinent. The 
third chapter also demonstrated that they have not done so through hard power. 
 
Accordingly, the goal of the fourth chapter was how to measure the soft power, to support 
those previous statements. That was done through the benchmarks within the case study. 
The same categories can be used for other Latin American countries. Different 
conclusions might be reached, for example that China has emerged through diplomatic 
soft power, or that South Korea has emerged through economic soft power, but the 
exemplary use of Chile as a case study is not affected by that.  
 
This specific case study can also be applied to other countries with a similar international 
positioning to evaluate the impact of soft power in them. Equally, it sheds light on how 
and if a country, which is neither a great power nor an emerging international power 
(South Korea) can emerge through culture. Consequently, the study broadens the analysis 
that exists about soft power, which has so far been limited to strong countries and shows 
that soft power can be useful for any country that wishes to change its international 
position.  
 
The last chapter will condense previous conclusions, while focusing on the research 
question and hypothesis.  
 
5. Conclusions and outlook 
 
The research question of this study was if soft power enabled China and South Korea to 
position themselves as emerging powers in Latin America. The hypothesis was that soft 
power policy is a strategic foreign policy that enables both countries to do so. Research 
goals were to conceptionalize and operationalize the concept of soft power and to further 
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define the concept of emerging powers. 
 
The first chapter started with an analysis of the current state of research and the definition 
of concepts such as emerging powers, middle powers, soft and hard power. It also 
included the methodology used, the explanation of the theory of complex interdependence 
and stated the research goals, as well as the units of analysis.  
 
In the second chapter, China and South Korea were presented as actors within their own 
region, East Asia. It was crucial to first show how soft power tools have been used there 
and how both countries have positioned themselves as emerging, middle or regional 
powers, before the third chapter continued with an analysis of Latin America and a 
comparison between both regions.  
 
The second and third chapter both focused on: soft power strategies, e.g., inaugurating 
language and cultural institutes, the role of governmental and online presence (Velarde, 
2015, pp. 45-46) play within soft power, how a country can implement its resources, 
economic factors that impact on cultural soft power, hard and smart power strategies that 
complement soft power and the different elements that the term “cultural soft power” 
builds upon.  
 
The fourth chapter focused on the case study within Latin America, through which it was 
possible to finish the conceptualization and the operationalization of soft power and to 
further the definition of emerging powers. Chile was presented as a meaningful partner 
for both China and South Korea. Afterwards, the chapter was divided into benchmarks 
and indicators. First, there was official cultural soft power with its indicators: treaties, and 
MOUs governmental cultural presence and cultural events organized by the government. 
The second benchmark was non-governmental cultural soft power with its indicators: 
immigration, cultural institutions and cultural events. The third benchmark analyzed the 
combination of both types of soft power. Indicators were: education, 139  media, and 
companies. The benchmarks and indicators were weighted equally.  
 
                                                 
139 Universities, research centers and schools. 
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This chapter will summarize all research results, goals, the corresponding hypothesis and 
research question. It will also highlight topics that can serve as an input for further 
research endeavors, beyond this study.  
Conceptionalization and operationalization of soft power 
Some aspects of soft power have not been thoroughly discussed or analyzed, neither in 
Nye´s own definition of the concept, nor in the work of other authors, which makes it 
difficult for it to be conceptualized and operationalized. Since that foreign policy tool 
includes several elements, not all notions can be easily defined. How can the word 
“culture” be interpreted? How do other variables such as economic power impact on soft 
power growth? What is attraction?  
One of the first aspects that I tackled was Nye´s assumption that only great powers can 
deploy soft power effectively. Even when mentioning China, the author considers that 
this type of country cannot challenge the US. His soft power approach is Western biased, 
which is why small power and middle powers are almost entirety left out from analysis. 
Additionally, there is no mention of how smaller countries could take advantage of the 
resources they have to become stronger or of how to use their existing soft power. This 
study showed that middle powers such as South Korea can deploy their soft power 
strategically, and that a country does not have to be a great power, or to be a Western 
power, to emerge. 
Nye also affirms that “popular culture is more likely to attract people and produce soft 
power in the sense of preferred outcomes in situations where cultures are somewhat 
similar rather than widely dissimilar” (Nye, 2004a, p. 16). The study proves that China 
and South Korea have created soft power in Latin America, while not sharing many 
cultural similarities with the subcontinent. The impact of US cultural soft power in several 
world regions also highlights how a country with a completely different culture 140 
dominates in diverse contexts. 
At the same time, China´s and South Korea´s rise in East Asia could be used as an 
argument that supports Nye´s hypothesis. For instance, Confucian, Buddhist and other 
values resemble those in South Korea´s immediate neighborhood and surrounding region, 
which would explain the success Hallyu has had. Yet, this argument is no longer valid 
                                                 
140 At least at the beginning of the Americanization process. 
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when observing Latin American culture. This means that smaller countries, with 
completely different cultures can also have a regional and international impact. As a 
matter of fact, Asianness, cultural diversity, an “exotic” feel, along with curiosity, and 
other elements that surround Chinese and South Korean culture have been determining 
factors for the attraction that both countries have generated. Of course, there also exists 
the possibility that Korea´s K-pop´s similarities with US music, e.g., hip-hop have been 
the elements creating attraction in Latin America.  
 
A third important aspect of Nye´s analysis is that the fails to clearly differentiate between 
hard and soft power. Calling the combination of both concepts “smart power” does not 
change the fact that hard power can be soft, and that soft power can be hard. Countless 
combinations of tools and policies exist in between both tools. If soft power means 
attraction, then military power, too, is soft. Chinese actions for instance, represent soft 
power in Latin America, but at times hard power in East Asia. Culture can also be 
perceived as hard or as soft, as this study showed. Korean cultural presence might be 
perceived as a threat in East Asia, and therefore as hard power, but not in Latin America, 
where Korean culture is considered soft power. Thus, the differentiation of both types of 
power cannot be established by the government or by authors beforehand, local 
perception is the determining factor.  
 
Nye´s research reflects his stance on the role of governments that export soft power. 
According to him, the US created soft power by turning Coca Cola and Hollywood into 
international “brands”; the aforesaid aspect relates to nation branding being described as 
entirely under government control. As could be seen in this study, China´s cultural soft 
power, as intended by the government, does not convert into actual cultural soft power 
that enables China to rise in Latin America. The factor that has helped it rise, has been its 
economy. In the South Korean case, Hallyu may be supported by the government, but 
fans, social media and the internet have helped it grow further. Thus, in both cases, the 
government has not been able to control nation branding and soft power.  
An important hypothetical scenario to consider for China and South Korea would be one 
with less government support. As I concluded in the third chapter, China´s cultural soft 
power might not be able to remain the same in Latin America, and if government support 
diminishes, cultural soft power might not maintain itself. On the contrary, because the 
Korean Wave is self-sustaining, less government support would not diminish South 
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Korea´s soft power significantly.  
 
In summary, a crucial contribution by this study to the theory of IR is that it also takes 
into account how the foreign policy element is perceived. While I observe the outcomes, 
other authors trace the strategies behind them. Perception is fundamental as the perception 
of empathy leads towards attraction which, again, means more soft power. Essentially, 
the perception on the receiving side varies from region to region and from country to 
country. In East Asia, for example, China might be perceived as a threat when soft power 
is associated with political and economic pressure. That means, China´s foreign policy is 
perceived as hard and not as soft power. 
 
Defining emerging powers 
 
Emerging powers is a widely discussed concept within IR theory. Measuring power, and 
its variations, is difficult and so is deciding which country has “emerged” or is “emerging”. 
A consensus has been reached in literature (as discussed in the first chapter) that these 
countries rise through economic, diplomatic and political power. A cultural rise is almost 
completely left out from analysis. Furthermore, just those countries who are already 
strong are considered emerging. The realist perspective even excludes or neglects the 
possibility of a rise through soft power, even though, in a strict sense, diplomatic power 
can be soft and political power at the same time. 
 
Not much can be found in literature, especially from the US and Europe, about the rise 
(ergo emergence) of a country within a specific world region that is not its own. One 
example would be Brazil as a rising power in Africa or India as a rising power in Central 
America. This study also contributes to IR theory by exploring such a constellation, i.e. 
analyzing whether and how China and South Korea have risen in Latin America.  
 
It can be concluded that China has risen as an emerging power in Asia, having achieved 
the same status on an international level and in other regions, one of them being Latin 
America. Its growth has been such that the country has become a regional power in East 
Asia, and is starting to replicate that success in Latin America, where it is increasingly 
competing with the US and Brazil. China has not risen through cultural soft power, but 
rather through a byproduct of the economic hard/soft power mix it employs to achieve its 
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goals in its region and in Latin America. Cultural soft power is an accompanying catalyzer, 
not the main element. 
 
Cultural soft power is not needed for Chileans to become interested in China. Findings in 
Chile attest that interest in Chinese history, Chinese political system, Chinese 
developments, is scarce and unimportant as long as the economic strength can be felt in 
the South American country. What would happen if China´s economic strength declined? 
Would cultural soft power stay the same? Would economic soft power shrink at a quick 
pace? Recent developments and China´s faltering economy worldwide, in its own region 
and in Latin America, ensure that such questions remain relevant.141  
 
South Korea has become a middle power on an international level and an emerging power 
in Latin America. Its main strategy to position itself, in both world regions explored, has 
been a niche diplomatic approach as well as cultural soft power, with the Korean Wave 
being the main reason behind it. Cultural soft power has been implemented as part of its 
foreign policy, through governmental and non-governmental channels. Support for online 
presence is crucial, because it is Hallyu´s main channel of expansion into Chile and into 
Latin America in general, since results from soft power initiatives can be directly 
observed, and because internet facilitates, transmits and diversifies different types of 
contents. A conclusion drawn from the case study is that Hallyu keeps growing without 
requiring neither guidance nor government support.  
 
To overcome its middle power status in Latin America, a feat difficult to achieve in its 
own region, South Korea has implemented policies that can help it connect cultural and 
other factors. The country´s chaebols are examples of bridges that create liaisons between 
culture and economic strength. Korea can serve as an example for growth, it can also 
cooperate with other middle powers in Latin America, i.e., the case study Chile. 
Compared to China, a reduction in economic strength may not be perceived immediately, 
but less cultural presence will -especially in the long run- as its attraction is based on 
cultural rather than economic factors. If culture fails, economic attraction may too.  
 
                                                 
141 See for example an article from 2016, called “The Effect of China’s Slowdown in Latin America” which 
analyzes how China´s growth process has been and how its relation to Latin America might change, because 
of its economic slowdown (Gonzalez-Perez, 2016).  
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Research question and goals 
 
Finally, the answer to the research question is: Soft power has enabled China and South 
Korea to position themselves as emerging powers in Latin America. Yet, only South 
Korea has risen through the deployment of cultural soft power while China´s rise has 
taken place through the attraction its economic strength creates and not by using cultural 
soft power as a strategic tool. 
 
The sub goal was achieved as the concept of emerging powers was further conceptualized, 
for example by showing that one country can rise through culture (South Korea) and that 
countries can rise in regions besides their own, which means that they can be a middle 
power in one region and emerging powers in the other one.  
 
The main goal of operationalizing the concept of soft power was obtained as the Chilean 
case demonstrated how cultural soft power can be analyzed by filtering it through several 
benchmarks and interpreted through indicators, how statistical data along with qualitative 
analysis can be combined and how comparisons can be made of two actors within a third 
state.  
 
The conceptualization of soft power was further specified. The elements that it consists 
of and that were ambiguous, were described and analyzed throughout the research, for 
example by showing that soft power does not necessarily benefit from the cultural 
closeness between two countries, that hard and soft power cannot be differentiated by 
“carrot” and “stick” categories, governments do not have complete control over soft 
power, and a foreign policy that is perceived as soft, is soft power as it fulfills its goal to 
create that type of attraction.  
 
The main result from this study is that soft power and what it achieves lies on the eye of 
the beholder — the country — that is on the receiving end. If the population of country 
A perceives B´s military exercises as soft, then that is soft power. If, instead, the people 
from country A perceive C´s ideology as hard (for example as repressive), then that is 
hard and not soft power. If China´s attraction is created through economic strength, then 
China has used economic soft power, if South Korea attracts through the Korean Wave 
and its culture, then South Korea has used cultural soft power.  
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